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Abstract 
An insight moment is defined as a sudden new idea, understanding or solution 
to a problem accompanied by an Aha experience. Typically researchers have 
described this experience in terms of positive emotions, with a recent shift in focus 
from purely cognitive aspects to explore the phenomenology of insight. Taking such 
an approach, this thesis firstly identifies that the historical research focus on 
cognitive, experimental methods in the study of insight may have led to an 
incomplete definition. A series of qualitative studies were therefore undertaken to 
characterise everyday experience of insight.  
Firstly an online questionnaire collected 76 open, qualitative descriptions of 
everyday insight moments. These were analysed by an adapted qualitative method, 
Integrative Thematic Analysis (ITA); developed within this thesis to minimise the 
effects of researcher subjectivity bias. Results identified a typology of insight, with 
themes describing the Process (Time Away, Active Search, Social Facilitation), 
Content (Intellectual, Practical, Personal) and Feeling (Positive and Negative) 
aspects of insight. These findings represent the documentation of negative insight in 
research for the first time. A follow up study using the same methodology was then 
conducted to specifically record everyday experiences of negative insight. ITA and 
Deductive Content Analysis were performed on the 67 insight descriptions collected. 
Findings suggest a functional role of everyday negative insight as a problem finding 
process, which is not recognized in current definitions of insight framed as a positive 
event. As a result, this thesis proposes the development of an updated definition of 
the insight moment for further experimental testing as: 
A sudden new understanding, realisation or idea that is 
accompanied by a positive feeling Aha moment, or negative feeling 
Uh-oh moment. 
A third qualitative study was then conducted to record everyday insight 
moments in real-time, using a diary methodology and event contingent sampling in a 
focused sample of 11 participants. This aimed to explore the prevalence of insight in 
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in real-time in everyday life for the first time. Follow-up semi-structured interviews 
with participants were then conducted that intended to enable rich accounts of their 
insight experiences. Insight moments were shown to be rare, with few reports made 
during the participants' week of recording. This corresponds with researchers 
expectations in terms of prevalence but was shown to contrast to the participants 
who were surprised by how few insights they experienced. Furthermore, the de-brief 
interviews identified some participants who reported never experiencing insight, 
corroborating other recent research suggesting that the insight moment might not be 
a universal experience. ITA identified themes, including Individual Differences in 
insight, where participants suggested that differences in factors such as trait 
emotionality may affect how people experience insight. 
The emotional aspects of insight identified from the qualitative studies were 
then explored in two laboratory-based experiments. Psychological and physiological 
aspects implicated in previous insight and emotion research were measured 
including: emotional expressivity (Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire), interoceptive 
accuracy (Heart Beat Counting [HBC] task) and heart rate [HR]. In Study 4, 79 
participants completed Compound Remote Associates, an established problem 
solving task that elicits positive insight and search experiences. No relationship was 
seen between emotional expressivity or heart beat counting accuracy and 
performance (proportion of insight and search reported) on the CRA. Different HR 
changes were shown between insight and search trials, with decreased deceleration 
in insight. A biphasic HR change response was seen for both solving types that was 
congruent to HR changes shown in previous research in response to emotional 
stimuli. 
Study 5, then aimed to explore the same measures using a problem solving 
task that in addition, elicited negative insight. In order to do this, a novel paradigm 
was developed, using Connect 4 as a naturalistic problem solving task. This was 
demonstrated to elicit the full range of problem solving experiences, positive and 
negative, insight and search in a sample of 80 participants. No associations were 
seen between solving performance and emotional expressivity or heart beat counting 
accuracy. HR change patterns seen in Study 4 were replicated, with greater HR 
decreases for search compared to insight trials, although evidence was less clear in 
terms of the biphasic response. 
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The utility of Connect 4 as a naturalistic problem solving task was 
demonstrated by Study 5, however limitations in the computer-based version of the 
game developed in this thesis were also identified. As such, future research is 
recommended with an improved version Connect 4 to enable more robust 
conclusions to be drawn. In addition, the limitations of the proportion of insight, a 
problem solving performance measure, were also highlighted. Therefore, future work 
to better validate this measure in laboratory based tasks, and in relation to everyday 
insight experience are proposed. 
The findings in this thesis are discussed in terms of wider impact, in relation to 
applied fields beyond academic study. For example, in Counselling Psychology 
where insight is seen as a central process in therapeutic change, there are 
implications in terms of individuals who do not report having insight. Furthermore, 
everyday creativity including experiencing insight has been demonstrated elsewhere 
to relate to flourishing and wellbeing, with this research offering corroboration in 
terms of the positive experiences reported in relation to insight. 
This thesis contributes to our knowledge in first offering an updated and 
ecologically validated definition of insight. Furthermore it highlights the role of 
emotion in insight experience and corroborates the phenomenological approach that 
is now being seen in insight research. Finally, it identifies a possible somatic marker 
in HR, to distinguish insight and search solving. In addition, novel methods of 
qualitative analysis (ITA) and a naturalistic experimental problem solving (Connect 4) 
have been developed.  
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1 Literature Review 
This programme of research aims to explore the naturalistic experience of 
insight. It will firstly focus on every day experience of insight to clarify if and how the 
definitions of insight used in creativity research relate to those seen in daily life. A 
second aim is to expand definitions that focus on insight as a positive, solution 
moment to incorporate negative insight experience. Finally the role of biology, 
drawing from problem solving and emotion research in relation to positive and 
negative insight will be explored. 
1.1 Approaches and definitions in the study of insight.. 
 Origins of research into creativity and insight. 
The often cited catalyst for psychologists' interest in creativity is 
Guildford's1950 APA presidential address, through which he highlighted the 
"appalling" (p. 34) lack of research into this area at that time. Reviewing Guildford's 
(1950) speech provides many interesting correspondences to the contents of this 
thesis that will be highlighted in the following overview. 
Firstly, and perhaps key is the relationship between creativity and insight. 
While Guildford (1950) bemoaned the general paucity of creativity research, he 
highlighted the close association between creativity and insight. Outlining an early 
stage model of creative problem solving processes (Wallas, 1926) that identifies 
insight as one of its four stages. Section 1.1.3.1, below charts this model and its 
relationship to historical and contemporary perspectives, notably early Gestalt 
research from which frequent reference is drawn by Guildford (1950).  
A second notable reference is made by Guildford (1950) to creativity in 
everyday life. He highlights that empirically developed conceptions and measures of 
creativity would need to be related back to people's behaviour in their daily lives in 
order to demonstrate validity. Furthermore asserting that creativity should be 
considered in the full range of a population, not just eminent creatives. Section 1.1.2 
below (and also 2.4.4.3) will outline how this may have been seen for creativity, but 
has been overlooked with respect to insight. 
Throughout his address, Guildford (1950) takes an individual differences 
perspective reflecting his research focus on psychometrics and the argument he was 
making to look beyond intelligence traits towards those representing creativity. 
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Below, this chapter will explore how an individual differences perspective in insight 
has very much taken a back seat to the search for cognitive processing explanations 
of insight (described in section 1.1.4). In particular, the case for exploring emotion 
and insight will be made. This is not something that Guildford (1950) explicitly 
discussed, however throughout his address are echoes of concepts that are 
arguably related to emotion, for example discussions of motivation and 
temperament. "Impressionability to the environment" (p. 42) that Guildford (1950) 
tentatively relates to curiosity could equally relate to individual differences in 
emotional experience. He further highlights how feelings of "unease" or "sensitivity" 
(p. 42) in some individuals might promote problem finding (whilst others are 
oblivious); this can be seen to be congruent to ideas proposed in this thesis of the 
existence of negative insight, outlined below in section 1.2. 
Guildford's (1950) address was before the 'cognitive revolution' and the 
subsequent development of neuroscience to complement psychological research 
and help explore the relationship between mind, body and brain. As such it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the final consideration of this thesis, exploring 
physiological (heart rate) aspects of insight, was not discussed by him. Section 1.2.5 
will outline the biological basis of insight, briefly focusing on neuroscience and 
psychophysiological approaches. 
 Creativity and Insight 
Definitions of creativity typically incorporate two aspects, that it produces 
something novel and useful (Kaufman and Sternberg, 2010). The novelty part of this 
definition is usually quite easy to determine, more debate revolves around the idea of 
utility that can be further expressed in terms of the quality of an idea and how useful 
it is. As highlighted above, Guildford (1950) advocated a research focus in 
psychology on creativity. Subsequent work has taken both an experimental 
approach, for example using laboratory based tests such as the Alternative Uses 
Task (1967) where scores of fluency, originality, flexibility and elaboration are given 
for participants' creative uses for everyday objects such as a brick. Taking on board 
Guildford's (1950) call for validation of creativity findings, general creativity in 
everyday life has also been explored. For example investigating the features and 
adaptive explanations for creativity in daily life and looking at the benefits of creativity 
at an individual and societal level (Richards, 2010). In contrast to general creative 
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behaviour in everyday life, much less research is seen specifically in relation to 
insight in everyday life. 
In terms of creativity theory, Wallas (1926) proposed a stage model of 
creative problem solving which can be seen as an early process model of creativity. 
He identified four stages of problem solving: preparation, incubation, illumination and 
evaluation. The preparation stage sees efforts to capture aspects relevant to the 
problem, incubation is seen as an unconscious process where the work continues on 
the problem while an individual is engaged in other, unrelated activities. The solution 
then appears back into consciousness through a moment of illumination or insight, 
with a final verification checking the solution is correct. This model has clear links to 
insight, which will be further discussed below in 1.1.3. 
However, other models of creative processes have since been proposed that 
can also be seen to relate to insight. For example, Runco and Chand (1995) 
suggested that there are three aspects involved with creative problem solving, 
problem finding, ideation and evaluation. The role of insight in this model is less 
explicit than in Wallas' (1926), with insight processes forming part of ideation, in the 
production of different candidate solutions to the problem. 
A final alternative way to compare creativity is as a developmental process. 
Kaufman and Beghetto (2009) expand on a distinction often made in creativity 
literature between eminent creative people and everyday creative acts such as 
painting or playing music. They highlighted that further distinctions be made, 
identifying a progression from one type of creativity to another. As such the final 
stage of this can be seen as the Big-C of eminent creativity. However not everyone 
reaches such recognition, but never the less engages in high levels of creativity 
perhaps in a professional basis where a certain level of expertise is assumed, this is 
categorised as Pro-C. The everyday creativity, recognised as such by others would 
therefore be seen as non-expert creativity, so the painters and musicians who show 
little-c creativity. However, in addition Kaufman and Beghetto [2009] propose a more 
personal level of creativity where activities are new and useful to an individual, so-
called intrapersonal insight, in which the first level of creativity is seen, labelled mini-
c. Further discussion regarding this model in relation to insight can be seen in 
section 2.4.4.3.  
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 Historical Study of Insight: Gestalt Psychology 
 Insight solving: beyond learning explanations. 
Early studies of insight were undertaken by Gestalt psychologists such as 
Kohler (1925), Maier (1931) and Duncker (1945). These focused on the restructuring 
element of insight and were seen to support the notion that perception of the Gestalt 
or more accurately, changes to this perception are necessary to enable an insight. 
This provided a challenge to the predominant American behaviourist approach that 
argued any behaviour could be exclusively explained through learning and 
conditioning processes. As such, Gestalt and neo-Gestalt (e.g. Ohlsson, 2011; 
Perkins, 2000) psychologists posited that insight (as part of creative thinking or 
problem solving) was a special process distinct from analytic thinking that relied on 
trial and error, learning-based processes. 
This original distinction between insight and learning-based explanations was 
described by Wertheimer (1959) as productive versus reproductive thinking 
(Cunningham and MacGregor, 2016). With reproductive thinking being a problem 
solved by 'reproducing' previously learnt or habitual behaviour. Whilst productive 
thinking requires something more in its explanation than previous learnt behaviour. 
That 'something', the Gestalt psychologists argued was insight (Dominowski & 
Dallob, 1995). Recent research has adopted this distinction to propose a series of 
behaviours that are self-rated and give an indication of an individual's tendency to 
use productive or reproductive thinking (Cunningham & MacGregor, 2016, 2013). 
Cunningham and MacGregor's (2016) approach sees productive thinking as 
analogous with insight. 
However, another common distinction is made in research is between insight 
and search (interchangeably referred to as search or non-insight solving) (Bowden 
and Jung-Beeman, 2003a; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). In this paradigm, participants 
are typically presented with word association problems (a variation on Mednick's 
(1968) Remote Associates Test (RAT) called the Compound Remote Associates 
(CRA) task (Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003b)) where they find a single word 
which forms a compound word or phrase with each of the three presented. For 
example the solution when presented with river, note and account, is bank. 
Participants then rate their solving experience indicating whether they were solved 
by insight or non-insight, search-type processes using what was subsequently 
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labelled feeling-of-insight ratings (Jarosz, Colflesh and Wiley, 2012). Bowden and 
Jung-Beeman (2003a) used a seven point rating scale to measure the degree that 
their participants felt a problem was insightfully solved, while Jung-Beeman et al. 
(2004) presented a two alternative forced choice (2AFC) response of insight versus 
non-insight solution. Subsequent research has adopted both approaches dependent 
on the type of comparisons being made (for examples of use see Danek et al. 
2014a; Jarosz, Colflesh and Wiley, 2012; Subramaniam et al., 2009). 
However, CRA solutions can be seen as being novel in the sense that they 
are solutions to a problem that is unlikely participants have faced before, as such 
both types of solving (insight or search) that the task elicits are examples of 
productive thinking. Search in the CRA paradigm is in the main defined as an 
experience that is not insight. The definition of insight commonly offered being: 
A feeling of insight is a kind of ‘Aha!’ characterized by suddenness and 
obviousness. You may not be sure how you came up with the answer, but 
are relatively confident that it is correct without having to mentally check it. 
It is as though the answer came into mind all at once—when you first 
thought of the word, you simply knew it was the answer. This feeling does 
not have to be overwhelming, but should resemble what was just 
described (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004, p. 0507). 
As such non-insight or search might be inferred as being a solution with no Aha, that 
was not sudden or obvious, with a conscious perception of the process by which it 
was reached. This is different from reproductive thinking where the solution is 
derived from habit or a purely learned response. This demonstrates how different 
researchers are using different definitions of insight in their work. 
The word association studies described above enable with-in participant 
comparisons of insight to non-insight problem solving over many trials and so have 
the potential to provide data enabling more powerful statistical analysis of aspects 
related to insight (Bowden et al., 2005). Additionally these types of problems lend 
themselves to being used in neuro-imaging studies as they can be conducted using 
display screens and eliciting verbal responses and button presses from participants 
without the need for extensive movement or physical action (Bowden and Jung-
Beeman, 2003a; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Subramaniam et al., 2009). Taking this 
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approach, the definition of insight relies on the requirement for a solution to be 
judged sudden and unexpected and accompanied by an Aha moment. This definition 
focuses on the phenomenological experience of the problem solver and neglects 
process aspects that will now be discussed. 
 Re-Structuring and Fixation in Insight.  
The illumination stage of Wallas (1926) model is equivalent to the insight 
moment on which Gestalt psychologists focused (section 1.1.3). Many of the tasks 
that they used to elicit this moment of illumination form part of a classic collection of 
insight problems still adapted and used in research today. Maier's (1931) ‘two 
strings’ problem is one example. Two strings are suspended in a room at a distance 
where one cannot be reached while holding the other. The task is to tie the strings 
together. Also in the room are a chair and table on which there are a variety of 
objects, including some pliers. The solution is to use the pliers as a pendulum weight 
on one string, swinging it so it can be caught while holding the other string. Maier 
(1931) argued that this problem was difficult for people to solve due to a fixation on 
using the objects for their primary purpose, so the pliers are only considered to hold 
or cut things, not as a pendulum weight. In order to solve the problem a mental re-
structuring is necessary to imagine using the pliers in an unusual way. 
Duncker (1945) also highlighted the role of fixation (also termed set) in his 
candle problem. Participants were provided with a candle, box of matches and 
drawing pins and asked to attach the candle to the wall (cork board) so that it could 
be burnt without spilling wax on the table or floor (version used by Isen, Daubman 
and Nowicki, 1987). This again elicits a functional fixation as most participants see 
the box (either drawing pin or match box) as a container and discount it as a 
resource to solve the problem. The moment of insight occurs when they overcome 
this fixation and mentally re-structure to see the box's potential to be used as a 
platform, being attached to the wall by a pin and so hold the candle. 
A second insight problem proposed by Duncker (1945) was the tumour 
problem. In a hypothetical scenario given to a participant, a patient has an 
inoperable stomach tumour that needs a high dose of radiation to treat. However the 
dose necessary would also damage surrounding healthy tissue. Participants are 
asked to provide a solution to treat the patient's stomach tumour without damaging 
their healthy surrounding tissue. The solution is to use several lower powered 
31 
 
radiation sources around the body enabling a concentrated higher dose to be 
delivered at their targeted point of intersection on the tumour. It is suggested that this 
is difficult to imagine as many participants falsely believe that the radiation can only 
be delivered from one source (Gick and Holyoak, 1980). This is an example of 
fixation resulting from an initial misrepresentation, in this case a single source of 
radiation. 
These classic insight problems do not see comparisons between different 
types of solving, rather making the assumption that if an insight problem is solved, 
then insight occurred, and if it was not solved there was no insight. The 
characteristics of the problem, so the level of restructuring or fixation to be overcome 
defined it as an insight problem. 
 Insight and the Role of Experience 
Others however have argued that the Gestalt psychologist's assertion that an 
individual has experienced insight by virtue of solving an insight problem is flawed 
(Chu and MacGregor, 2011). It has been demonstrated that classic insight problems 
may not necessarily be solved by insight (Danek, Wiley & Öllinger, 2016; Davidson, 
1994; Webb, Little and Cropper, 2016). This suggests that insight should be defined 
by the individual's cognitive processes or experience rather than by the type of 
problem they solve. One example of this is the role of experience in solving insight 
problems. This has been explored in terms of it increasing an individual's likelihood 
of fixation and impeding problem solving and insight (for example Wiley, 1998). 
Conversely, experience has also been demonstrated to improve performance on 
insight tasks. 
Enhanced solving of Duncker's (1945) tumour problem (see section 1.1.3.2) 
was seen when participants had previously experienced an analogous problem and 
solution in a different context or domain. One such example is the Attack Dispersal 
story (Gick and Holyoak, 1980). In this scenario a General plans to invade a fortress. 
There are landmines on all the approaching roads that would detonate under the 
weight of the General's troop. The General resolves this problem by splitting the 
troop into smaller groups who use different access roads, safely passing over the 
mines (the smaller groups weigh less than the detonation threshold) and mounting a 
simultaneous attack on the fortress. The underlying strategy for this is analogous to 
the solution for the tumour problem. Both divide the attacking agent (troop of soldiers 
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or dose of radiation) to quantities below the trigger threshold that would cause an 
undesirable outcome. These converge on the target from different directions at the 
same time. Gick and Holyoak (1980) demonstrated that participants exposed to the 
Attack Dispersal Story (especially when a hint about its helpfulness were given) were 
more likely to solve the tumour problem. As such it was argued that experience of 
the fortress problem could aid insight in the tumour problem. This additionally 
highlights a weakness in the assumption that all insight problems are necessarily 
solved with insight, as experience may actually negate the need of an insight 
moment. 
 Role of Intuition in Insight Problem Solving.  
Metcalfe and Wiebe identified in 1987 that while the concept of insight 
mapped to common sense descriptions, there was little empirical evidence to 
support the notion of insight. They set about providing evidence in terms of self-
reported intuition as participants solved problems through insight and non-insight. 
Participants indicated how close to a solution they felt at regular intervals whilst 
solving classic insight and contrasting systematic, algebra based problems. For the 
algebra problems participants were generally shown to give gradual increasing 
'feeling of warmth' (FOW) ratings with time as they worked towards a solution. 
Conversely for the insight problems, no gradual increase was shown, with low FOW 
ratings given up until solution when a sudden jump was seen congruent with the 
insight moment. Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) suggested the participants' lack of 
intuition that they were close to an answer could be used to empirically identify and 
differentiate insightful from analytic problem solving. 
However, Metcalfe and Wieble's (1987) distinction was reliant on self-reported 
awareness of how close participants were to a solution. Maier (1931) demonstrated 
in his two strings experiment outlined above that there was a difference between 
participants reports of their problem solving experience and what actually happened. 
Participants who were unable to solve the problem were given an implicit hint by an 
experimenter brushing past one of the ropes and so causing it to swing. This group 
demonstrated enhanced solving of the problem in relation to others in a no hint 
condition, suggesting that the cue helped them solve the problem. However, none of 
the participants reported that this incident (the brushing of the rope) helped them 
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reach a solution. This presented early evidence of a disconnect between participant 
self-reports (such as FOW) and behavioural evidence. 
Bowers, Regher, Balthazard and Parker (1990) conducted a series of 
experiments to explore intuition in discovery. They firstly presented participants with 
two lists of three words. For one of the lists (the coherent list) there was a word 
which associated with the three words presented, participants were asked to detect 
the coherent list and give the common associated word. For trials where they were 
unable to give a solution, participants were asked to indicate which list was the 
coherent one. While participants reported that they were guessing, they selected the 
coherent list at above chance. A second study repeated the methodology employed 
using Gestalt Closure Figures (partial line drawings of familiar images such as a 
camel, see Figure 1.1) instead of word lists, The components of the Gestalt Closure 
Figure (coherent image, Figure 1.1a) were rearranged by artists to produce an 
incoherent yet "aesthetically pleasing" (Bowers et al., 1990, p. 82) image (see Figure 
1.1b). Similar to the effect seen with the word lists, for images that they could not 
name, participants were better (than chance) able to correctly identify which image 
was coherent. This again demonstrated that despite a lack of reported intuition, as 
participants felt they were guessing between the two images, something was 
enabling them to act intuitively.  In a final experiment participants were presented 
with a list of words for which they had to identify a solution word that associated to 
each of those on the list. If participants did not know the solution word they were 
asked to guess, and give a rating of certainty. An additional word was then added to 
the list and the process repeated until participants indicated they were certain they 
had the solution. The closeness of the words given through this process for a 
selection of the participants was rated by assessors blind to the nature of the study. 
It was demonstrated that the participants' responses gradually became more 
associated to the actual solution. Crucially, this was much sooner than the 
participants' indication that they had a hunch (so an increased rating of certainty). A 
similar convergence on the true solution word was seen in the guesses made for 
trials reported as insight, where no feelings of certainty were reported before the 
solution moment. In sum, this research suggests that while intuition may not be 
consciously reported in experimental problem solving, behavioural evidence 
supports a role of intuition in insight problem solving.    
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Figure 1.1 Example of coherent (A) and incoherent (B) images of a camel from 
Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task. Adapted from Intuition in the context of 
discovery by K.S. Bowers, G. Regehr, C Balthazard & K. Parker, 1990, 
Cognitive Psychology, (1), 72. Copyright 1990 by Elsevier. 
 
 
 Contemporary Theories of Insight 
 Representational Change Theory.  
The examples above can be seen to highlight the importance of re-structuring 
in insight. This forms the basis of a theory of insight proposed by Ohlsson (1992), the 
Representational Change Theory (RCT) which was later incorporated into a wider 
reaching Redistribution Theory (Ohlsson, 2011). This proposes that insight is 
contingent upon the presence of an impasse in problem solving from which the 
representation of the problem is re-structured (the terminology changes to 
redistributed in his later theory). Representation of a problem can be restructured in 
a number of ways: Ohlsson (1992) proposed mechanisms including elaboration and 
re-encoding which both operate on the initial representation of the problem. An 
example being in Duncker’s (1945) Candle Problem (see section 1.1.3.2) where the 
initial representation of the box as a container is re-encoded to see it as a platform. 
Constraint relaxation is another re-structuring process Ohlsson (1992) suggested, 
this operates on the representation of the goal rather than specific elements in the 
problem. An example of this can be seen in Figure 1.2 which shows the solution to 
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the six match problem (for example, Weisberg and Alba, 1981). Participants are 
asked to arrange six matches to make four equilateral triangles and not given any 
information about the form the solution takes. Ohlsson (1992) suggests that an 
impasse is caused by the problem solver's representation of the solution as two 
dimensional. The actual solution is to construct a three dimensional pyramid from the 
matches where each face forms an equilateral triangle. In this instance he argues 
that there needs to be a relaxation of the implicit constraint that the solution is two 
dimensional in order to break the impasse. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Solution to the 'Six Matches' problem 
 
 Criterion for Satisfactory Progress.  
Ohlsson’s (1992) RCT can be contrasted to another theory of insight, the 
Criterion for Satisfactory Progress (CSP) theory (formerly Progress Monitoring 
Theory, MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle, 2001; Chu and MacGregor, 2011). The 
focus of this explanation of insight is conscious cognitive processes, explaining 
impasse and re-structuring in terms of “lookahead” (MacGregor et al., 2001, p. 176) 
ability, the extent a problem solver plans their forward moves which therefore 
determines the point at which impasse will occur, with greater lookahead abilities 
enabling an individual to identify a potential impasse sooner, so begin a search for 
alternate solving strategies. Jones (2003) compared predictions made by both 
theories for the car park problem, an unlimited moves computer game where the 
object is to clear an exit path for a taxi in a car park by moving cars. Trials could be 
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set up requiring an insightful move (where the taxi was moved in addition to parked 
cars). He found support for both theories and suggested an integrated theory of 
insight where CSP explains the individual difference in when impasse occurs within 
the RCT model.  
 Role of Incubation in Impasse 
Sio and Ormerod (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of incubation studies in 
the context of general problem solving, though in practice the majority of studies 
incorporated in the analysis used problems identified above including classic Gestalt 
insight problems (section 1.1.3.2), RAT/CRA (section 1.1.3.1) and rebus problems. 
They identified aspects of insight which seem to affect problem solving performance 
including the time of attempted problem solving (preparation) and incubation, the 
presence or absence of misleading cues and the type of problem being solved. 
Additionally the type of activity undertaken during incubation was also suggested to 
impact. Curiously, the biggest positive impact on problem solving was seen for 
incubation tasks of low cognitive load, preferential to either a high load task or where 
no task was undertaken (generally participants were required to rest or do nothing). 
Baird et al. (2012) directly tested this finding, investigating the effects of different 
types of incubation periods on repeated (tested pre and post incubation) and novel 
(post incubation only) alternative uses tasks. Their findings corroborated Sio and 
Ormerod's (2009) assertion of the enhanced effect of mundane incubation tasks over 
a lack of, or more complex activity. They furthermore demonstrated that this 
enhancement was not shown for new post incubation tasks, eliminating a general 
post incubation task increase in creative thinking explanation for incubation effects.  
Different theories have been proposed to explain incubation effects. Gilhooly, 
Georgiou and Devery (2013) set out to test three prevailing theories by exploring the 
interactions between the types of problem solving and incubation tasks presented. 
One theory suggested that a break from problem solving simply helps to change the 
focus of the problem solver, so if they are set on an unhelpful aspect of the problem, 
the break gives the opportunity to change to another aspect (Segal, 2004). An 
alternative suggestion is that the incubation period enables the problem solver to 
forget unhelpful approaches, again enabling the adoption of new approaches post 
incubation (Simon, 1966). They finally explored Dijksterhuis and Nordgren’s (2006) 
Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT), which posits that attempts to problem solve 
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persist outside of the participants' awareness during the incubation period. In the 
study participants' either provided solutions for a divergent spatial creative task 
(mental synthesis) or verbal creative task (alternative uses), with incubation breaks 
comprising of a verbal or spatial task. Better performance on the creative problem 
solving task was found subsequent to an incubation period where a less similar task 
was performed. This suggested support for the Unconscious Thought Theory 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) as the similarity of tasks should make no difference 
to performance where it is simply the presence of a break that explains the effect. In 
fact forgetting should actually be maximised when the tasks are more similar, as the 
same cognitive resources would be deployed to the incubation task. For different 
tasks drawing on different cognitive resources, there would be less of a distraction 
effect to break the focus on the useful aspects of a problem. Conversely, and in 
accordance Gilhooly, Georgiou and Devery's (2013) findings, a similar incubation 
task competing for cognitive resources taking the UTT perspective would interfere 
with the unconscious processing that could take place. In a recent review of these 
different explanations Gilhooly (2016) concludes that the most likely explanation for 
incubation effects is spreading activation below the threshold of conscious 
awareness. 
Whatever explanation is adopted for incubation effects in creative problem 
solving, it intuitively makes sense that reaching an impasse would cause the problem 
solver to put aside the task and do something different. However as highlighted, 
most studies in this area are experimental and so lack ecological validity. This is in 
terms of the problems being set, the types of incubation task employed and of 
constraints on natural problem solving behaviour, for example incubation periods are 
pre-determined rather than occurring in response to participants' reaching an 
impasse. Therefore it can again be seen as desirable to explore how creative 
problem solving occurs in daily life. 
 Insight without Impasse 
Cranford and Moss (2010) also used CRA tasks to elicit insight and search 
problem solving whilst conducting verbal protocol analysis: they recorded 
participants "thinking aloud" to describe their thoughts as they attempted to solve the 
puzzles, these were transcribed and coded for different aspects of insight such as 
impasse. From this they identified that some trials of the CRA task were almost 
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immediately solved (within the first 15 seconds), where the first solution word offered 
by participants was correct. Participants labelled these incidences as insight despite 
there being no preceding discussion of impasse beforehand. Cranford and Moss 
(2010) speculate that while there may have been an impasse that was too fast to 
describe, an alternative explanation might be that the solutions were not insightful, 
but rather labelled as such due to the speed that the participants saw the answer. As 
highlighted at the end of the above section (1.1.3.1), participants are instructed to 
focus on phenomenological aspects such as suddenness when making their FOI 
judgements. Yet when they respond according to these criteria, the behavioural data 
collected does not match other cognitive features of insight, such as the presence of 
impasse. This highlights a gap between cognitively focused, research based 
definitions of insight and the phenomenologically focused instructions that 
participants receive in order to identify and report it in elicitation studies. 
Cranford and Moss (2011) followed up this with an fMRI study of participants 
undertaking CRA tasks and giving feeling-of-insight reports. They identified two 
different neural activity patterns for responses reported as insightful using the 2AFC 
feeling-of-insight paradigm. These again distinguished between immediate and 
delayed insight, whilst participant reports did not. 
In a subsequent study Cranford and Moss (2012) again conducted verbal 
protocol analysis with the CRA task. As by definition immediate insight is almost 
instantaneous, no protocols were produced and so no analysis of this type of 
solution process was made. For delayed insight and non-insight solutions however, 
they coded for examples of impasse, fixation and re-structuring and found that 
occurrences of these in protocols did not predict that a solution would be reported as 
insightful. As discussed above, a trial is labelled as insight in this paradigm by the 
subjective experience of the problem solver. Taking this perspective, focusing on 
self-reported experience and contrary to RCT and CSP theory, the presence of 
impasse is not seen as an essential component of insight. 
 
 Weisberg's (2014) Stage Model of Problem Solving: Incorporating 
Insight without Restructuring and Impasse. 
Weisberg (2014; Fleck and Weisberg 2004, 2013) also expands from the 
dichotomous notion of insight versus search problem solving processes and 
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suggests a stage model of problem solving (see Figure 1.3). It proposes that in the 
first stage of problem solving, solutions result from the transfer of knowledge directly 
related to the problem. At the second stage solutions result from the application of 
heuristics. This incorporates the search approach outlined above, but as Fleck and 
Weisberg (2013) suggest also accounts for CSP, as look-ahead can be seen as a 
heuristic process. The third stage represents solutions elicited by conceptually driven 
restructuring, identified by Fleck and Weisberg (2004) as an incidence of 
restructuring (and as a consequence and in line with some of the wider definitions, 
as an incidence of insight) in the absence of an impasse, a suggested necessary 
component of contemporary insight theories outlined above (RCT and CSP). In the 
fourth stage (termed by the authors, 'pure insight') solutions occur due to 
restructuring prompted by impasse.  
This model can therefore be seen to incorporate processes described in RCT 
and CSP whilst accounting for the apparently contradictoriy findings of Cranford and 
Moss (2010, 2011, 2012) that insight can occur without impasse. The incidence of 
immediate insight can also be seen to be analogous to solutions reached through 
Stage 1 of the model. However, Weisberg (2014; Fleck and Weisberg 2004, 2013) 
asserts that these will be solutions without an Aha, whilst the Aha is the defining 
feature of their classification as insight by CRA tasks. This again demonstrates how 
differences in how researchers conceptualise insight in cognitive terms, yet describe 
insight to participants in phenomenological terms, is problematic. 
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Figure 1.3 Model of stages in Problem Solving (Wiesberg, 2014). The solution 
moments have been highlighted with red boxes. Stars indicate where possible 
Mini Aha moments might occur. Adapted from Toward an integrated theory of 
insight in problem solving by R. W. Weisberg, 2014. Thinking & Reasoning, 
21(1), 5-39. Copyright 2014 by Taylor & Francis. 
 
The stage model additionally highlights another potential aspect perhaps 
overlooked. In tracking progress through this model, the potential for mini Aha 
moments can be seen during the problem solving process. These have been added 
to the original figure produced by Fleck and Weisberg (2004) shown in Figure 1.3. 
Effectively, each point where participants glean new information about either the 
problem or solution could represent a moment of insight, and may in itself elicit an 
Aha moment. These have been labelled mini Aha to differentiate them from the 
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solution moment. Really this is a question of scale. In daily life, problem solving is 
unlikely to fall into neat episodes that can easily be divided into distinguishable 
problems mapping to linear problem solving models such as Wallas (1926) (see 
section 1.1.2). What is more, as highlighted in real life case studies of famous 
problem solvers (more detail in section 2.1.4.3), problems may not be solved in a 
matter of minutes or even days. Therefore, along the way it is possible that both 
moments of search and insight might contribute to the big Aha at the end. 
 Lack of a Definitive Insight Definition  
To summarise, it can be seen that different research definitions for insight 
very much depend on the theoretical or methodological approach of the researchers. 
For Gestalt psychologists, restructuring was central and so problems that on face 
value required such changes were classified as insight problems and their solving 
taken to mean an experience of insight had occurred. Neo-Gestalt theorists such as 
Ohlsson (2011) and MacGregor et al. (2001) focused on the process causing 
restructuring, seeing impasse as a necessary precursor to restructuring through 
insight. As such, impasse was central to their working definitions for insight and 
theories to explain it. As highlighted above, while these theories might be seen as 
conflicting, Jones (2003) identified that they are complimentary explanations for how 
impasse might occur. Both however neglect to explain experiences of insight without 
impasse, some taking these experiences to not represent insight because of this 
(see Cranford and Moss [2010] and Weisberg [2014]). However others identify 
insight in relation to experiential aspects rather than processes, for example Jung-
Beeman et al. (2004). Use of this definition would not exclude instances of insight 
without impasse. Finally, a juxtaposition can be seen between Jung-Beeman et al.’s 
(2004) working definition that participants use to label insight versus search focusing 
on experiential elements incorporating cognitive and emotional descriptors and their 
research focus on purely cognitive processes (this disparity will be further explored in 
section 1.2).  Overall however this demonstrates that no single definition of insight is 
adopted across the literature, and furthermore sees classification of insight moments 
as dependent on the definition adopted. 
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 Definition of Insight (for now) 
As has been discussed above, there are varying definitions of insight used by 
different research teams using different methods to elicit insight. However, in 
contrast to creativity research, little has been explored in terms of everyday 
experience of insight making it difficult to comment on the usefulness and validity of 
insight definitions seen in research. The few studies that have recognised this are 
outlined in much greater detail in 2.1.4, but in summary this research in the main 
uses historical case studies (e.g. Klein and Jarosz, 2011) or focuses on Big C or Pro 
C creative individuals (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, 1995). As such, this thesis 
will explore everyday insight in an attempt to validate findings made experimentally, 
and check assumptions and definitions adopted over the last 100 years of insight 
research. 
For now, as a starting point two contemporary definitions taking alternate 
perspectives have been combined to offer a working definition for this research. 
Beeman, Collier and Kounios' (2008) research reflects a neuroscience approach to 
the study of insight, very much framing it within a problem solving paradigm. In 
contrast, Klein and Jarosz (2011) explored naturalistic case studies of insight 
encompassing a broader selection of situations in which insight might occur. 
Together they provide an interim definition on which to base an initial literature 
review and research design for Study 1. 
Insight is a sudden solution to a problem, sudden recognition of a new idea, 
sudden understanding of a complicated situation, a change in mindset or shift 
in thinking accompanied by an Aha moment (Beeman et al., 2008; Klein and 
Jarosz, 2011).  
Beeman et al.'s (2008) definition allows for the experience of insight across a 
wide range of situations but was interestingly originally offered not as part of an 
experimental research report, but rather a non-peer reviewed article directed at a 
business and management audience. The study of insight has long been identified 
as problematic as by definition it is unpredictable in its occurrence (Chu & 
MacGregor, 2011). As such, researchers have sought to identify situations which 
elicit insightful experiences in order to experimentally explore it. Efforts towards this 
have generally focused on the first aspect of Jung-Beeman, Collier and Kounios' 
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(2008) definition by creating problems which are solved through insight. In fact many 
working, research-based definitions of insight narrow to only consider it in respect of 
problem solving. Affective Aspect of Insight 
As demonstrated above the foundation for insight research and its 
subsequent empirical exploration has focused on it as a cognitive event. In the main 
this has concerned the exploration of the processes that occur during insight, for 
example the necessity for impasse or not. Little focus has been paid to emotional 
aspects that contribute to the experience of insight. This is despite the definitions of 
insight used, on which participants' make phenomenological judgements (see above 
section 1.1.4.4) including emotional aspects such as the feeling of Aha. 
 Gruber (1995) suggested that in respect of insight the cognitive and affective 
elements are viewed as separate in line with current thinking about the two at the 
time. However, as outlined above most research before and after this assertion takes 
a cognitive approach. If there is reference to affect in relation to insight, it is usually 
in terms of phenomenological descriptions used in participant descriptions. Little 
attention has been paid to the affective experience itself. Gick and Lockhart (1995) 
identify two components of an emotional response which they suggest correspond to 
the two sources of emotion in insight. Firstly they identify a response to the 
perceived suddenness of a solution when it comes. This could explain why Cranford 
and Moss's (2010, 2011, 2012) immediate insight is labelled as such. The surprise of 
the immediate solution due to its suddenness is interpreted as an insight experience 
despite other commonly identified aspects of insight being absent.  
A second affective aspect, again defined in terms of surprise results from the 
difference between the solution in comparison to the initial representation (and 
therefore expected solution) of the problem. Gick and Lockhart (1995) identify that 
this could be a positive or negative emotion, the positive response relating to the 
pleasure of having arrived at a solution. They discuss the negative reaction being 
one of "chagrin" (Gick and Lockhart, 1995, p. 202), as exemplified by the popular 
cartoon character Homer Simpson's 'd'oh', when he sees something that has been 
clear to all around him from the beginning. In this instance the negative affect results 
from annoyance at how obvious the solution was, and how wrong the person's initial 
interpretation of the problem was. Both of these emotional reactions assume that the 
insight relates to something positive. In fact this is implicit in the current insightful 
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problem solving paradigm which sees insight as the moment of reaching a problem 
solution and as such as goal achievement.  
However, others do not limit insight by explicitly defining it in terms of problem 
solving, For example, Klein and Jarosz (2011) described insight as a sudden, new 
and improved understanding to a situation. This understanding could relate to a 
better understanding which is negative, leading not to an Aha moment, but rather an 
Uh-oh or put less politely (and in more ecologically valid terminology) an oh-shit 
moment! An anecdotal example of this might be in a game such as chess, or 
Connect Four, where two players make alternate moves. In playing such games 
there are occasions where insight strikes with a sudden realisation that a move must 
be made or the game is lost, an Uh-oh moment. This meets the criteria of insight in 
that the individual experiences a sudden realisation which represents a better 
understanding of their situation (and often a realisation of something obvious) and is 
accompanied by an affective response.  
While there are no explicit accounts of Uh-oh moments in insight literature, 
Glick and Lockhart (1995) do unwittingly highlight an example in their discourse. In 
discussing the role of insight in humour and specifically humorous cartoons they 
draw attention to a particular illustration by Gary Larson (The Far Side) where two 
pilots in an aeroplane cockpit are pictured from behind viewing a goat emerging 
through the cloud (see Figure 1.4). One pilot is seen to remark. "Say....what's a 
mountain goat doing way up here in a cloud bank?" Glick and Lockhart (1995) 
suggest that the humour in this story originates in the reader's insight that the goat is 
in fact on a mountain; this represents a restructuring of the naïve pilots' view. If the 
pilots had the same realisation, it would likely not be seen as funny, but be 
experienced as an Uh-oh moment! This example can be seen to demonstrate the 
fundamental constituents of that outlined above in classic insight definitions, a re-
structuring of a problem accompanied by an affective aspect. An additional aspect, 
implicit in problem solving paradigms, and made more explicit in the context of 
creativity, is that insight is adaptive (Klein and Jarosz, 2011). In Larson's example, it 
would most certainly be adaptive for the pilots to have the negative Uh-oh moment in 
order to take evasive action as they speed towards the mountain! 
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Figure 1.4 Illustration by Gary Larson (The Far Side) discussed in Glick and 
Lockhart (1995) as an example of the use of insight in humour, this gives the 
viewer the insightful Uh-oh moment that the pilots are clearly lacking. 
 
 Definitions of emotions, affect and feelings 
As discussed above, emotion in insight has been largely overlooked. As such, 
this thesis will aim to investigate the relationship between emotion and insight 
further. There is much confusion in the literature regarding the use and meaning of 
different terms in the relation to emotion, or even in terms of agreeing what an 
emotion is. Accordingly, it is important to clarify the descriptors to be used in relation 
to emotion in this thesis. Classic neo-Jamesian approaches see the use of the nouns 
emotion and feeling interchangeably to describe psychological manifestations of 
perceived bodily change. Interestingly, when used as verbs in non-academic prose, 
'to feel' generally leads to an assumption of an inward psychological phenomenon 
shared from the first person perspective, whilst 'to emote' implies a more outward 
expression of emotion intended to broadcast ones inner feelings to others. Gross 
(2015a) does not define feelings, but does suggest that 'affect' be adopted as an 
umbrella term for psychological states where an evaluation is made as to whether 
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something is 'good for me' or 'bad for me'. He further suggests that an emotion is an 
affective experience (helpful or harmful) which is typically in response to an event or 
stimulus with a subjective experience of change that is relatively short in duration 
(longer affective experiences being seen as moods).  In contrast, Damasio (2000) 
separates the two: emotion being the actual bodily change; the psychological 
perception of these changes referred to as feelings. For the purposes of this thesis, 
emotion and feelings will be used in the interchangeable tradition of neo-Jamesians 
which is roughly akin to the way that Gross (2015a) defines emotion. 
 The Role of Emotion and Cognition in Insight.  
Sternberg and Davidson's (1995) seminal focus on "The Nature of Insight" 
included chapters which focused on insight and affective aspects. Within this, Gruber 
(1995) discussed affect in terms of the "temporally extended internal milieu" (p. 422) 
that relate to the insight moment, suggesting that the surrounding emotional feelings 
should be considered in terms of the insight moment. He further highlighted that 
insights experienced in different emotional contexts will represent different kinds of 
insight. Gruber (1995) is explicit in his consideration (a reflection of thinking at the 
time) of cognitive and emotional processes being separate but interactive processes.  
Evidence from decision making research contradicts this idea and suggests that 
distinctions between rational thought and emotion may not be as clear cut as 
assumed by insight researchers (see recent reviews by Clore & Palmer, 2009; Le 
Blanc, McConnell & Monteiro, 2014; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo & Kassam). In fact 
Ellesworth (2014) suggests that emotion and cognition are "inseparable" (p. 24). As 
such, taking this perspective the exploration of insight should necessarily be 
conducted with consideration of both cognitive and emotional aspects. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1984) demonstrated that how a problem is framed 
determines decisions made, highlighting a number of heuristics that contradict 
rational cognitive responses. For example, showing problems highlighting potential 
gains promote more conservative responses than when loss is emphasised (e.g. 
Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman & Schwartz, 1997). Recently this research has led to the 
distinction between two types of thinking. Type 1 thinking being automatic and 
largely without the involvement of working memory, while type 2 is effortful and 
involving working memory (Kahneman, 2011). Effortful and rational type 2 thinking 
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might be seen as akin to search and so labelled as such, while solutions that appear 
as if from nowhere, so not utilising working memory would seem to relate to type 1 
thinking. However, Barr, Pennycook, Stolz and Fugelsang (2014) suggest that both 
type 1 and type 2 thinking are seen in creative processes, finding different correlates 
to type 1 and type 2 thinking in different creativity measures. In relation to this thesis, 
the body of work exploring type 1 and 2 thinking highlights that people do sometimes 
base their problem solving judgements on something beyond reasoned cognitive 
calculations, this again suggests that affective aspects should be considered in 
processes previously considered to be cognitive, such as insight. 
Outside of the experimental domain, Bechara, Tranel and Damasio (2000) 
demonstrated the impact of damage to areas of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) on decision making in everyday life that they attributed to a disruption in 
the integration of emotional information. Patients with vmPFC dysfunction showed 
impaired performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, their selections leading to large 
losses unseen in healthy control samples. Damasio (1994) proposed that damage to 
the vmPFC prevented the integration of emotional information (the intuitive feelings 
about each hand of cards) based on previous experience in the task. These he 
named somatic markers, to avoid the controversies and inconsistencies over the 
terms emotion or feelings, and also to highlight the role of bodily changes in this 
process (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). His research demonstrated congruence in 
effects of the vmPFC damage both in decision making tasks, and in impaired 
integration of previously experienced emotions (Damasio, 1994). The somatic 
marker hypothesis proposed that these emotional elements serve an important role 
in enabling previous experience to influence decisions (but not always in conscious 
awareness).  
As such this highlights the role of biological and emotional aspects in relation 
to processes traditionally seen as rational and cognitive. The next sections will 
therefore consider firstly, the different theoretical perspectives of emotion in the 
context of insight (1.2.3 and 1.2.4) and then the biological basis of emotion and 
insight (1.2.5). 
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 Insight research taking a basic emotions approach 
One predominant approach in emotion research has been to identify and 
categorise discrete emotional experiences such as being happy, sad or angry. In 
"The expression of the emotions in man and animals", Darwin (1872) identified a 
collection of distinctive physiological responses to emotional situations. He sought to 
verify responses across cultures with missionaries and others who had been in 
contact with cultures remote to the West. He further identified comparable emotional 
responses in animals, including congruent illustrations of animals and photographs 
of human facial expressions. 
Ekman (1972, 1992) developed this idea, reviewing literature to identify 
images showing facial displays of discrete emotions that could be used in his 
seminal cross cultural research. He demonstrated that the expressions produced by 
natives from Papua New Guinea were mostly identifiable to participants in the United 
States, however there seemed to be problems distinguishing between surprise and 
fear faces (Ekman & Friesen, 1971). From this cross cultural recognition, Ekman 
built a body of research to support the notion of basic emotions which he claimed 
are: evolutionary in origin; universally exhibited and recognised; and include the 
original six taken to Papua New Guinea: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust 
and surprise (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen, 
1969;  Izard, 1971). Ellesworth (2014) however highlights the arbitrary nature by 
which the final set of images and therefore discrete emotions was arrived at in 
Ekman's original study. The set of emotional facial images verified in other research 
and available to take to Papua New Guinea was limited by time and resources and 
therefore was a somewhat arbitrary selection (Elleswoth, 2014). However, despite 
these limitations Ekman's research has had a fundamental impact on understanding 
of discrete emotions. 
Little research has explored the associated range of discrete emotions to 
insight. While two studies explicitly explore the basic emotions of happiness and 
surprise in their research (discussed further below), the relationship between the 
other emotions and insight remains uncharted. This immediately highlights one 
potential avenue for research questioning whether, and in what circumstances these 
remaining basic emotions of sadness, anger, fear and disgust might be experienced 
in the phenomenology of insight. 
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 Insight: happiness and certainty.  
Danek et al.'s (2014a, 2014b) predominant research focus was to validate a 
new task to elicit and measure insight moments using magic tricks. Participants were 
shown video clips of a magician performing a trick and asked to solve the puzzle of 
how he did it. In identifying the secrets behind each illusion, participants were asked 
to identify whether their solution occurred through insight or not. This provided the 
critical within participant and within task comparison between insight and non-insight 
episodes necessary for research aiming to identify aspects unique to an insight 
experience, such as brain activity (method first adopted in development of CRA 
problems by Jung-Beeman et al., 2004, see section 1.1.3.1).  
However whilst validating their magic trick paradigm, Danek et al. (2014b) 
also explored the phenomenological aspects of the insight moments they elicited. 
After participants had completed all the magic tricks they were asked to give a single 
qualitative description of their insight moments produced in the experiment. This was 
done retrospectively and a description was not collected for their experience of non-
insight solutions to enable a direct comparison. The researchers' describe how they 
identified "meaningful, self-created categories" (p. 5) (although not explicitly named 
as such by Danek et al. (2014b) this appears to match Hsieh and Shannon's (2005) 
description of a conventional content analysis). Three raters were asked to allocate 
each description to one of the categories, providing frequency data of the qualitative 
responses (given at two time points, on the same day as the magic trick task, and 
also in a recall session 14 days later). In addition to responses that simply mirrored 
the instructions and definitions given, cognitive and emotional aspects were 
identified. Descriptions of somatic reactions in insight were categorised separately 
from either the cognitive or emotional experiences. This is interesting accounting for 
the suggested physiological contribution to emotional experience discussed in 
section 1.2.5 below. 
The three emotional descriptions identified by Danek et al. (2014b) in their 
analysis of participants' qualitative accounts of their insight moments were: relaxation 
and release of tension; happiness; and performance related emotions (e.g. pride and 
satisfaction). In distinguishing emotions as discrete entities, Danek et al. (2014b) can 
be seen to be taking a basic emotions approach. The clearest mapping being the 
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identification of happiness in relation to insight, one of Ekman's (1972) basic 
emotions. 
In addition to participants' describing their insight moments using qualitative 
methods, Danek et al. (2014b) also asked their participants to rate using Visual 
Analogue Scales, the extent they experienced happiness (although retrospectively 
labelled as this the scale rated against was actually pleasant - unpleasant), surprise, 
suddenness, certainty and impasse. Here again the basic emotions of happiness 
and surprise are used to quantify the extent that these emotions were reported as 
being experienced during insight. However, again comparison ratings were not 
measured for non-insight solutions meaning it is difficult to attribute the reported 
experience to insight rather than as a generalised response to solving a problem 
(through either insight or non-insight). 
Shen, Yuan, Liu and Luo (2015) conducted a series of studies exploring 
emotional experience and insight. They firstly asked participants to describe their 
solution moments for each CRA trial (subsequent to providing their answer and 
feeling of insight ratings). The researchers took care to avoid too much priming of 
responses by offering a description of insight based on experiences and examples, 
rather than using terms relating to positive affect, suddenness or certainty. This 
produced a corpus of descriptors which were categorised as distinctive to problems 
that featured an Aha moment and those that did not. The authors do not make clear 
whether their categorisation was done by comparing response frequencies for the 
descriptors between the Aha and non-Aha trials or on some other basis. 
Furthermore, they report the descriptors most frequently used for insight solutions 
without offering a comparison to non-insight trials. This makes it difficult to eliminate 
the possibility that the emotions reported were simply in response to having found 
the solution rather than demonstrating that insight moment descriptions were 
distinctive from non-insight solutions. From the data reported for Aha solutions the 
descriptor happy was most frequently offered followed by certain, calm, then excited. 
A follow up study repeated the CRA task, asking participants to select from a list of 
descriptors rather than provide open text responses. Comparisons of the mean 
frequency that each descriptor was selected in insight and non-insight trials found 
differences in happiness, loss, hesitation, and nervousness but not for certainty or 
ease. Their data collection approach and analysis methods are congruent with 
51 
 
assumptions made of basic emotions, treating their descriptors as discrete entities 
including happiness which as highlighted above was one of Ekman's (1992) original 
basic emotions. 
Shen et al. (2015) additionally ran a study asking a new sample of participants 
to sort all the descriptor words given in the free report study for similarity. Using 
statistical methods (Euclidean Alternating Least Squares Scaling) they identified a 
model presenting the descriptors in two dimensions: motivational (approach - avoid) 
and psychological (cognitive - emotional). The authors do not make explicitly clear 
how this model relates to their findings from the CRA studies, other than to suggest 
that it supports the notion that insight experience is multi-dimensional. This 
dimensional approach (see section 1.13 below for discussion of dimensional 
approaches to emotion) would appear to be at odds with the discrete approach taken 
in their other two studies. 
In sum, the above studies have attempted to capture qualitative and 
quantitative descriptions of insight experience and emotion. They are consistent in 
identifying happiness as a discrete emotion associated to insight. 
 Insight and surprise.  
Whilst both Danek et al. (2014b) and Shen et al. (2015) identify happiness as 
a discrete emotion relating to insight, they differ in terms of surprise, which is another 
of Ekman's basic emotions. Danek et al. (2014b) identified surprise as the second 
most important emotion after happiness. In contrast, Shen et al. (2015) discarded 
surprise from further exploration as it did not figure substantially in the free 
responses given in their initial, exploratory study. 
Gick and Lockhart (1995) suggested that surprise is an emotion associated 
with insight. They posited that there are two potential aspects that contribute to this 
experience in insight. Firstly, surprise at the difference between the solution 
compared to the original notion of what the solution would look like. An example of 
this can be seen in Danek et al's (2014b) qualitative reports; "In most cases, it [the 
solution] is quite different than I had expected before" (full qualitative responses are 
included in the article's online supplementary information). Secondly, Gick and 
Lockhart (1995) suggest the suddenness and ease by which an insightful solution 
arrives also surprises participants. Again there were many reports of this in the 
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qualitative responses of Danek et al.'s (2014b) study, as well as supporting ratings of 
surprise. 
Surprise is unusual in emotions as there is disagreement as to what (if any) 
valence can be attributed to it (Topolinski and Strack, 2015). Some posit that 
surprise is a response to a difference between an event and a prior belief and as 
such does not have an attached valence (Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph & Schützwohl, 
1991, Meyer, Reisenzein & Schützwohl, 1997; Reisenzein, 2000). This position 
suggests that positive and negative feelings result from a subsequent evaluation of 
the surprising event in terms of whether is it desirable or undesirable. Such a notion 
of surprise echoes the first explanation for surprise in insight given by Gick and 
Lockhart (1995) and outlined above, where the event is the solution moment which is 
at odds with the problem solver's prior beliefs about the problem. So from this 
perspective the surprise attached to insight would not be seen as positive or 
negative. 
Bartlett and Izard (1972) however, suggested that surprise is a positive 
emotion related to pleasantness, further asserting that this is in line with a common 
sense view that surprise is seen as a positive experience. Shen et al.'s (2015) model 
of descriptor words identified surprise as being approach based, positively valenced 
in the context of insight. However, very few participants from a relatively small 
sample (only 19 participants in the first study) reported surprise in Shen et al.'s 
study, meaning caution should be employed in the generalisation of this finding. 
Ekman's et al. (1997) describe how fear and surprise were found to often be 
indistinguishable in their cross cultural facial expression research (see section 1.12). 
This highlights the possibility that surprise relates to negative experience (Ekman et 
al. 1997). Noordewier and Breugelmans (2013) aimed to test the idea that surprise 
might initially be experienced as negative. They were building on research indicating 
a tendency to like and strive for order and predictability; surprise being a deviation 
from this, therefore evoking a negative response. They first asked participants to 
recall a surprising event and rate that event for how positive or negative it felt; at the 
time it occurred and shortly after (so having had an opportunity to conduct an 
appraisal of the surprising event). They demonstrated that surprising events were 
initially rated as more negative, and were seen more positively after a short time.  
53 
 
Noordewier and Breugelmans (2013) then conducted studies where faces 
were rated for valence. Participants were shown Ekman's emotional facial images: 
adding the label of 'surprise' to pictures depicting surprise led them to be rated more 
positively than when no description was given. These two studies suggest that there 
is a positive appraisal bias for the concept of surprise, and this might explain 
experiences of surprise being remembered as positive, and furthermore the 
identification of something as surprising leading to more positive emotional 
interpretations. In order to offer ecological validity to their findings, Noordewier and 
Breugelmans (2013) used images from Dutch versions of popular television shows, 
the Antiques Roadshow and Ground Force; both of which incorporate moments of a 
surprise "reveal" for their general-public stars. They showed stills of the first 5 
seconds of the surprise reveal moment to participants, asking them to rate the 
valence of each image. Images from early in the surprise moment (first two seconds) 
were rated more negatively than from those at four seconds, post surprise event. 
This, the researchers suggest further supports the idea that the initial emotion of 
surprise is negative. However the validity of the findings might be criticised in terms 
of how naturalistic the TV images were. TV production processes may have 
introduced confounds, for example if the members of the public in the background of 
the filming did not look suitably surprised (presumably in congruence to stereotypical 
lay expectations of surprise) the sequences might have been re-shot to better reflect 
the 'surprise' being portrayed. There is no way of judging the extent of these types of 
production and editing changes and whether they may have interfered with the 
naturalistic expression of surprise portrayed.  
Topolinski and Strack (2015) followed up this work, measuring emotional 
facial muscle responses to experimental elicitation of surprise. Under a rouse to hide 
the intention of the study, participants were asked to read trivia facts previously rated 
by independent raters as being high or low in surprise, whilst their facial muscle 
movements were recorded. Muscle movement typically associated with frowning and 
therefore negative emotions (the M. corrugator supercilii) was recorded for high 
surprise trials. Contrary to expectations, muscles traditionally associated with 
surprise, creating the classic wide eyed expression through lifting the brow (the M. 
frontalis medialis) were not implicated. This again supports the notion that surprise is 
a negative emotion at the time of its occurrence. This may be an interesting line of 
54 
 
research to pursue in terms of mapping the progression of emotional responses in 
insight. Using insight elicitation methods for positive Aha and negative Uh-oh 
moments where the timing of the elicitation can be mapped, corresponding facial 
muscle movements could then be recorded. This of course would be contingent on 
reliable elicitation and recording methods for both Aha and Uh-oh moments, 
something yet to be ascertained (but see Chapter 6 for an exploratory attempt). 
Topolinski and Strack (2015) are clear to highlight that subsequent valenced 
feelings (either positive or negative) evolve as the content of the surprise is further 
appraised. This fits with Gross' (2015) notion that an emotional response develops 
by constant cycling through a valuation process allowing for changes in emotional 
valence over time (see section 1.2.4). Noordewier and Breugelman (2013) suggest 
that the positive bias in memory for surprise may relate to the subsequent appraisals 
of the surprise event as something good, with a latency memory effect where the 
initial negative response is forgotten. This demonstrated that the disconnect between 
the phenomenological recall of emotion surrounding an event and the experimental 
findings is relevant for future exploration of emotion and insight. It highlights that a 
body of evidence should be amassed drawing from a range of different 
methodologies exploring insight as it happens. For example recording how emotion 
develops over an experience of insight using: i. self-report phenomenological 
qualitative and quantitative capture; and ii. experimental measures associated with 
emotional experience such as physiological or neurological markers. 
Others suggest that while surprise associates with different discrete emotions, 
surprise itself is a purely cognitive process because it has no valence (Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 1987; Power & Dalgleish, 2007). For example, Vanhamme (2000) 
identified allied emotions providing valence to surprise: surprise and joy giving a 
positive experience whilst surprise and anger been seen as negative. If the findings 
of Noordewier and Breugelmans (2013) and Topolinski and Strack (2015) continue 
to be demonstrated across more experiments in different contexts they could begin 
to provide more robust evidence of an initial negative valence to surprise. As such 
this would challenge the view of surprise not being an emotion based on it having no 
valence, and more clearly re-establish surprise as a basic emotion. Furthermore, this 
may provide an avenue to examine the differences between insight and non-insight 
moments. If surprise does indeed render a brief negative facial response, and 
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surprise is a marker of insight, then one could derive and test hypotheses exploring 
differences in facial muscle responses for insight and non-insight moments. 
However, from the research described above it is clear that there is yet no 
consensus in terms of the "emotional chameleon" (Noordewier and Breugelmans, 
2013, p. 1327) that is surprise. This is threefold, in terms of: firstly, the extent that 
surprise is associated with insight; secondly, the exact nature of surprise as an 
emotion, and thirdly, if surprise is an emotion in the first place. Furthermore, it is 
unclear the extent that surprise might be separable form other basic emotions such 
as negative fear, or positive happiness responses. This may account for the different 
basic emotions makeup found to associate with insight between studies.  
Furthermore, little research accounts for the experience of basic emotions 
other than surprise and happiness in insight. Ellsworth (2014) cautions that a basic 
emotions approach constrains emotion research by disregarding most emotional 
experience and is removed from the experienced flow of emotional states.  As such it 
may be desirable to explore other approaches/theories in the study of emotion when 
considering insight. 
 Emotion: dimensional perspective 
An alternative perspective identifies different dimensions with which to 
measure and describe emotional experience. Probably the most often described 
dimension is that of valence. As highlighted above, this can be seen to be used in 
discussions of basic emotions. With most (see discussion above regarding the 
exception of surprise) being designated as discrete examples of emotion which have 
a positive or negative valence. Gross (2015a) asserts that it is this valuation, whether 
an event is 'good for me' or 'bad for me' that determines if something is seen as 
emotional and, if it is, how the unfolding emotion is regulated. Gross (2015a) is clear 
that this valuation can be formed of internally perceived events as well as external 
stimuli. Therefore framing insight as an internal world event, the 'good for me' or 'bad 
for me' judgement may be pertinent to whether an insight leads to an Aha or Uh-oh 
moment respectively. This idea is in line with Shen et al. (2015) who propose insight 
events be considered incidences of endogenous emotion. 
Russell (2003) proposed that two dimensions best capture moment to 
moment experiences of core affect in his circumplex model. In addition to pleasure 
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(valence) he identified that arousal was also important, arguing that emotional 
experience is psychologically constructed; based on core affect (pleasure and 
arousal); and attributed to events. Russell (2009) uses the terms arousal and 
activation (antonym being deactivation) interchangeably. Accordingly, psychological 
construction of emotion incorporates both biological and cultural influences. 
Biological influences may be interpreted as physiological changes in relation to 
arousal or valence. Cultural influences highlight that there is also a learned aspect to 
emotional experience. So from this perspective emotional experience is seen as a 
construction incorporating both aspects. 
Jarman (2014) asserts that emotional experiences are secondary 
consequences to the purely cognitive insight moment (see section 2.1.5 for more 
detailed discussion of Jarmam's (2014) research). This stance is maintained in a 
more recent paper detailing the mental itch experience in everyday, extreme insights 
(Jarman, 2016). However, examination of the two cognitive components (arousal 
and motivational urgency) that Jarman (2016) identifies, sees congruence with 
dimensions seen for Russell's (2003) core affect. Firstly, Jarman's (2016) arousal 
experience would appear consistent with the similar term in the circumplex model. 
The second component identified by Jarman (2016) was motivational urgency. Again 
an interesting analogy can be seen to dimensional accounts of emotion. Alternate 
descriptions of the valence dimension labelling extremes as approach - avoidance 
(motivations) or positive - negative (valence) rather than pleasure - displeasure 
(Russell and Barrett, 1999; see also section 5.1.3 in Chapter 5 regarding defence 
cascade model.). The motivational urgency identified by Jarman (2016) reflects that 
his research was focused on problem solving, assuming participants were 
experiencing insights as solutions to problems with activated goals. As such, the 
motivation described was purely an approach motivation; the negative aspect to this, 
avoidance motivation being omitted. However this does demonstrate that there is an 
arguable, alternative (to the cognitive explanation given by Jarman, [2016]) seeing 
an emotional interpretation of Jarman's (2016) findings.  
This highlights that the dimensional perspective might be a promising 
approach from which to explore emotion and insight. As such, positive insight would 
be expected to be rated as pleasurable whilst negative insight as unpleasant. This is 
congruent to Danek et al. (2014b) who asked their participants to rate their positive 
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insight experiences against this scale (pleasant to unpleasant), but did not elicit 
negative insights so leaving the picture incomplete (see more detailed explanation of 
this research in section 1.2.3.1).This simple distinction would additionally avoid the 
problems outlined above in identifying discrete emotions and fit with the implicit 
conceptualisation of insight as valenced (positive and negative) taken throughout this 
thesis. In terms of arousal, this again is highlighted as pertinent in everyday problem 
solving, as demonstrated by Jarman (2016) where differential motivation and so 
arousal will be seen for different problems and between different individuals. 
 Biological basis of emotion and insight. 
When considering the biological basis of behaviour consideration can be 
made of activity in the brain and body. This section will briefly explore both in relation 
to insight and emotion, firstly a neuroscience approach, then physiological. 
There is an extensive body of work that has explored the neural processes in 
and around insight problem solving that in the main is beyond the scope of this 
thesis (for reviews see Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Kounios & Beeman, 2014). In 
general studies that explore insight identify the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) as important (Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan & Iacoboni, 
2008; Cranford and Moss, 2011; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; 
Sandkuhler & Bhattacharya, 2008; Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish & Jung-Beeman, 
2009; Zhao et al.,2013). However, many do not actually record activity at the time of 
insight, one of the few that does being Jung-Beeman et al. (2004). Despite this, most 
identify the ACC and PFC as key areas relating to insight and interpret this activity 
as relating to the integration of remote associates (e.g. Subramaniam et al., 2008; 
Zhao et al., 2013). 
The area of the brain most associated with emotion is probably the amygdala, 
however as discussed by Craig (2009) this represents one component of the 
underpinning neurological activity to an emotional experience. He proposes that an 
integration of information pertinent to emotion occurs in the insula; particularly 
sensory information from the body and external world (somatosensory areas, 
amygdala and hypothalamus), hedonic information judging valence (accumbens), is 
assimilated with motivational and social cognitive signals from the ACC and PFC. 
Further studies investigating interoception, the process by which bodily signals are 
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integrated in higher order neural processing, implicate this in the experience of 
emotion (for detailed explanation see section 5.1.5.1). For example, Schandry (1981) 
showed stronger emotional responses in those with better interoceptive accuracy. 
Interoception in the brain again sees a principle role of the insula, ACC and PFC 
(Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman & Dolan; 2004, Hertbert, Pollatos & Schandry, 
2007; Terasawa, Fukushima & Umeda, 2013; Weibking & Northoff, 2015).  
In sum, this highlights how similar brain areas and functions, namely the role 
of the ACC, in integration are seen for emotional experience and in insight. However, 
as identified above (section 1.2), and further discussed in Chapter 5 (section 
5.1.2.2), implicit assumptions by insight researchers regarding emotion as an after 
effect rather than integral to it may have led to the relationships between the 
neurology of emotion and insight to be overlooked. As such, this adds weight to a 
need for an approach that considers insight and emotion together. 
One problem with studies that take a neuroscience approach is that the 
conditions in which such data is collected, for example in an fMRI, lead to very 
unrealistic or even unpleasant experiences (Shermer, 2008). As this study is aiming 
to explore naturalistic experience of insight, it would seem pertinent to take 
approaches that align to this. As such the invasive and uncomfortable data collection 
methods associated with neuroimaging may not be the best approach to adopt for 
this aim. 
In addition to the biology of the brain, somatic aspects can also be considered 
in relation to insight and emotion. These are explored in more depth in Chapter 5 
and 6, but will also be summarised here. Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995) were the 
first to report biological aspects in relation to insight problem solving. Their results 
suggested a gradual increase in heart activity when problems were solved with 
search compared to a late jump in activity just prior to a solution in insight. Little 
research was then reported until several recent papers that again focused on 
physiological changes with insight. For example, Lackner et al. (2013) also focused 
on heart rate change when participants viewed humorous, insight eliciting cartoons 
finding different activity for these against non-humorous control pictures. Shen et al. 
(2016) recently published research whilst this thesis was being written up (so all 
thesis data having been collected and analysed) measuring electrodermal activity 
(EDA) and heart rate variability (HRV), showing effects for EDA but not HRV (for 
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further information see section 5.1.3.1). As discussed in the introduction literature 
review in Chapter 5, similar physiological responses in terms of EDA have been 
seen in response to emotional elicitation, for example when participants are 
presented with pictures with emotional content greater EDA responses were seen for 
pictures rated as more emotionally arousing (for example Bradley and Lang, 1996; 
Hempel et al., 2005; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993; Levenson, Patrick, 
Bradley and Lang, 2000; Sánchez-Navarro,  Martínez-Selva, Torrente & Román, 
2008). These corresponding physiological responses seen in insight and emotion 
offer additional belated (in terms of the publication after the design and data 
collection phases of this thesis) support for further exploration in this thesis of the 
relationship between physiological changes, emotion and insight. Furthermore, 
collection of physiological data, such as heart rate and EDA is less invasive than 
neuroimaging techniques, so offers a promising method for the measurement of 
more naturalistic problem solving of interest in this thesis. 
1.2 Outline of research in this thesis 
As highlighted above the overall aims of this research programme are to 
explore the insight from a naturalistic perspective, with particular attention to emotion 
and related biological processes. This section will firstly address the researcher’s 
approach to this research in a reflexive section, then outline the individual studies 
undertaken and identify how they contribute to this overall aim. 
 Reflexivity 
Where qualitative research is undertaken it is typical for the researcher to 
outline their philosophical standpoint and theoretical position in relation to their 
analysis. Long (2014) offers a useful review of recently published (2003 - 2012) 
creativity research, which unsurprisingly highlights that overall the majority of studies 
(83%) in this field take a quantitative perspective. The rest were either seen to be 
qualitative (13%) or mixed methods (4%). Of these, the predominant qualitative 
method used was case studies. The majority of the rest were categorised as 'basic 
methodology', as they included descriptions of the qualitative data collection 
methods (i.e. interview, observation) but gave little detail about the qualitative 
methodology used in analysis. Furthermore, for studies that were classified as 
mixed-methods, these were labelled as such in the sense that they used a mixture of 
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qualitative and quantitative methods separately, with separate and specific research 
questions to each part. Long (2014) identified that in the field of creativity, no authors 
explicitly discussed the methodological perspectives of their studies or the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning their work. 
This thesis can therefore be seen to take a congruent approach to that 
identified by Long (2014). It takes a post positivist perspective, primarily undertaking 
small q qualitative research that will inform a predominately quantitative approach 
(Braun and Clarke, 2013). However, in contrast to Braun and Clarke's (2013) 
identified pathway of exploratory, qualitative work aiming to generate research 
questions for subsequent quantitative studies in a sequential design, this thesis is 
effectively looking to firstly verify the existing, large experimental knowledge base 
and offer ecological validity to findings after-the-effect and secondly to identify any 
gaps in that theory. 
This stated aim to be both inductive and deductive means that some 
qualitative methodologies are incompatible with the research approach in this thesis. 
For example Grounded Theory where there is an avoidance of preconceptions from 
previous literature (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Furthermore, Braun and Clarke (2013) 
highlight Grounded Theory’s foundations in sociology means that it has a focus on 
social structures and processes rather than the psychological aspects of interest in 
this thesis. An additional consideration is that participant’s experiences of insight in 
everyday life are unlikely to be deeply held or reflected upon. Methods such as 
Interpretive Phenomenal Analysis would therefore not be appropriate as there would 
not be enough depth to the data for this approach. Thematic analysis provides a 
flexible alternative in terms of theoretical perspectives and can be used both 
inductively and deductively (Braun and Clarke, 2006). As such this will form the basis 
for the qualitative analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
 
 Overview of studies 
The first aspect that is explored in this research is the experience of insight in 
everyday life. Study 1 uses open ended questions to elicit qualitative descriptions of 
insight from online and face to face participants through a questionnaire. Qualitative 
analysis will be carried out on descriptions given, using a novel method, Integrative 
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Thematic Analysis. This has been developed for this thesis to protect against biases 
in analysis introduced by the first researcher (the author of this thesis), who 
necessarily has expert knowledge of insight. This should ensure that the conception 
of insight identified is not simply a reflection of the knowledge from previous 
research-based work. This study will provide for the first time an empirically obtained 
picture of everyday insight experience. This will inform definitions developed through 
a purely experimental approach and offer ecological validity to comparable 
laboratory based findings. 
The second study in this thesis then aims to focus specifically on negative 
insight. Study 2 will again adopt similar qualitative methods described for Study 1 
above. A working definition of negative insight will be developed and offered to 
participants, based on findings regarding everyday insight experience from Study 1, 
and the research relating to positive insight. This study will therefore enable a more 
complete characterisation of negative insight in everyday life. It will provide new 
knowledge to inform and update definitions of insight to incorporate negative insight. 
Furthermore, it should provide functional explanations and lay interpretations of the 
adaptive role of negative insight in everyday life. 
Study 1 and 2 aim to capture snapshots of everyday experience of insight 
minimising memory effects in the recall of the experiences by asking (in the first 
instance) for those that occur within 24 hours. However, these studies collect data 
through an anonymous questionnaire and so there is no opportunity to probe 
responses to check understanding where descriptions are ambiguous. Furthermore, 
the question of prevalence of insight is not addressed through this method. As such 
Study 3 will adopt Experience Sampling Methodology (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 
1987) taking event contingent reports of insight in real-time, following eleven 
participants over a week (Moskowitz & Sadikaj, 2011). De-brief interviews, 
conducted to review the reports each participant made over their week should 
provide rich detail of everyday insight, with the opportunity to fully explore and 
understand their experiences. The qualitative reports and interview transcripts will 
again be analysed with ITA to elicit further understanding of everyday experience of 
insight. Furthermore, this will enable the prevalence of insight in everyday life to be 
reported for the first time. 
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The research will then begin to explore emotional and biological aspects of 
insight. In the first instance, in Study 4 this will be done using an established 
laboratory task to elicit insight and search solving, the CRA task. Performance on 
this task will be compared to aspects relating to emotion, including self-reported 
individual differences in the experience of emotion and interoceptive accuracy. Heart 
rate change over the solving period for insight and search solving will also be 
compared in order to identify somatic markers of insight. 
Having used an established elicitation method in Study 4, Study 5 will finally 
look to develop a more naturalistic task to experimentally explore insight and creative 
problem solving processes. A computer based version of Connect 4 is proposed, 
that in addition to eliciting insight and search solving, will also incorporate emotional 
aspects of insight and look to stimulate the newly identified negative insight (with a 
corresponding, negatively valenced search experience). Furthermore, a continued 
problem solving experience is seen, more akin to everyday solving, when playing a 
game; with a series of moves each representing separate solving episodes building 
toward a superordinate goal of winning the game by getting four counters in a row. 
Similar measures to those recorded in Study 4, so heart rate, an individual 
differences measure of experience of emotion, and interoceptive accuracy will be 
taken in order to test theories relating to somatic markers for insight and individual 
differences in emotional experience and interoception in relation to insight. This also 
provides an opportunity to collect phenomenological reports of the different solving 
experiences rendered in order to compare to findings using other problem solving 
tasks. Finally, by targeting repeat participants from those who take part in Study 4, 
some longitudinal comparisons on the measures taken will also be made. The 
beneifts of which will be to explore test-retest reliability of the measures used in 
these studies. 
In summary, this thesis aims to explore physiological and psychological 
aspects of emotion (positive and negative) insight. This is in terms of everyday 
insight experience, something that previous research has tended to overlook. Using 
qualitative data collection and analysis to elicit a detailed, rich characterisation of 
everyday insight experience. Building on these findings, additional research in a 
more controlled, experimental environment will explore aspects (psychological and 
physiological [heart rate change]) of emotion, identified in daily life insight, firstly 
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using an established problem solving task. Finally a novel problem solving task will 
look to elicit both positive and negative insight and search solving experience. 
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2 Everyday experience of insight: Questionnaire study. 
2.1 Introduction  
2.1.1 Circularity Problem in Insight Research 
For all of the current approaches to the study of insight outlined in Chapter 1, 
there is a danger that they rely on a circular argument. The characterisation of 
insight (on which definitions are based) is made in consideration to performance on 
insight problems (Dominowski and Dallob, 1995; Ollinger and Knoblich, 2009). In 
turn, these problems are designed to elicit aspects identified by the working 
definitions of insight derived from earlier studies. Furthermore, many novel 
paradigms to investigate insight are validated by comparison to classic insight 
problems. For instance, Cunningham, MacGregor, Gibb and Haar (2009) used the 
Repertory Grid (REPGRID, Kelly, 1955) technique to identify characteristics of 
classic insight problems. This was done by comparing different triads of ten 
established insight problems. For each, a characteristic was identified which was 
common to two of the triad, but not the third. This process was repeated between 
different combinations of the problems and by different researchers in order to 
identify six key characteristics of insight problems: they elicit a focus on prominent 
but un-useful concepts blocking alternative productive conceptualisations; solutions 
require a change in assumptions regarding spatial aspects; or the expected form or 
structure; sequential nature of a problem; misdirection in problem (either explicitly in 
question or in assumptions made about the question); unclear what form a solution 
takes. They then considered the merits of new paradigms including rebus puzzles 
and remote associate word problems in relation to these characteristics. While such 
corroboration of new insight problems in accordance to established research tools 
may assure the reliability of new methods and measures, it does nothing to establish 
the ecological validity of the conception of insight studied. As demonstrated, the 
circularity problem means that validation of new insight research methods has been 
contingent on a characterisation of insight derived from classic insight tasks.  
2.1.2 Reliance on Student Samples in Insight Research 
A further point to note with regards to validity is the samples from which 
participants were drawn for the body of insight research. This can be seen in 
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Appendix 1 which summaries the participant details for the insight studies identified 
in the initial literature review conducted for this thesis and described in chapter one. 
The majority of studies which do describe their participants investigate insight using 
student samples. MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle (2001) do include a sample 
which they refer to as being members of the public, however these were from a 
convenience sample of attendees at a University Open Day, so quite likely potential 
students.  While this is not uncommon in the context of psychology research it may 
be problematic in generalising findings. It could be questioned if students are 
representative; as they are generally young and above average intelligence (for 
example, Sears, 1986). Furthermore, students are in a learning environment and 
presumably (hopefully!) actively engaged in learning. As learning has been explicitly 
linked to insight one might ask if the insight characteristics seen in this population 
are replicated in older or working participants. Pertinent to this point, Ovington, 
Saliba, Moran, Goldring and MacDonald (2015) highlight that most anecdotal 
examples of insight are described in scientists and inventors which again neglects 
the experience of insight in a more general population. A first step to address this 
problem might be to include more general samples in insight research to make 
comparison to results from student participants. 
2.1.3 Insight Tasks Contribution to Circularity in Insight Research 
As discussed above the circularity problem may have led to ever more narrow 
definitions of insight in research outlined in Chapter 1, where some researchers only 
define insight in terms of problem solving without reference to other possible 
aspects.  As highlighted, there are varied accounts of the cognitive and affective 
aspects of insight. These can often be seen to map to the type of research methods 
and insight elicitation adopted by the researchers. For instance, look-ahead ability in 
relation to the nine dot problem was used to characterise CSP theory by MacGregor 
and his research team (MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle, 2001; later Chu and 
MacGregor, 2011). However this is suggested to be less useful in describing 
problem solving behaviour in other insight tasks, for instance problems which require 
a single step, and therefore the role of progress monitoring is limited (Jones, 2003).  
A further potential product of this recursive approach to the study of insight is 
the possible omission of important aspects. Weisberg (2014) concurs, highlighting 
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that our present conception of insight is unable to explain all real life examples. He 
draws attention to Perkin's (2000) discussion of the accidental discovery of penicillin: 
Alexander Fleming observed in that bacterial growth was suppressed in cultures 
corrupted by mould, leading to his 'breakthrough' thought of using this characteristic 
to create an antibiotic. Weisberg (2014) suggests that such insight incorporates the 
aspect of problem finding (identified by Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, 1995), which 
current models of insight are unable to account for. A further exclusion from current 
conceptions can also be seen in the case of negative insight: the Uh-oh moment 
highlighted in section 1.2.   As such, one of the aims of the current research is to 
identify and provide evidence of Uh-oh experiences and accordingly a novel example 
of insight as negative insight. 
The omissions outlined above highlight that, in addition to validation against 
previous research it is important to ensure that new methods developed to elicit and 
investigate insight have ecological validity. In other words, researchers must seek to 
ensure that the experimental incidences of insight studied, map to everyday 
insightful experience. In order to do this an accurate description of everyday 
experience of insight must first be obtained.  
2.1.4 Ecologically Valid Experience of Insight 
2.1.4.1 Case studies in insight.  
With-in their discourse regarding insight many researchers do offer 
comparison to real-life case-studies. They compare these examples to the 
characteristics they have experimentally identified, as seen above with regards to the 
case of penicillin. This is often in their introduction to the topic as exemplified by 
Ollinger and Knoblich’s (2009) opening to their chapter on “Psychological Research 
on Insight Problem Solving”. They highlight Wertheimer's conversations with Albert 
Einstein regarding his discovery of the theory of relativity (as recounted in 
Wertheimer, 1959) and discuss how this relates to insight.  Others use examples in 
relation to their research findings. Cunningham et al. (2009) highlight how creators of 
the user-interactive technology such as Wii and i-pod changed defined structures or 
forms: one of the characteristics of insight problems their research identified. In the 
case of the Wii they suggest the way in which a game player interacts through the 
remote was re-defined. While in the case of the i-pod; a changed view of portable 
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data storage was offered, leading to a new market of digital music and media 
players. For another of their characteristics; the difficulty in verifying what a solution 
will look like they again draw from case-study material, relating this to Watson and 
Crick's search for the structure of DNA.  
However there can be argued to be problems in using case study examples in 
terms of the subjectivity of their interpretation. For example, Ohlsson (2011) used 
Edison's invention of the lightbulb filament as a case study to examine the production 
of novelty. He outlines how Edison and his team carried out extensive research into 
different materials: looking for the one with the right properties to be used as a 
filament, focusing initially on platinum but finding a solution relatively quickly once 
attention moved to the exploration of carbon. He (Ohlsson, 2011) uses this case 
study to exemplify the aspects of impasse and re-structuring central to his model of 
insight. However others use the same Edison case study to highlight the extensive 
role of analytical, effortful search in so called insightful creations (e.g. Perkins, 2000). 
Wiesberg (2014) likewise criticised its use, highlighting aspects of historical accounts 
which contrast to the suddeness and unexpectedness of the search switch described 
by Ohlsson (2011). This demonstrates the problem with using historical accounts as 
exemplars of insight. Whilst aspects of these accounts can be suggestive of insight, 
without the ability to question the historical character, this cannot be definitively 
determined and so be open to conjecture and therefore argument as highlighted 
above. 
Klein and Jarosz (2011) used ‘real-life’ examples of insight from books, 
magazines and newspaper articles (again many being historical case studies). In 
addition they composed examples from their research discussions and interviews for 
other studies and from the personal experience of the lead researcher. As a result 
they compiled a collection of 120 insight "incidents" (Klein and Jarosz, 2011, p. 337). 
Their criterion for inclusion was that the person made a “radical shift" (Klein and 
Jarosz, 2011, p. 338) in his or her mental model and that this was towards an 
improved, more precise or useful representation (adaptive function of insight).  They 
then coded the incidents for 14 features identified from their initial sorting and 
according to previous literature. Some were common aspects identified in previous 
insight research, such as the occurrence of incubation or impasse. While other 
features reflected contextual aspects: an accidental discovery, or elements of the 
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person’s cognitions such as identifying connections or contradictions. They 
concluded that some assumptions regarding insight are incorrect, for example that 
insight is sudden, asserting that it can be a gradual process. However, this 
demonstrates how the researcher’s original definition influences their findings. As 
they did not exclude search type processes from their working definition, it is 
unsurprising that they found evidence of it in the incidents they analysed. This is 
contrary to many contemporary researchers, who actually contrast search type 
problem solving strategies to those of insight: unsurprisingly, they do not find insight 
to include such stepwise, search processes (Cranford and Moss, 2011;2012; Danek 
et al. 2014; Jarosz, Colflesh and Wiley, 2012; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; 
Subramaniam et al., 2009). Both approaches are clear examples of the working 
definition determining the subsequent characterisation of insight in research findings. 
 
Figure 2.1 Anchor model of insight. Adapted from  A naturalistic study of 
insight by G. Klein & A. Jarosz, 2011. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and 
Decision Making, 5(4), 335-351. Copyright 2011 by Sage Journals. 
Klein and Jarosz’s (2011) aim was to conduct an investigation of everyday 
experiences of insight and in collecting such examples they could be argued to add 
validity to the experimentally derived notion of insight. Their proposed Anchor Model 
of Insight (see Figure 2.1) does widen the scope of insight experience outside of the 
problem solving realm. It suggests that insight can result and follow three pathways: 
an identified contradiction or inconsistency in information; an unexpected connection; 
desperation when all options for a situation are exhausted. However, as outlined 
above their method of identifying insight incidents was contingent of their working 
definition of it and therefore influenced their findings. Additionally, the incidents used 
mostly relied on retrospective, often secondary source reports of the insightful 
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experience. Such reports would likely be subject to inaccuracies introduced such as 
by retrospective memory bias or an author’s poetic licence.  
2.1.4.2 Errors in recall of insight events.  
Gruber (1995) highlights three typical errors which can result from the 
interpretation of historical accounts of real-life insight incidents. Firstly telescoping: 
individuals' lose detail due to limitations of their memory, often exhibiting primacy 
and recency effects (Ebbinghaus, 1902). This means that they remember less of the 
middle part of an episode potentially leading to a false report of suddenness and 
completeness of a solution, as some of the process (probably the more laborious 
working part) is omitted from memory.  Secondly, Gruber (1995) identifies that 
memories may be embellished or altered through rationalisation. These alterations 
result from a more rational and intuitive interpretation of the situation, being made 
from the frame of the individual at the time of recall. This may therefore be influenced 
by aspects such as additional knowledge not available at the time of the incident, or 
changed social conventions at the time of recall. Furthermore, an expectation that 
creative invention results from moments of insight might mean such moments are 
more likely recalled as such. 
Errors may finally result from what Gruber (1995) classified as 
decontextualisation: the moment of insight stands out and is recalled while 
surrounding contextual information is not. This may not just be due to memory 
effects, but also related to perceptual and cognitive interpretations at the time of 
encoding. Maier (1931) demonstrated such an effect in participants undertaking his 
two strings problem (outlined in section 1.1.4.2). Participants who were unable to 
solve the problem were given an implicit hint, by an experimenter brushing past one 
of the ropes and causing it to swing. This group demonstrated enhanced solving of 
the problem in relation others in a no hint condition, suggesting that the cue helped 
them solve the problem. However, none of the participants reported that the brushing 
of the rope helped them reach a solution. This would suggest that although the cue 
was demonstrated to help, the participants did not see it as contextually relevant to 
their problem solving and so did not report it. 
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2.1.4.3 Research of insight in 'Great Minds'.  
Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) carried out two hour, in depth interviews 
with older [over 60 years] participants who were prominent creative individuals in 
their field. From analysis of these transcripts, they identified two types of insight 
problem solving. Firstly, "presented insight problem solving": akin to the type of 
insight problem solving elicited and examined in cognitive psychology research. 
Secondly, "discovered insight problem solving": longer term (in relation to the likely 
duration of all stages, preparation, incubation, insight and evaluation) and ground-
breaking in its outcome (Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, 1995, p.337). 'Discovered 
insight problem solving' could be argued to congruent to the notion of problem 
finding discussed above in the context of the discovery of penicillin.  
Marton, Fansham and Chaiklin (1994) used historical data to explore eminent 
scientists.  They analysed the transcripts of routine (annual) television interviews 
undertaken with newly awarded Nobel prize winners in physics, chemistry and 
medicine. The researchers identified that for the majority of years in their period of 
study (1970-86), a question was asked of the prize winners regarding scientific 
intuition. Intuition, although defined by the authors as an "immediate comprehension" 
(p. 457) often sounds more similar to an account of insight in Marton et al.'s (1994) 
descriptions. For instance, they discuss historical accounts of scientific intuition 
(Archimedes, Kekulé and Poincaré), which are seen by others as examples of insight 
(see Gruber, 1995). Furthermore they contrast analytic thinking to intuition, a 
distinction again more often seen in relation to insight (Cranford and Moss, 
2011;2012; Danek et al. 2014; Jarosz, Colflesh and Wiley, 2012; Jung-Beeman et 
al., 2004; Subramaniam et al., 2009). Marton et al. (1994) found that the scientists 
likewise saw intuition as distinct from logical reasoning. They furthermore identified 
that the scientists described a feeling of certainty in their direction of research, often 
without empirical grounding for their decision.  
Both Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) and Marton et al. (1994) were 
drawing from primary sources, but were still likely subject to the types of error 
outlined by Gruber (1995). Furthermore, the participants they identified were all 
prominent in their fields and renowned for the work which they were asked to 
discuss. It is therefore likely that these accounts had been made many times 
previously and so particularly increasing the likelihood of rationalisation errors and 
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embellishments due to changes in interpretation occurring through repeated re-
telling. 
Approaches as outlined above by Klein and Jarosz (2011), Gruber (1995), 
Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995) and Marton et al. (1994) fall into what 
Sternberg and Davidson (1995, p. 327) termed the "Great Minds Approach". By 
focusing on individuals who exemplify creative or insightful endeavour it assumes 
that key characteristics of insight might be gleaned. Such an approach neglects the 
role of insight in the everyday life of ordinary individuals. Furthermore, by focusing on 
eminent individuals, the accounts garnered are by their very nature retrospective, 
often collected years after the events described and subsequent to many renditions 
in which memory refinements as outlined by Gruber (1995) likely introduced errors. 
2.1.4.4 Insight in real-time.  
One example which explored the creative processes including insight from 
primary sources and direct real-time observation was Hargadon and Bechky's (2006) 
workplace study. They selected creative groups within different companies and drew 
data from a range of sources including direct interview of members of the groups; 
documentation produced by the workgroups; and observation of the creative groups 
at work. By use of real-time data collection from primary sources, they likely 
minimised the likelihood of errors highlighted by Gruber (1995). Hargadon and 
Bechky (2006) characterised the social nature of creativity at work, suggesting that 
moments of interaction lead to re-framing as a kind of "collective insight" (Hargadon 
and Bechky, 2006, p. 496).  
Dunbar (1995) likewise sought to explore first hand, the processes of scientific 
discovery in an occupational setting. He observed molecular biologists operating in a 
simulated genetics laboratory and identified aspects which underpinned their 
insights. They included the use of analogy and noting of inconsistent or surprising 
experimental results. These can be seen to be parallel to the three components 
identified by Klein and Jarosz (2011) in their Anchor model of Insight discussed in 
section 2.1.4.1. Dunbar (1995) furthermore highlighted the role group discussions in 
insight which can be seen as congruent to Hargadon and Bechky's (2006) findings 
outlined above.  
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2.1.5 Phenomenology of Insight Experience 
A series of recent studies have sought to identify the characteristics of the 
insight experience which it is suggested may serve to unify experimental and 
naturalistic insight accounts (Jarman, 2014). Topolinski and Reber (2010) proposed 
a theoretical account to explain the phenomenological accounts of insight in previous 
academic literature which describe the suddenness, ease, positive feeling and 
certainty that characterise insight experience. They assert that feeling aspects, such 
as the positive affect often described are products of a cognitive experience, a 
response to the change in processing fluency resulting from finding a solution to a 
difficult problem. A number of attempts have been seen to empirically explore this 
assertion. 
Jarman (2014) asked a sample of online participants to think of a difficult 
problem that required a novel approach or solution, from this 37% reported having a 
"mental click" (p. 279) insight experience. Participants were asked to rate their 
experience on a series of scales which Jarman (2014) devised to measure two 
cognitive aspects of insight. He concurred with Topolinski and Reber (2010) that 
affective components are secondary and directly attributable to cognitive 
experiences, and so used these to validate his cognitive focused scales. The first 
aspect of interest was radicality, how much cognitive change a person experienced 
during their insight. Secondly, a measure recorded how sudden the cognitive shift in 
insight was perceived to be. These aspects were compared to reports of processing 
fluency in multiple regression in how they predicted assumed experiential outcomes 
including affective ones (relief, satisfaction and how good it felt), excitement, 
intensity, mysteriousness and impact of the insight. From this Jarman (2014) 
demonstrated that his aspects explained variance in the outcome factors beyond 
processing fluency, suggesting that these additionally contribute to the insight 
experience. However the scales designed, analyses made and resultant conclusions 
are all based on the assumption that cognitive factors lead to affective outcomes, 
without any empirical support for the direction of these assertions. This again is a 
demonstration of circularity, where the implicit idea that insight is a cognitive 
phenomenon influences the research rationale and hypotheses tested. So while 
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Jarman (2014) did collect data from an everyday sample reporting real-life problem 
solving, the issues outlined above in terms of circularity and memory reports remain. 
Danek et al. (2014b) and Shen et al. (2015) both sought to capture the 
phenomenal experience of participants in experimentally elicited insight moments 
(see section 1.2.3.1 for further detail). Both in the first instance asked for open ended 
qualitative accounts of the insight experiences that participants had in solving magic 
tricks and word puzzles (CRA taks) respectively. However, neither robustly 
demonstrated that the experiences described were exclusive to the experience of 
participants in their insight solution moments compared to non-insight solutions also 
elicited in both studies. Despite this, both studies reported affective as well as 
cognitive aspects in insight experience in an experimental environment. So rendering 
hints as to possible phenomenological components of insight but not in a real life 
context, or with sufficient experimental control to conclusively attribute these to 
insight. 
A recent study did seek to collect qualitative accounts of insight in real life. 
Ovington, Saliba, Moran, Goldring and MacDonald (2015) used an online 
questionnaire to reach a large sample of participants and collect qualitative data 
describing insight experience in daily life. Firstly, the study identified a substantial 
minority (20%) of participants who did not report having experienced insight. A 
demographic profile of those reporting insight (or not) suggest that females are more 
likely to report having insight experience than males. No age or other demographic 
trends were detected. Those reporting having experienced insight were asked to 
provide descriptions of where they usually experienced insight. Responses were 
coded by one researcher, and a second applied the coding guide to the data to 
provide a high rate of agreement between the two. This essentially represents 
quantification of the qualitative data, something akin to a content analysis (Hsieh and 
Shannon (2005) (for full description see 3.2.3.2). From this frequencies of reports 
mapping to each category were recorded with participants' most often reporting 
insight occurring at night, at work and in the shower. While this study begins to 
demonstrate the when and who of insight, the reports given were generalised 
accounts of insight from memory. These would again be susceptible to the 
introduction of biases and memory effects (Gruber, 1995) (see above section 
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2.1.4.2). Furthermore, in quantifying and categorising the accounts of insight given 
some of the rich detail of qualitative data may have been lost.  
Ovington et al's (2015) participants were given a detailed definition of insight 
reflecting current research, framing it cognitively and as a solution moment in 
problem solving. Participants were asked to indicate if they felt the definition given 
matched their own ideas of what insight is. This can be seen as an opportunity to 
introduce new aspects or challenge the conceptions of the research definition of 
insight and so protect against the circularity problem in insight research (see section 
2.1.1). Only a small proportion of participants identified that they saw a difference 
(10%). This may suggest that the definition used in research matched lay 
perceptions of insight. However, within those who offered additional definitions, the 
majority outlined aspects mirroring the definition given in the first instance by the 
researchers. The participants may not have recognised that the components they 
offered matched the original definition, suggesting they either found it difficult to 
disengage from the definition given or did not understand it. This highlights the need 
to explore the impact that giving a definition of insight has on the qualitative 
responses collected. 
The different studies collecting phenomenological accounts of insight have 
taken different approaches in capturing experience, some from real life incidences 
others from experimental insight elicitation. However problems have been 
highlighted in the research approaches described, meaning that the effects of 
circularity and memory biases in the researchers' assumptions and participants' 
reports are not always acknowledged. Furthermore, while some studies describe the 
data collection and analysis as qualitative, the methodology utilised is not always 
clear or may actually be more aligned with a quantitative approach. 
2.1.6 Research Rationale and Study Aims 
The intention of the research in this chapter is firstly to collect the insight 
experiences of a general population sample, so not exclusively students, scientists 
or others selected according to any creative characteristics in their everyday lives (so 
again not in a specified creative context). It will employ an online questionnaire which 
will aim to capture self-reported experiences of insight accounting for memory bias 
by in the first instance asking for recent experiences of insight (within the last 24 
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hours). Furthermore, in order to explore the possibility that working definitions in 
insight studies influence the consequent insight characterisation made, participants 
will be grouped and given different working definitions to compare responses given. 
As this study is exploratory in nature, the qualitative accounts will also be analysed 
qualitatively, using an adapted form of a recognised methodology (Thematic 
Analysis, Braun and Clarke, 2006). Together, this novel approach will aim to draw 
conclusions on how insight is experienced in the every life of ordinary participants 
whilst minimising biases introduced from memory effects and the influence of 
previous research in this area. 
2.2 Method 
 Participants  
Participants were a voluntary, snowball sample recruited through online (on 
social media) and leaflet hand-outs with links to the online questionnaire. A hard 
copy version of the questionnaire was also distributed to a convenience sample of 
the local (non-university) and university population. Seventy-six participants (female 
n = 55) were recruited from both student (female n = 27, male n = 10, Mage = 27.3 
years, SDage = 8.95, rangeage:18 - 53 years) and non-student ((female n = 28, male n 
= 11, Mage = 42.9 years, SDage = 13.69, rangeage: 21 - 74 years) samples, all gave 
informed consent. The study was approved by the University of Buckingham School 
of Science ethics committee. 
Seventy-seven additional commencements were made to the online 
questionnaire, but participants withdrew before reaching the end. This led to an 
imbalance in the number of participants' in each of the definition groups. There were 
more participants in each of the definition groups (emotion definition, n = 63 and 
cognitive definition, n = 54) than the no definition group (n = 35). Allocation of 
participants to the definition groups in the case of survey monkey used the in-built 
page randomisation feature, sending participants to pages with one of the three 
definition conditions [positive/negative definition; full definition; no definition]. It is 
assumed that this allocation is at random chance, but the questionnaire's allocation 
is only visible for participants who completed the qualitative open text response 
pages, so equal allocation of the three cannot be verified for the online data. For the 
paper questionnaires, equal numbers of the three versions (incorporating the 
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different definitions) were printed and distributed, in this instance a drop out would 
include potential participants who received a copy of the questionnaire but did not 
complete and return it. 
 Materials and procedure 
An online questionnaire, the 'Insight Log' was designed using Survey Monkey. 
On giving consent by checking a box in Survey Monday and providing demographic 
information (age, country of main residence/birth and occupation) first time 
participants are randomly allocated to one of three groups who each received a 
different definition page. All contained a simple image of a matchstick figure with a 
light bulb (see Figure 2.2), one with no accompanying definition [no definition 
abbreviated to ND]. A second cognitively focused definition (abbreviated to C) gave 
Beeman et al.'s (2008, p. 20) description of insight that explicitly refers to problem 
solving: "Insight is a sudden solution to a long vexing problem, a sudden recognition 
of a new idea, or a sudden understanding of complicated situation accompanied by 
an Aha moment". The final group was given a wider definition of insight in line with 
the notion of Klein and Jarosz (2011, p. 338); "Insight is a change in mindset or shift 
in thinking", but with additional prompts that the experience might be accompanied 
by an 'Aha moment' for a positive realisation or by an 'Uh-oh moment' when it is 
negative" [emotion focused definition abbreviated to E].  
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Figure 2.2 Screen shot of online questionnaire definition page. 
All participants were then asked if they had experienced insight in the last 
twenty four hours. A positive response fed to 'insight log' pages. Each insight 
experience was captured on a single survey page ('Insight Log' page, Figure 2.3) 
with three questions about the insight experience. Two required open text responses 
with the following cues "Give a brief description of your insight experience" and 
"What were you doing when you experienced this insight? What were your thoughts 
leading to the insight?"  A final question asked the participant to record 
"Approximately how long have you been trying to solve this problem?", for which 
they were offered the following dropdown options; "minutes, hours, days, weeks, 
months, years or my insight wasn't a solution to a problem". These questions aimed 
to capture experience in participants own words and so avoid extensive or 
prescriptive instructions 
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Figure 2.3 Screen shot of online questionnaire 'Insight Log' page. 
There was the opportunity to log a number of insight experiences from the last 
twenty four hours (up to five experiences). Where there was no experience of insight 
in the last twenty four hours participants were asked to share a memorable insight 
experience from further in the past, again using the standard 'insight log' page as 
outlined above. The inclusion of this question aimed to maximise experiences of 
insight captured, while differentiating between recent and memorable but more likely 
memory biased retrospective ones.  A final de-brief page thanked participants and 
invited them to return in the future to share any further experiences of insight. As 
such, the questionnaire enabled return participation from the same URL. Return 
participants were not grouped or offered insight definitions, they were directed 
straight to an 'insight log' page on giving their consent and demographic information 
(as above). 
Most of the participants who withdrew from the online questionnaire dropped 
out at the point they were asked to give a qualitative description of their insight. In 
the initial incarnation of the questionnaire there was not opportunity to complete the 
questionnaire without giving experience details. The questionnaire was later 
amended to enable completion without adding these details and an opportunity to 
indicate a reason for not adding details from the following options: I have never had 
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an insight; I have had insights but cannot remember them; I do not want to share my 
insight. However, due to design limitations in the online version, these options were 
not as obvious as would have been desirable if preparing the questionnaire from 
scratch. Following this change participants continued to withdraw at this point in the 
study without explanation. 
 Analysis of data 
2.2.3.1 Quantitative Analysis: Demographic and response analysis.  
Descriptive statistics are presented for the demographic aspects of the 
participant sample. Comparisons between the frequency distributions of responses 
were made using Chi-square analysis for gender, definition group or student/non-
student status comparisons. 
2.2.3.2 Integrative Thematic Analysis (ITA).  
The data collected was predominantly qualitative and consisted of textual 
excerpts of the personal accounts of insight experience given via the insight log page 
of the questionnaire. The accounts given were relatively brief, and it is unlikely that 
accounts given by participants would be particularly deliberative. As such methods 
that take a phenomenological approach would not have enough information to 
analyse (see also section 1.3.1). Therefore a form of thematic analysis was carried 
out following assumptions and guidance outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006) where 
one researcher: familiarises themselves with the data; groups excerpts; identifies 
potential themes; finalises themes giving them names and descriptions (see Figure 
2.4a). A second research might then be asked to confirm that the excerpts match the 
themes identified (typical confirmatory triangulation – see discussion below). 
However, as highlighted in section 2.1.1 there is a circularity problem in insight 
research. Knowledge of previous insight research will influence the interpretations 
made in the thematic analysis, for example potentially directing attention to aspects 
in the data that align with previous assumptions. The second researcher would then 
also be prone to confirmation bias when agreeing the themes identified.  
The use of two or more researchers in qualitative analysis can be seen to 
align with the catchall term proposed by Denzin (1978) as researcher/ investigator 
triangulation (Denzin, 1978)In a recent critical review of mixed methods approaches 
employing investigator triangulation [IT], Archibald (2016) identified there was little 
80 
 
explanation of this process beyond Denzin’s (1978) original statements on 
triangulation that included one outlining the "use of multiple observers/ investigators 
in a single study" (p. 229). It was found that in practice IT was confirmatory (as 
highlighted above specifically in relation to Thematic Analysis), and did not specify 
any criteria necessary or important to the characteristics of the researchers to 
support the notion that their combined use increased the robustness of findings. 
Furthermore, the literature was unclear on the roles that each researcher took in any 
triangulation process, and there was no acknowledgment of their philosophical or 
paradigmatic stances. Little detail was provided as to how researchers agreed on the 
final findings of their analysis, with most applications of IT seeing the use of a priori 
codes or a second researcher reviewing themes identified by the first, so being used 
as a consistency check.  
An adapted form of Thematic Analysis was developed for this study. This 
aims to explicitly outline research design aspects in relation to the use of more than 
one researcher in analysis. For example in terms of the approaches to analysis each 
research takes (see below). It furthermore provides detail of the methodological 
steps taken by each researcher to arrive at their findings. As such this can be seen 
to address deficiencies highlighted by Archibald (2016) in typical IT applications. 
As shown in Figure 2.4b Integrative Thematic Analysis (ITA) requires two 
researchers to independently conduct the early stages of thematic analysis, 
identifying themes within the data. Using a second researcher who is naïve to the 
research question or general supporting literature, and so using a purely inductive 
approach protects against the circularity effects identified above in section [see 
section 2.1.1]. Once themes are identified independently, the researchers work 
together to integrate their themes and produce a final representation of the data. It 
should be highlighted that the actual process of thematic analysis is much more 
iterative than shown in the process diagrams in Figure 2.4, here the process is 
simplified to illustrate the adaptations made in ITA.  
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Figure 2.4 Integrative Thematic Analysis (ITA): a. Typical process of Thematic 
Analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). b. Adopted process where themes are 
developed by integrating the independent analysis of two researchers, one 
naïve to the research question and background literature (so taking an 
inductive approach). 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) highlight that in poor thematic analysis the initial 
questions asked of participants constitute resultant themes. In addition to ensuring 
that the themes identified in this study were not reflections of the questions asked, it 
was also ensured that themes did not mirror the definitions given to participants. 
Therefore where a theme linked to something explicitly identified in one of the 
definitions given, supporting excerpts were required from the other definition or no 
definition group to verify it as a valid theme. 
2.3 Results 
 Quantitative Analysis of Participant Response Patterns 
As shown in Table 2.1, 71% of participants reported an insight experienced in 
the last 24 hours (binomial test, p < 0.001, n = 76). 
Survey Monkey allocated participants to groups at random. There is no way to 
check the exact allocation as only where a participant response is given can this be 
recorded. Therefore the allocation of participants who withdrew is not known, but it is 
expected that across participants there would be equal allocation to each of the three 
groups (C, E and ND) meaning an expected proportion of 0.33 for each group. 
Examination of response frequencies for the different definition groups see 
significantly less than expected responses collected from participants in the No 
i
i i
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Definition group (18%) than groups given a definition (binominal test, No Definition 
expected proportion 0.33, versus aggregated Definition group responses, p = 0.008, 
n = 76). 
Table 2.1 Frequency of reports of insight within the last 24 hours according to 
sex, student status and definition group. 
  Within the last 24 hours: 
  Insight No insight 
Total  54 22 
Sex 
Female 39 16 
Male 15 6 
Status 
Student 27 10 
Non-student 27 12 
Definition 
group 
ND 10 4 
C 15 10 
E 29 8 
 
As highlighted, this study aimed to obtain responses from both student and 
non-student samples. Comparisons were made in reporting of insight as being 
experienced in the last 24 hours or not (offering an insight from memory instead) and 
there were no differences in the patterns of reporting across sex or student/non-
student participants. A summary of response frequencies for different groups can be 
seen in Table 2.1. 
 Thematic Analysis 
Thematic analysis was undertaken on the textual descriptions of insight given. 
Two participants returned to share a second insight experience. Two participants 
had two experiences within the previous 24 hours, while a third logged three. The 
themes identified by the two researchers and resultant integrated themes are shown 
in Table 2.2. The excerpts of insight in the following summary of the final themes are 
provided with codes detailing the sex (F/M), age, student/non-student status (S/NS) 
and definition group (no definition, ND; cognitive, C; emotional, E). 
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Table 2.2 ITA process demonstrating independently identified themes / sub-
themes that lead to final integrated themes for the everyday experience of 
insight. 
  Theme* Sub-Theme* Final Theme** 
   Content Process Feelings 
 R1 Self 
Realisation 
 Personal     
Social 
Aspects 
  Social Facilitation  
Problem 
Solving 
 Intellectual   
 Practical   
Active Search  Active Search  
Time Away  Time Away  
Feelings Certainty   Positive 
 Uh-oh   Negative 
R2 Life 
Reflections 
Positive 
Affirmations 
Personal  Positive 
Change/Self 
Improvement 
Personal  Negative 
Theoretical/ 
Conceptual 
Trying Hard/ 
Stress 
Intellectual Active Search Negative 
Relaxed/Quiet 
Time 
Intellectual Time Away Positive 
Visual-Spatial       Practical   
One-Solution 
Problems 
 
Intellectual 
Practical   
Learning/ 
Being Taught 
  Social Facilitation  
 * ITA stage iii – Candidate Themes / Sub-Themes ** ITA stage iv & v 
 
The final themes are also shown in Figure 2.5. In the later stages of ITA 
(when the independent researchers' themes were being integrated) it was identified 
that the themes could be grouped to represent different aspects in a typology of 
insight. Three themes described the content of their insight as being Intellectual, 
Practical or Personal. The themes Time Away, Active Search and Social Facilitation 
all represent process accounts of insight, while two themes related to an affective 
component of the insight, either Positive Feelings or Negative feelings. Thematic 
analysis allows for a single excerpt to support a number of themes within the data. 
So in this study a single insight description represented a data excerpt, for example 
the insight description: 
While doing the statistics for my dissertation. I was having trouble figuring 
out how to analyse one aspect of my data. I suddenly realised what I had 
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to do, and did it right then and there. I had been thinking hard about what 
I had to do, but then my mind wandered. During the wandering I realised 
the solution to my problem. (F, 20, S, E) 
This description (except) supports a number of themes identified, it is 
Intellectual in content (solving an issue with statistical data analysis), having 
occurred whilst the person was taking Time Away from the problem (e.g. 
daydreaming) and can be seen as Positive (it is assumed that this solving moment 
was a positive experience). 
 
Figure 2.5 Final model of typology of insight identified using Integrated 
Thematic Analysis. Themes interact in three aspects: Content, Process, and 
Feelings. Both dark grey and light grey cubes demonstrate themes with 
distinct supporting excerpts in this study. Light grey cubes highlight novel 
aspects identified by this research. Dark grey cubes demonstrate the 
predominant focus of previous experimental approaches. White cubes did not 
have strong support from the excerpts in this study but provide conceptually 
possible categories for future research to investigate. 
 
 Intellectual [Content].  
This theme encompasses insights that are theoretical or conceptual in nature, 
often in an educational or scientific context. The excerpt above represents an 
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intellectual insight, the participant describing their understanding of the correct 
statistical test to apply to data (scientific) for their dissertation (education). Support 
for this theme was seen across all participant groups, for example a non-student 
shared the insight, "I was reading an article at the time, and a particular phrase 
struck me. I suddenly realised that there was a connection between the subject I was 
reading up about, and my more usual area of study" (F, 53, NS, E). Both these 
examples could be argued to link to academic pursuits. Insights that were intellectual 
in a more general way were also shared: as seen in a participant's "realisation of 
how easy it is to have a sense of entitlement, and to subconsciously disregard the 
reality of those less fortunate, and thus how hypocritical it is to criticise, for instance, 
politicians for doing the same" (M, 41, NS, C). 
 Practical [Content].  
Practical insights incorporated descriptions of physical manipulation of objects 
as seen in the following insight about a magic trick. 
Sometimes the method behind a trick requires an awkward body position 
that, if not justified within the context of the performance, makes the 
method obvious to the audience. In this situation I need to keep my arm 
bent in a certain way. I realized that my arm looks totally natural in that 
position if I am holding something up to my face, as if trying on a pair of 
glasses. It just suddenly made sense. (M, 28, S, C) 
The Practical theme often saw insights set in a problem solving context, so 
solving hands on immediate problems such as “how to use tyre air pressure pump at 
garage for the first time, could not work out how to attach it to tyre valve [and] 
suddenly realised how to attach it after examining the device” (F, 41, S, E). It is worth 
noting that both student and non-student participants offered examples supporting 
this theme. Additionally, the above car tyre example while being offered by a student 
describes a distinctly non study related problem solving incident. 
 Personal [Content].  
Participants also described insights relating to themselves in terms of their 
thoughts and feelings about their own lives. Some were quite general personal 
insights relating to broad depositional realisations for instance, the “power of 
focusing on one thing in life, and all else will fall into place automatically” (M, 24, S, 
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E). Other insights related to something more specific like an impending event, "“I 
can't make my wedding perfect. Sometimes I need to save my energy and accept a 
compromise solution earlier” (F, 35, NS, ND). Alternatively a particular area of an 
individual's life such as their "next job role - it's in my hands and with the years 
passing by I just need to challenge myself and make it happen" (M, 55, NS, C). 
 Active Search [Process].  
Active search describes a theme where participants have an insight whilst in 
the process of attempting to solve a problem. They often describe active 
engagement in problem solving, searching for answers by reading, using the internet 
or thinking through the problem. Whilst participants were explicitly asked to describe 
what they were doing when they had their insight, descriptions incorporating their 
active problem solving attempts were volunteered in the first response which asked 
them to describe their insight. This reduces the likelihood that the theme is simply a 
reflection of a specific leading question. One example of response to the open ended 
request to describe their insight starts by describing their Active Search:  
Helping my son with his homework. He had written a creative writing 
passage but he was over his word count, we were brainstorming together 
to try new ways of saying what he had written but in less words. Then I 
had an Aha moment and we reduced the word count with him. (F, 36, S, 
E) 
The above example describing the search to perfect a magic trick (see under 
Practical theme above, section, insert 2.3.2.2) also supports the Active Search 
theme.  
 Time Away [Process]. 
 In contrast to the Active Search theme, participants also described having 
insight about problems whilst taking Time Away from attempting to solve them. For 
example a post graduate student reported having an insight regarding his studies 
during a break "eating lunch whilst watching things on YouTube with [his] girlfriend" 
(M, 21, S, C). Many insights occurred during other mundane or routine activities such 
as walking, running or travelling. Others describe having their insight either at night 
or first thing in the morning, for instance, "I woke up with a novel idea for student 
assessment" (M, 40, NS, C). The time away may also constitute a shorter break from 
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problem solving effort, for example in daydreaming: "I had been thinking hard about 
what I had to do, but then my mind wandered. During the wandering I realised the 
solution to my problem" (F, 20, S, E). 
 Another set of descriptions highlight how participants had insights that 
were improved solutions to problems they had already solved, so again they were 
not actively searching for a solution and in this sense having Time Away from active 
problem solving. This is illustrated by a participant describing an insight about their 
study design: "I realised that there was a better way of manipulating a psychological 
construct. Happily I was in the process of designing a study so hadn't already started 
collecting data" (F, 27, NS, E). 
 Social Facilitation [Process].  
This theme recognises the social environment in which many of the shared 
insights occurred where participants attribute their insight to a contribution from 
others, or as a result of a social interaction. The former often occurred in a teaching 
environment: "someone was explaining how something worked, and I didn't 
understand, until it suddenly clicked and it made perfect sense" (F, 23, NS, C). As 
this example from the non-student sample illustrates, teaching may occur in 
everyday contexts outside the classroom or lecture hall. The teaching/being taught 
aspect of this theme was identified by the second researcher.  
A case which can also be seen to support insights in other socially driven 
contexts such as where the individual's insight is driven by joint attempts to solve a 
problem. This effort is exemplified by one participant's insight: "a Lecturer needed a 
kidney bean but, of course, there were none in the office so I suggested using blue 
tack, to mould the kidney bean" (F, 44, NS, ND).This insight can be seen to be 
socially driven as the participant was helping her colleague to solve their problem. 
Both were actively engaged in effortful problem solving. 
Other insights were socially facilitated as a coincidence of a social interaction 
rather than through the deliberate efforts of another person to impart a new 
understanding or solve a problem. For instance as the result of a conversation, the 
insight of "understanding the rationale for someone sending their child to private 
school over a perfectly good standard state run school" occurred whilst "chatting at a 
social event" (F, 46, NS, E). The inference here is that the participant's insight was 
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incidental to the conversation they were having rather than the key focus of the 
social interaction.  
 Positive Feelings [Feelings].  
The Positive Feelings theme reflects either explicit or assumed positive affect 
relating to an insight. Implicit in insights describing the finding of a solution to a 
problem is the notion that this is good for the person, and so positive. The above 
example of with the kidney bean, while not describing an emotional component can 
be seen to be positive. Some participants did explicitly describe an emotional aspect 
as seen in this insightful crossword solving moment.  
I had [ ] a surge of sudden understanding, almost like switching on a light - 
which made me very happy. I then immediately thought 'Oh! That's lovely!' 
because I thought the solution was extremely clever, novel and elegant. I 
had no doubt it was correct. (F, 53, NS, E) 
Other aspects of the positive emotion theme relate to feelings of intuition and 
certainty during insight. These aspects were not mentioned in either of the definitions 
given to participants. The following excerpt illustrates both of these expressions. 
It was a crystallisation of a research problem I'd been thinking about [ ] 
before I had traced the whole path, I suddenly knew where it was going, 
and really had this feeling of crystallisation, of a definite form emerging. 
Though initially indistinct, I knew it was what I needed for the research 
problem to move on a step. (F, 35, S, C) 
The second researcher identified more general expressions of positivity in the 
insight descriptions, naming the theme Positive Affirmation. Insights such as "I have 
finalised realised that life is too short and I should enjoy myself" (M, 24, S, E) fit this 
aspect of Positive Feelings. 
 Negative Feelings [Feelings].  
This theme represents insight incidences which were negative realisations. 
The negativity was often inferred rather than explicitly stated, for example 
participants did not use the term Uh-oh. It is clear from the following that this 
realisation would be seen as bad for the individual, and rather than expressing an 
Aha! would likely have uttered an oh-no or far worse!  
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Driving home when I suddenly realised that I hadn't saved the essay draft 
I'd worked on all day, as I had downloaded it from my [online cloud file] 
and worked on it in uni [versity]. So I realised I had lost a whole days 
work. (M, 21, S, C) 
Other experiences are more ambiguous and without accompanying contextual 
information make it difficult to draw firm conclusions. An example can be seen in the 
insight: "a realisation that I had misinterpreted an EU regulation" whilst "discussing it 
in a meeting" (M, 54, NS, E). This was initially interpreted by the first researcher as a 
positive example of social facilitation and learning. It should be noted that the first 
researcher is based in a small science department within a building predominately 
housing the University's Law School. Accordingly, this is the frame in which it was 
first interpreted, where in an academic context such misinterpretation is expected 
and likely a normal part of legal study and learning. However, when the participant's 
job role is taken into consideration, a different interpretation might be made. The 
participant from the non-student sample and is a consultant. In this context, such a 
misinterpretation can be seen to potentially have more far reaching and negative 
implications, and as such could represent an example of an Uh-oh moment 
generated in response to the definition given (the participant received the emotion 
focused definition). 
 As with the Positive Feelings theme the second researcher identified 
more generalised affective descriptions in their theme Trying Hard/Stress. The stress 
of the situation where this participant had their insight is very apparent: “crying while 
trying to sleep” (F, 18, S, C).  
One of the participants who shared more than one insights from within the last 
24 hours presented a series of insight experiences which can be seen to represent 
an Uh-oh, negative insight followed by an Aha, positive insight. She firstly records, 
"going to work, my car key wouldn't open my car" (F, 44, NS, E). Her following 
insight log is "I found the spare key to my car after the main key wouldn't work." The 
participant's first insight finds them identifying a problem, which in this instance is 
subsequently solved. Similarly problem finding can be seen in a number of 
experiences, often shared in the context of the ultimate solution to the problem they 
found, for example one insight being, "the filter in the dryer was full of washing 
powder which I cleaned and put back yesterday, today when I came in I found that 
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the filter could no longer fit properly, I have now reported it to housekeeping" (F, 58, 
NS, E). Here it can be seen that in order for the participant to solve the problem by 
reporting it, she had to have the insight as to the true nature of the problem, not a 
simple powder accumulation, but that the filter did not fit. Both of these examples 
result from participants' given the emotional focused definition that explicitly refers to 
Uh-oh moments. However, a similar sequence can be seen in an insight report made 
about a daily inspection of a new house build with the participant realising that a 
"garage door opening [was] too small (built incorrectly), organized two props from 
another site to enable opening to be enlarged and door fitted correctly" (M, 52, NS, 
ND). The negative realisation of the incorrect build (negative insight?) enabled him to 
seek solutions to the problem. This example again comes from the No Definition 
group. All of these suggest that negative insight, the described initial Uh-oh moment 
changed the perception of, or alerted participants to a problem which all then 
attempted to solve. The resultant problem solving actions in response to the negative 
insight moment of "suddenly realising I'd misunderstood a crucial element of an 
author's methodology" (F, 29, S, E) are described by one participant, "after some 
reading came to understand this better and how it can be applied in my own 
research." However, as the majority of these sequenced descriptions are from the 
Emotional focused definition group, not enough support can be offered for a 
separate theme or sub-theme from the data analysed. 
2.4 Discussion 
The prime aim of this study was to collect and analyse the real-life, everyday 
insight experiences of participants (from non-student as well as student samples). As 
the majority of insight experiences were reported within 24 hours of experiencing 
them, the characterisation of insight resulting from analysis of these can be seen to 
be relatively accurate with minimal memory effects on the events recalled. 
Fundamentally the collection of these examples demonstrates in the first instance 
that insight is a phenomenon experienced and understood outside of the narrow 
research community interested in it and the usual student samples used to research 
it. After a brief examination of the prevalence of insight, the majority of this 
discussion will focus on the themes identified in the results including the identification 
of the first research examples of negative insight, the Uh-oh moment. It will highlight 
where these correspond or contrast to the body of (mainly experimental) insight 
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research; both examples outlined in the Introduction (section 2.1) and drawing from 
outside of the original literature review's realms where unexpected themes emerged. 
Finally, the novel methods employed in this study, grouping participants to give 
different definitions of the concept of interest and the development of ITA will be 
assessed in relation to the findings of this study and in terms of future avenues of 
research both within the scope of this thesis and beyond. 
 Prevalence of Insight 
As shown in Table 2.1 it can be seen that the majority (71%) of insight 
experiences collected were experienced within the last 24 hours. This gives an 
indication of the prevalence of insight in daily life, something research is only 
beginning to address (Ohlsson, 2011). From this it might be inferred that the majority 
those who experience insight do so on a daily basis. However, the nature of the data 
collection only provides a snapshot of experience within those participants who 
completed the study. This does not account for those who did not finish the survey or 
any sampling bias in recruiting participants in the first place. As such further research 
might look to clarify prevalence, perhaps using Experience Sampling Methods (see 
section 4.1.3). 
 Ovington et al. (2015) recently presented a different measure of prevalence 
relating to the percentage of people who reported having ever experienced insight. 
Interestingly, their research suggested that there is substantial minority of the 
population who do not experience insight. This might explain the high proportion of 
withdrawals from the insight log. Participants were initially unable to complete the 
online version of the insight log without giving an insight experience (either from 
within the last 24 hours or a memorable insight from further back). For participants 
who do not have such experiences, the only option would be to exit the 
questionnaire, recorded as a withdrawal by researchers. However, this is only 
conjecture and research which more closely follows participants as they experience 
insight in their daily life may inform further in the future (see Chapter 3).  
 Typology of Insight 
A typological model of insight was identified (see Figure 2.5) using ITA. This 
demonstrates how the themes are represented and interact within the data. So an 
insight incidence can be described in different ways. Firstly, in terms of the content of 
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the insight, describing what the new thought or understanding is, whether it was 
Intellectual, Practical or Personal. The process aspects of insight examine the 
context in which the insight occurred, what the person having the insight was doing 
at the time of their insight: actively searching for a solution to problem (Active 
Search), taking a break from problem solving efforts (Time Away) or saw Social 
Facilitation of an insight. The final aspect saw themes describing an affective 
component to insight: Positive Feelings or Negative Feelings. 
 Feeling Aspects of Insight 
 Positive Feelings: happiness and certainty.  
The identification of the themes relating to the affective experience of insight 
in daily life suggests that it is not a purely cognitive experience. Many of the insights 
shared included explicit descriptions of emotions, and as reflected by the two 
themes, these can be seen to be both positive and negative. This study provides 
congruent support to that of Danek et al. (2014b) and Shen et al. (2015) who also 
recently highlighted an emotional component to the phenomenological experience of 
insight. With insights shared in this study describing positive emotions such as 
happiness likewise identified by both Danek et al. (2014b) and Shen et al. (2015) (for 
further discussion see section 1.2.3.1).  The recorded experiences of insight from 
these were elicited in a laboratory based task for which this study offers 
complementary evidence of a positively valenced, emotional component of insight 
with greater ecological validity. Together they represent an exploratory foundation to 
initiate further research into insight phenomenology, in particular they highlight the 
value in considering both cognitive and emotional components of insight. 
 Negative Feelings: Uh-oh moments.  
This study provided the first documented examples of negative insight. These 
are examples where the new idea or realisation that a person suddenly has, is 
negative; so the insight alerts them to the fact that things are worse than they 
originally thought or knew. Previous theoretical discussions have raised the 
possibility that an insight might be negative and experienced as chagrin: annoyance 
at not having seen the solution or idea sooner (Gick and Lockhart, 1995). However 
this still centres on the notion that the content of the insight is essentially good for the 
person having it, representing the end of their search for a solution. In this sense the 
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insight content remains positive, but this is overshadowed by annoyance (negative 
emotion) at having missed it before (Homer Simpson's D'oh). Congruent to this 
Danek (personal communication) identified that some participants rated solving 
problems through insight negatively, again contrary to the idea that this always elicits 
positive emotions. Interestingly, no examples of chagrin were shared in this study. It 
may be that people do not equate such occasions with insight, as the subsequent 
annoyance might mask the Aha moment itself. Alternatively, making chagrin public 
may lead to additional negative feelings of embarrassment: reporting such an 
occurrence would possibly be avoided in favour of other insights (Brown & Garland, 
1971). Finally, occurrences of chagrin could just be rare and so none of the 
participants had such an experience in their previous 24 hours to share. 
Some of the examples seen that support the Negative Feelings theme saw a 
negative Uh-oh leading to subsequent Aha moments. As highlighted in section 
2.3.2.8, one excerpt explicitly described how the negative insight led them to attempt 
to resolve the problem, in this instance by reading up on the author's work following 
the Uh-oh moment exposing their misunderstanding. Runco (1994) suggests that an 
affective component is particularly pertinent to problem solving. He posits that with 
no emotional salience things would not be considered to be problems, and 
furthermore there would be no motivation to try and solve them. The Uh-oh moments 
described in the Negative Feelings theme can be seen to align to this idea, with the 
emotional negative Uh-oh moment identifying a salient issue that motivates problem 
solving. This is likewise similar to Guildford's (1950) example of a creative individual 
using an uneasy feeling they have about something to explore it for problems (see 
also 1.1). This highlights the need for further research to verify the role of negative 
insight in everyday life and in relation to problem solving, see Chapter 3 for further 
discussion. 
The examples of insight shared where participants' describe finding an 
improved solution to a problem they have already solved, while not necessarily 
experienced as negative Uh-oh insights can be seen to similarly be incidences 
where something new in a situation not judged to be problem is seen. Relating this to 
Wallas (1926) stage model of creative problem solving (see section 1.1.3) 
participants would presumably be in the verification stage or beyond (being satisfied 
that the problem is solved) when they had their insight. This and the examples of 
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negative insight confound the stage model and demonstrate an out of sequence 
progression: the insight serves to reinitiate problem solving, seeing participants 
identify that the new [insightful] solution is identified as better than the original 
through verification. 
 Divergent and convergent problems.  
Perhaps an additional aspect to consider is in terms of the types of problem 
that the insight relates to. Guildford (1967) distinguished between convergent and 
divergent problems. Convergent problems, are those with one or a limited few final 
solutions. The second researcher identified a candidate theme of One-Solution 
Problems analogous to convergent problems. Participants shared insights that 
occurred giving a solution to a problem, like how to fit an air pump to a car tyre. 
These offer daily life examples of convergent problem solving to fit alongside many 
traditional insight elicitation paradigms which also employ convergent problems, for 
example CRA problems (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b, see1.1.4.1). The 
Gestalt tradition of insight problem solving likewise presented problems with one (or 
a very limited few) solution(s) so were in that sense closed, convergent tasks. 
However some insight problems do have varied solutions and so are perhaps 
less convergent than at first considered, for instance Perkins (2000) highlights some 
differing solutions for the nine dot problem (see Figure 2.6) The most offered solution 
is the one shown in Figure 2.6a, where all the dots are drawn through using four 
straight lines without lifting the pen from the paper. However there are additional 
solutions where the dots can be crossed through by drawing a single straight line, 
either by folding the paper (Figure 2.6b and d) or making a cylinder shape (Figure 
2.6c). A quick internet search renders even more obscure and perhaps creative 
solutions to this problem, for instance that shown in Figure 2.6d which appears to 
require an aptitude for origami!  
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a b  c d  
Figure 2.6 Solutions to the Nine Dots problem. b and c adopted from Perkins 
(2000) downloaded from 
http://www.unlearning101.com/fuhgetaboutit_the_art_of_/quiz/ 
While there are more solutions in the nine dot problem, these again are not 
open in the sense of traditional divergent tasks such as Guildford's (1967) Alternative 
Uses Task (AUT) or in many examples of many of the insights presented in this 
chapter's results (section 2.3). For example the description relating to research 
design where the insight mapped a path through an indistinct problem. The second 
researcher again identified this aspect in the candidate theme Theoretical/ 
Conceptual, reflecting the divergent nature of the problems, however, both of these 
candidate themes had an intellectual content, and it was this aspect that was finally 
agreed between the researchers. 
 Content of insight 
 Practical/Intellectual.  
The examples of insight that support the Practical and Intellectual themes 
have much in common with previous experimental approaches to insight. Most tasks 
used to elicit and explore insight in the laboratory produce insights within the 
Practical or Intellectual domain. Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) identified such a 
distinction. They compiled a selection of insight tasks previously used in 
experimental insight research, including Gestalt problems such as Duncker's (1945) 
candle problem and tumour problem and Maier's (1931) two strings problem (see 
section 1.1.4.2 for further details) and non-insight tasks, for instance the Tower of 
Hanoi (Egan & Greeno, 1974). They carried out cluster analysis to identify tasks 
where participants performed in a similar way, so a group which the same participant 
generally did well or poorly on all. From this nine clusters were identified, which in 
the main fell as exclusively insight or non-insight tasks within a cluster. They also 
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asked participants to complete a battery of cognitive tests measuring aspects 
including fluid intelligence, working memory, verbal ability, and visuo-spatial ability. 
Multiple regressions statistically explored which of the cognitive abilities predicted 
performance on the insight tasks. Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) identified that insight 
tasks could be differentiated into verbal insight tasks and spatial insight tasks, 
verifying this distinction with the fact that different cognitive abilities facilitated 
performance on each type. The spatial insight tasks map to the Practical theme, with 
the second researcher using this label to describe the theme.  
It is perhaps harder to say that Verbal insight tasks are directly analogous to 
the Intellectual theme, as this would seem to incorporate wider aspects than simple 
verbal ability or vocabulary. However closer examination of Gilhooly and Murphy's 
(2005) grouping of tasks sees them select tasks specifically in terms of the spatial 
criteria and label all remaining tasks as Verbal. However, this label is to reflect that 
performance on vocabulary tests was a significant predictor of performance on this 
group of insight tasks. Regression examines correlational relationships, so 
vocabulary may not be the underlying ability utilised in all of the insight tasks rather a 
proxy for another aspect unexplored by Gilhooly and Murphy (2005). The Intellectual 
theme describes insights that are conceptual in nature, all of the problems described 
as Verbal by Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) are conceptual in the sense that they are 
essentially thought experiments presented in written or verbal form. They are solved 
through conceptual means, thinking through the problem. Participants solving the 
spatial insight problems meanwhile could employ mental imagery of the spatially 
based, practical tasks. So from this perspective the distinction highlighted in this 
study between insights that represent problem solving in the Intellectual and 
Practical domains is congruent with that identified in experimental insight problem 
solving tasks.  
 Personal insight.  
The Personal theme was unexpected as most insights within cognitive 
research are framed as intellectual or practical problem solving. However, 
examination of counselling psychology literature finds discussion of insight in the 
context of therapy. Across traditions (humanistic and psychoanalytic) change within 
an individual is effected by self-insight; without a recognition of their problems 
individuals' are unlikely to experience therapeutic change (Connolly et al., 1999; 
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McLeod, 2013; Williams and Lynn, 2010). Tolor and Reznikoff (1960) created the 
"insight test", which presented hypothetical scenarios with a choice of responses 
designed to measure the clients defence mechanisms and therefore identify their 
'psychological mindedness', in other words their readiness to engage in change. In 
psychotherapy, insight is seen as the agent to initiate change (Moro, Avdibegović & 
Moro, 2012). Clients reflecting on their own therapeutic journey likewise identified 
that their insights did not represent final solutions to their problems, rather served to 
help them define their problems as they work through them (Timulak & McElvaney, 
2013).  
That is not to say that all of the participants in this study are assumed to be 
sharing instances of Personal insight resulting from therapy. Hillis et al. (2015) 
emphasise that as clients move through therapy they aim to develop "Stimulating 
Mastery (p. 125), which enables them to deal with everyday life problems using an 
understanding of self or others in relation to themselves. The Personal insights in 
this study likely reflect these desirable and likely innate problem solving approaches 
to daily life. 
From this standpoint personal insights could be argued to be analogous to the 
concept of problem finding discussed above (section 2.1.4.3), as in essence insight 
helps the client to see what their problems are and where they stem from, initiating a 
problem solving process, therapeutic change. Many of the experiences supporting 
the Personal theme demonstrate this, where insight clearly communicates a 
realisation of a need to change rather than their insight being an outright solution to 
their problem. For instance, one participant's insight identifies that they have to 
challenge themselves in order to find their next job role, effectively their insight sees 
them identifying the problem in themselves, rather than reaching a specific solution. 
 Intrapersonal insights of mini-c creativity.  
An additional similarity can be seen between the Personal insights identified 
here and Kaufman and Beghetto's (2009, p. 4) "intrapersonal insights". Intrapersonal 
insight is the result of an attempt to explain different types of creativity. There is a 
classic distinction made between Big C creativity which occurs in eminent 
individuals: the Great Minds examples described in section (see section 2.1.4.3) are 
examples of Big C creativity. This contrasts with little c creativity described as 
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everyday creativity, the examples of insight shared in this study would typically be 
categorised as little c. However, Kaufman and Beghetto (2009) identified cases that 
did not easy fall into either of the above. Firstly, professionals engaged in creative 
activities but not seen as eminent could not readily be classified as either Bic C or 
little c, so were labelled as Pro c. Secondly, they suggested that some everyday 
experiences were personally creative in the sense that they were novel and useful to 
the individual (Plucker, Beghetto and Dow, 2004). However to others they were not 
new nor relevant, and so not useful to them as such they were not satisfying a 
definition of everyday creativity seen in little-c. Kaufman and Beghetto (2009) 
labelled these as mini-c, and used the example of learning in describing it. The 
insights supporting the Social theme (section 2.4.5.3) that describe insights initiated 
through teaching are good examples of this. The new information or understanding 
being novel to the person having the insight, yet familiar to the teacher. 
The Personal insights shared are likewise examples of mini c. Ideas and 
realisations about one's own career prospects or wedding (see section 2.3.2.3) are 
of little utility to others and so would not be seen generally as creative. Yet to the 
individual the thoughts are both novel and useful, so meeting the criteria for being 
creative mini c. This study therefore offers additional real-life evidence of Kaufman 
and Beghetto's (2009) mini-c in a different, novel context. 
 Process (in insight) 
When considering what processes account for insight one approach is to 
identify factors that are necessary or enhance insight occurrence. One of the most 
debated aspects is whether reaching an impasse is a necessary precursor to insight 
(see discussions in section 1.1.5). The themes of Time Away and Active Search 
together contribute real-life evidence to support experimental work in this area and 
suggest that insight can occur either whilst actively searching for a solution or when 
an individual has reached an impasse and is perhaps not engaged in the problem 
solving task as seen in the Time Away examples. As seen in the methods of insight 
research outlined in Chapter 1 (sections 1.1.4 and 1.1.5) much of the experimental 
work into insight has adopted problem solving paradigms, most often with a single 
participant attempting to solve problems that elicit insight. The Social Aspects theme 
contrasts this and supports research exploring how insight occurs in social 
situations. 
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 Active Search: Insight without impasse.  
Examples where insight occurred whilst participants were actively searching 
for a solution suggest that impasse is not necessary in order to experience insight. 
Such a contingency is described by Weisberg (2014; Fleck and Weisberg 2004, 
2013) in his stage model of problem solving (see section 1.1.5.5). Examples given in 
support of this theme offer real-life verification of pathways described. For example, 
one participant's description of their attempts to perfect a magic trick (section 
2.3.2.2). Firstly stage one, there is no immediate match for the problem solution in 
memory, presumably because the trick being developed is new. No new information 
is rendered so the solver progresses to stage two. Stage two employs heuristics 
such as practicing the trick. Stage 2B sees the heuristic giving new information, the 
participant noticing the necessary awkward arm movement he has to make to 
perform trick. This new information takes the solver to stage 3, the new information 
leading to restructuring, the participant describes that they suddenly realise how 
holding a pair of glasses would mask this movement (stage 3A, solution through 
insight without impasse). This demonstrates insight in real-life without the solver 
reaching an impasse. 
Klein and Jarosz (2011) furthermore suggested that insight could also be 
seen as a gradual search process which is in contrast with many other insight 
conceptions. However, as discussed this conclusion could be argued to map directly 
to the working definition that the researchers used (which included search strategies) 
to identify the everyday examples of insight they analysed (see section 2.1.4.1). The 
Active Search theme has relevance to this discussion as many of the excerpts 
supporting this suggest that insight was the product, and part of a very active and 
almost systematic search process. Participants typically give descriptions such as, 
"looking at lecture slides, a book and my notes" to "solve a statistical exercise" (F, 
23, S, C). This participant was from the cognitive definition group and so received a 
full description of insight and the accompanying Aha moment. However there was no 
explicit mention of search in the definition. It might be assumed that the participant 
took all aspects of the definition on board. That said, without further direct probing of 
their experience (as is achievable with face to face interviewing techniques) it is 
possible that the participant based her judgement of what constituted an insight on 
her own understanding of what insight was and ignored the definition given (see also 
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section 3.4.1.1 for further discussion regarding this). Alternatively she may have 
taken heed of one component of the definition, for instance, understanding a 
complicated situation and gave less consideration of whether it satisfied the 
additional aspects of a suddenness and an accompanying Aha. However such 
limitations aside, these types of experience again suggest that insight occurs whilst 
searching for a solution, and without the necessity of an impasse. 
 Time Away: Incubation effects in insight.  
The Time Away supporting excerpts can be seen to provide real-life examples 
of various factors associated with different theories of incubation and impasse in 
insight. As described in section 1.1.5.3, in experimental work incubation tasks of low 
cognitive load were found to be most likely to elicit insight. Many of the examples of 
insight offered in this study contributing to the Time Away theme may be useful in 
supporting this notion. They describe how insight occurred whilst doing mundane 
tasks of likely low cognitive load and so can be seen as comparable to the 
experimental findings. For instance, participants described it occurring whilst walking 
or running. Furthermore, the Time Away tasks were often in different domains to the 
problems which they solved through insight during these times. This can be seen 
with the student who had an insight about his research whilst eating lunch and 
watching YouTube: one might assume that he was not watching videos relating to 
his work, his girlfriend might object! These types of example are congruent with the 
findings from Gilhooly, Georgiou and Devery (2013), suggesting that doing dissimilar 
tasks in Time Away from the problem may enhance solving.  
The findings are also congruent with findings from another recent daily life 
study, Ovington et al. (2015) (see further description in section 2.1.5) found that the 
most reported locations for having insight included being in the shower, on transport, 
during exercise and in nature. All of these situations likely involve activities such as 
driving or riding on a train/bus that again might be argued to have a low cognitive 
load and likely different to the problem they solved. One participant in this study 
summarised in everyday terms the general finding from incubation research, she 
explained experiencing her insight whilst "walking to get some lunch. Time away 
from the computer is far more productive for 'big' thoughts I find" (F, 30, S, E). 
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The Time Away theme however extends beyond ideas explored in incubation 
studies, and incorporates shorter periods of time away. As highlighted by the insight 
in (section 2.3.2.5) that describes it occurring during mind wandering. Often 
colloquially termed daydreaming it is also referred to as stimulus-independent 
thought (SIT, Schooler et al., 2011). Research exploring the cognitive mechanisms 
and neurological correlates of SIT, particularly examining the impact of SIT on task 
performance found that time away was detrimental to it. In contrast this study 
highlights a potential beneficial outcome to SIT in line with that proposed by Dixon, 
Fox and Christoff (2014) who suggested that creative thinking might be one area 
where mind wandering is beneficial. They propose that this would involve alternating 
between mind wandering to generate ideas and metacognition to monitor and 
evaluate them.  
Other explanations for why an insight might occur during mind wandering 
could relate to theories about incubation effects on creative thinking (see also 
section 1.1.5.3). Three theories are proposed and have been explored in the context 
of longer incubation periods away from divergent thinking tasks. In these situations 
Gilhooly, Georgiou and Devery (2013) provided evidence to support that 
unconscious processing best accounted for an increase in creative idea generation 
after incubation. The situations in this study describe an idea suddenly occurring 
during the Time Away rather than subsequent to it under resumed efforts to problem 
solve. These are analogous with Gilhooly's (2016) description of "breakthrough" 
solutions that emerge during time away from problem solving attempts. 
However, aspects of the theories explored by Gilhooly, Georgiou and Devery 
(2013) might still be pertinent to mind wandering. The proposed benefits of 
incubation in terms of breaking set, so moving problem solvers away from an 
unhelpful aspect of the problem might still be seen in mind wandering. Schooler 
(2013) highlights that SIT is detrimental to the focal task because it takes attention 
away from it. Where attention is a necessary and helpful thing to the task, such as 
reading tasks that Schooler et al. (2011) describe, then SIT is likely undesirable. 
However, such a removal of attention would be a positive thing if the problem solver 
is focused on the wrong aspect of the problem, enabling them to break set. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that focused attention in experimental insight tasks 
may be detrimental to problem solving. This was highlighted by the verbal 
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overshadowing effect that saw a decrease in problem solving performance during 
verbal protocol analysis, so when attention was paid to, and thoughts verbalised 
(Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks, 1993). In addition, situations that compromised 
participants' attention to the task, such as listening to irrelevant speech or under 
articulatory suppression saw an increase in insight solutions (Ball, Marsh, Litchfield, 
Cook, & Booth, 2014). Alcohol consumption is likewise suggested to enhance insight 
problem solving by reducing inhibition and as a result seeing less focused attention 
(Jarosz, Colflesh and Wiley, 2012). Interestingly, Sayette, Reichle and Schooler 
(2009) recently found that alcohol consumption increased incidences of mind 
wandering during a reading task, which the authors again attribute to its effects on 
attention.  
In sum, the examples of Time Away offered in this study provide daily life 
examples of insight in during incubation and mind wandering to corroborate 
experimental studies in this area, furthermore that may contribute to the identification 
of novel questions to explore in the future. For instance one aspect that was not 
apparent in the experiences shared was the reasons that caused participants to take 
time away from their problem solving efforts. As highlighted in (1.1.5), some 
researchers assume that reaching an impasse causes the cessation of problem 
solving efforts in favour of an unrelated activity, but there is yet little naturalistic 
evidence of this in daily life problem solving. 
 Social Aspects.  
The insights in this study which describe social aspects to insight highlight 
that thinking and problem solving in real life do not occur in a vacuum. This 
corresponds to Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer's (1995) observation from their 
interviews of eminent creative individuals, that insight occurs at a "social, 
interpsychic level" (p. 337) in contrast to the focus on individuals' mental processes 
and behaviour which predominates cognitive psychology. They further assert that a 
lack of social interaction may reduce the likelihood that insight occurs. Dunbar (1995) 
likewise found that group discussions (held by their participants) contributed to 
insightful moments for participants in his simulated genetics laboratory. Hargadon 
and Bechky (2006) again demonstrated a social aspect of insight, evidenced in the 
emerging insight of one "creative collective" in their design of a novel basketball 
shoe. The insight to incorporate side air cushions was highlighted by the authors as 
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the result of a group of individuals with disparate knowledge and expertise. One 
member had a medical background whilst another's technical expertise was 
pneumatics, it was their interaction which enabled individual member's existing 
knowledge to be re-structured in a group insight. 
All previous examples of social aspects of insight draw from studies which 
selected participants due to their notable creative achievements (Kaufman and 
Beghetto's (2009) Big C) or careers with a creative component (Pro c). The 
examples from this study offer complementary evidence of socially derived insight 
more broadly in everyday life and in more mundane circumstance. Most of the 
insights of other studies were work related and focused on the work setting, Dunbar 
(1995) provided a simulated work setting for his molecular biologists, whilst 
Hargadon and Bechky (2006) followed work groups through the development of 
specific products or projects. Some of the insights shared from this study are also 
examples of group generated, work related insights, like the insight relating to a 
kidney bean (section 2.3.2.6). However, others may be considered more 
serendipitous insights from outside of the work realm. For instance, the insight about 
schools which occurred at a social event. 
The insights occurring whilst learning or being taught can also be seen to 
overlap with the social aspect of insight: these represent deliberate, socially imparted 
or initiated insight. This is distinct to the concept of 'insight learning' most often 
discussed in respect of animal behaviour which describes a new adaptive behaviour 
within an individual; arrived at suddenly and not by trial and error, shaping, or social 
learning (see Shettleworth [2012] for full discussion). As discussed in section 2.4.4.3, 
these instances are also daily life examples of the mini c "intrapersonal insight" 
(Kaufman and Beghetto, 2009, p. 4). These insights are creative to the learner in the 
sense that they are novel and useful, but this creativity is unique to the learners, and 
would not be considered creative from a wider everyday perspective seen in little-c 
creativity. 
 Effects of Giving a Definition When Collecting Qualitative Data 
A further aim of this study was to explore the effects of offering different, or no 
definition to the qualitative responses garnered. Such an approach protected against 
the possibility that the definition offered primed participants' responses. Participants 
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in a recent study by Ovington et al. (2015) may have demonstrated a difficulty in 
disengaging from the original definition of insight they were given (see further details 
in section 2.1.5). Moreover, Danek et al. (2014b) identified that a third of their 
participants' open qualitative responses described insight mirroring the definitions 
participants were given. Accounting for this effect was important to counter the 
circularity problem of insight research (see section 2.1.1). Shen et al. (2015) also 
recognised the possibility that definitions given to participants could contribute to the 
circularity problem. They omitted aspects of interest from their definition to avoid 
leading responses. However this means that in choosing a single definition, 
researchers must effectively identify aspects that are not of central interest to their 
research question and yet be sufficient to aid participants in recognising the 
phenomenon of interest. 
 Using several and no definition groups as demonstrated in this study enabled 
exploration of aspects included in the definitions used. As highlighted in section 
2.2.3, this provided stronger support for themes offered, drawing examples from 
groups where the aspect being considered was not included in the definition given. 
Therefore, accounting for definition priming enabled a richer analysis of the data and 
assessment of themes' validity. So where there was wide ranging, solid support from 
all definition groups the resulting theme could more confidently be ascribed as valid. 
Within the Negative Feelings theme, the additional aspect of a series of 
experiences, an Uh-oh (problem finding) followed by an A-ha (problem solving) 
experience. The majority of these episodes arose from the Emotional focused 
definition group, so could have resulted from priming and so not confidently be 
ascribed as a theme or sub-theme in their own right. This highlights a further benefit 
to grouping for definitions, enabling a more nuanced discussion of the level of 
support seen for various aspects identified with in the data. This enables 
differentiation between themes which have strong support from all groups (such as 
the theme negative insight) and other aspects that are seen, but have less strong 
support (such as the outcomes from having an Uh-oh moment). Aspects with 
inconclusive support can be highlighted as such in order to elicit future research 
questions. 
A further point of note is that there were fewer responses in the No Definition 
group (see Table 2.1). Survey Monkey randomly allocated participants to a definition 
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group, so it would be expected that there would be equal numbers of responses 
collected for each group. This highlights that while there are issues in giving a 
definition, in terms of leading the participant's response, a definition is useful to 
maximise collection of data. It is not clear what aspect of not giving a definition 
decreased response rates. One might surmise that a definition helped participants to 
understand what type of experience they were being asked to share, but without 
further research into this it is not possible to make any such assertions.  However, it 
may be pertinent for future exploratory qualitative studies of this nature to include a 
number of definition groups omitting and including the pertinent aspects of the study 
subject to protect against confirmation bias, but without a no definition group to 
maximise participant response rates.  
It must however be recognised that there were dropouts from both of the 
definition groups as well as the no definition group, so other factors may also be 
pertinent to this observation. It is difficult to ascertain what a normal level of 
response completion is as most researchers discard any incomplete questionnaires 
and do not report this, as ethical guidelines generally consider these to be examples 
of withdrawn consent. Further research to explore why participants dropped out at 
the point they did may be pertinent, most having completed demographic and the 
closed questions about their insight experience whilst leaving the open responses 
unanswered.  
 Limitations of questionnaire design 
The insight reports made in this study were often very short, for example, 
"what to do for a party [whilst] meditating". This restricted the level of analysis that 
could be carried out and sometimes led to debate of how an insight could be 
interpreted. The researcher has sought to make clear where such interpretation 
reaches beyond the data given. In ideal circumstances the opportunity to further 
explore responses with a participant would have enabled a far deeper understanding 
of the experiences shared. However this is offset by the number of participants that it 
would be practicable to do so with. It would also reduce the anonymity of completing 
an online questionnaire, where more sensitive insights might not be shared if 
participants anticipate having to explain them to a researcher face to face. 
Participants, knowing that their insights are identifiable to them and that they are to 
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be questioned on them may opt not to share certain insights or create demand 
characteristics in the socially desirable version of an insight that they share. 
 Conclusion 
In conclusion the application of ITA on the qualitative accounts of everyday 
insight collect identified through research, negative insight for the first time. Further 
exploration of everyday negative insight is reported in Chapter 3. On demonstrating, 
as this chapter has that an emotional component of insight is of interest, 
experimental research that seeks to validate these claims is described in Chapters 5 
and 6. Finally, whilst this chapter established that people are able to recount insight, 
often from the last 24 hours, it did not provide any conclusive account of the 
prevalence of insight in everyday life. This question is considered in Chapter 4.  
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3. Everyday experience of negative insight. 
3.1 Introduction 
Negative insight is a sudden, sickening moment of realisation (Friedlander, 
personal communication 2016). While it has been identified as a feature of everyday 
insight in Chapter 2, there were not sufficient examples of negative insight to enable 
a characterisation of it.  As such, the nature of negative insight is still unknown. A 
number of questions in particular are pertinent to this characterisation. Firstly, what 
aspects constitute negative insight in everyday life? Secondly, are these the same or 
different to positive insight in everyday life? Finally, what function does negative 
insight serve in its daily life occurrence? 
 As highlighted in section 1.2, and because this thesis has been the first 
to identify negative insight there is little literature to review. Therefore this study aims 
to take an exploratory approach to begin to characterise negative insight. As such, it 
will ask open questions to elicit, in the first instance an account of a recent (within the 
last 24 hours) negative insight experience. This is again to reduce memory effects in 
the recounting of insight experience highlighted as problematic by Gruber (1995). 
The incidences shared will then be analysed using Integrative Thematic Analysis 
(ITA) to enable as an objective analysis as possible to and minimise effects of 
findings from previous studies in this thesis (see sections 2.2.3.2 and 2.4.8). This 
should provide further information as regards to aspects that constitute negative 
insight. 
With regard to the second question, a typology was identified for general 
insight experience in everyday life in Study 1 (see Figure 2.5). This, and the literature 
summarised in previous chapters for positive insight serve to provide a comparison 
point for negative insight. A Content Analysis of the negative insights shared will 
therefore be undertaken using the typology from Study 1 to code the negative insight 
examples. This should give an indication of the extent that negative insight in daily 
life is similar or different to generalised everyday insight. 
As highlighted in sections 1.1.4 and 1.1.5, positive insight is described within 
a problem solving framework, specifically representing the solution point. Discussion 
in Chapter 1 illustrates how negative insight might serve to initiate problem solving, a 
contrasting function to that often posited for positive insight (see section 2.4.3.3). 
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Asking participants to describe what they were doing when they had their negative 
insight will help to identify the circumstances of their insight. However, to fully 
explore the situation surrounding negative insight a further question to probe what 
happened next will also be asked. Together these may help to explore the function 
that people attribute to negative insight in everyday life. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
 Recruitment of participants was undertaken using snowball sampling 
via online social media and leaflet promotion. Sixty-seven participants (Mage = 
38.14yrs, SDage  = 16.05) completed the online questionnaire (an additional 94 
questionnaires were not fully completed and so not included in the data), Table 3.1 
shows the proportion of participants in terms of sex, occupation and time that insight 
reported occurred. Nine insights were reported as being made by participants who 
had previously shared a negative insight. However there was not sufficient 
information recorded to pinpoint how many returning participants there were or link 
them to their original posts. As such it should be noted that the information in Table 
3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the same as if these nine responses were 
made by new, unrelated participants. As no statistical analysis is being conducted 
this should not be too problematic an assumption to make. 
Table 3.1 Demographic breakdown of participants 
  n 
Sex Female 
Male 
53 
14 
Occupation Students 
Non-student 
53 
14 
Time of 
reported insight 
Last 24 hours 35 
Over 24 hours 32 
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3.2.2 Materials and procedure 
 The format of the online questionnaire described in 2.2.2 was adapted 
to ask questions specifically regarding negative insight. As there were not a variety 
of research definitions available to compare responses against, a single definition 
was derived based on those used for positive insight (see section 1.1.2) and from the 
findings of Study 1. The definition used was: "Negative insight is a sudden new 
thought, understanding or idea accompanied by an Uh-oh moment. It is your sudden 
realisation that things are worse than you originally thought". On giving informed 
consent and providing demographic information (age, sex, occupation, country of 
birth/main residence) participants were provided with the negative insight definition 
and asked if they had experienced it in the last 24 hours. They were then asked to 
share an insight, in the first instance from the last 24 hours but otherwise one from 
further in their memory. Participants indicated how long ago their insight occurred, 
selecting from within the last: 24 hours; week; month; year; 1-10 years; over 10 
years ago. They then described their insight responding to three open questions. 
Firstly, "Please give a brief description of your negative insight experience." 
Secondly, "What were you doing when you experienced this insight?" Finally, "What 
happened as a result of your negative insight?" Participants were then taken to a 
debrief page which provided information on how to contact the researcher and an 
invitation to return and share future negative insights. 
3.2.3 Analysis of data 
3.2.3.1 Integrative Thematic Analysis 
The data collected in this study was first analysed using Integrative Thematic 
Analysis (see section 2.2.3.2). A direct content analysis was then conducted. The 
ITA was undertaken first to minimise the influence of the previous themes identified 
in Study 1. The remaining sections of this chapter are dedicated to the two different 
analyses in turn, firstly the Analysis of data, Results and Discussion relating to ITA 
then in respect to content analysis. 
Note that a different "second researcher" was used for the ITA analysis in this 
study than in Study 1. Using the same person would have introduced subjectivity into 
this analysis due to their knowledge of the themes previously identified. The person 
selected was both naïve to the previous research conducted in this thesis and to 
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insight literature more generally, this was to ensure they were taking a data driven 
approach in their analysis. 
3.2.3.2 Content Analysis 
A directed content analysis was undertaken following Hsieh and Shannon 
(2005). This method draws on previous theory to form a coding schedule. In this 
case the themes identified in Chapter 2 were used to code. Two researchers 
independently coded each negative insight for its Content [Intellectual, Practical and 
Personal] and Process [Time Away, Active Search and Social]. Note that the third 
aspect identified in Study 1 was not coded as this was the feeling component and in 
this study all were negative as this is the focus of the research. The definition for 
each theme was reviewed to take into account the context of negative insight, the 
amended definitions adopted are reported in Table 3.3. Definitions for Time Away 
and Active Search were amended, see section 3.6.3 for further discussion relating to 
this. An additional category of Not Insight was added as a result of the ITA (see 
sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.1) which identified this as a theme. It would be problematic to 
code incidences that are not insight using a typology developed for it. Therefore the 
introduction of this as a category negates the requirement to do so. 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) feature a hypothetical example in their explanation 
of directed content analysis where the questions asked of participants [in a semi-
structured interview] probe for things related to the theory being used for coding. As 
the Uh-oh study aimed to also conduct data-driven thematic analysis, this aspect of 
the directed content analysis was not followed, and open ended, un-targeted 
questions were used in the questionnaire. The "second research" asked to code this 
data was actually the "second researcher" who conducted the ITA in Study 2, this 
ensured that they were very familiar with the themes and their definitions when 
coding. Initial agreement (using Cohen's Kappa) between coders was moderate for 
both Contents, κ = .49 (95% CI, .35 to .63), p < .001 and Process κ = .50 (95% CI, 
.35 to .65), p < .001 (Landis & Koch, 1977). It was identified that an area of 
uncertainty for both coders was in whether some of the descriptions represented 
insight, the definition of insight used to identify non-insight was changed to "non-
insight or not enough information to label as insight"; coding was then repeated (see 
Table 3.2). This saw an increase to substantial agreement, for Contents, κ = .76 
(95% CI, .65 to .88), p < .001 and Process, κ = .80 (95% CI, .32 to .91), p < .001 
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(Landis & Koch, 1977). Furthermore, it led to subjective reports that the researchers 
were more confident in their coding. As such results reported in 3.3.2 represent the 
coding of the first researcher. 
3.3 Results Integrative Thematic Analysis (ITA) 
ITA was conducted and identified six themes: Uh-oh No Insight; Social 
Environment; Time Away; Mental Time Travel; Gut Feelings and; Sucking It Up. The 
initial themes identified independently by each researcher and the final theme that 
they contributed to can be seen in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 Characterisation of negative insight using Integrative Thematic 
Analysis: candidate themes identified independently by two researchers were 
then integrated into final themes which were labelled and described. 
  Description 1st Researcher 
2nd 
Researcher 
Uh-oh No 
Insight 
Participants describe experiences 
relating to an Uh-oh moment in 
direct response to a cue without 
any mental restructuring 
Uh-oh no 
insight 
Not insight 
(active 
problem 
solving) 
Social 
Environment 
Insights in this theme are 
embedded within the social 
environment in which they occur. 
Relationships Setting (Social) 
Time Away 
This theme sees insight occurring 
when participants were distracted 
or first thing in the morning or last 
thing at night. This was not 
identified by the first researcher, 
perhaps overlooked due to it being 
a theme in previous studies in this 
thesis. 
 It dawned on me 
Mental Time 
Travel 
Participants' insights see an 
association of events over different 
time frames, memories from the 
past, observations from the 
present and plans for the future. 
Mental time 
travel 
Mulling it 
over - 
situational 
cues 
Gut Feelings 
Participants relay their negative 
insight experience in terms of 
physiological descriptions. 
Bodily 
descriptions Gut feelings 
Sucking It 
Up 
This theme represents the 
participants' descriptions of their 
active attempts to resolve the 
issues highlighted through 
negative insight despite the 
negative nature of their realisation. 
Initiation of 
problem 
solving 
Sucking it up 
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3.3.1 Uh-oh No Insight.  
A proportion of the respondents described experiences that focused on the 
emotional aspect of the definition for negative insight given, so the Uh-oh moment; 
but did not map to the other parts of the negative insight definition which describe 
cognitive restructuring. For example, "my baby was sick all over me and the floor ” 
(F, 22yrs). These represent a negative emotional response to stimulus in the 
environment rather than a negative new thought or realisation. A theme describing 
incidences of non-insight was identified by both researchers as seen in Table 3.2. 
3.3.2 Social Environment 
Many of the negative insights shared were embedded in the social world of the 
participants; some were pertinent to the individual or related to others that they 
know. The following example illustrates how the insight occurs as a result of a social 
interaction. Furthermore the insight represents a new understanding regarding a 
working relationship. 
I was talking to a client [on the phone] and realised comments I had made 
earlier had been misinterpreted and that that client was going to react in a 
way that would make it harder for us to work together. As a result of my 
negative insight, I was worried and attempted to I proactively clarify my 
meaning and apologise for any misunderstanding. This did not work. (F, 
37yrs) 
The relationship aspect was identified by the first researcher, and this was 
seen to align with the second researcher's theme that described the social situation 
as being intrinsic to many insights. Together it can be seen that there are social 
aspects in both the contextual and content components of negative insight moments. 
3.3.3 Time Away  
This theme was labelled as 'It dawned on me' by the second researcher and 
describes common situations where participants found they were having insights 
such as in moments of distraction, first thing in the morning or last thing at night. This 
is demonstrated in the insight below. 
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Suddenly realising that I had an excess to my insurance policy upon which 
I was about to make a claim [whilst] trying to sleep. Had to rethink if I 
would still make the claim given the excess. (F, 45yrs) 
The first researcher did not identify this as a theme, however during the 
integration process it was agreed that this was a valid theme. The first researcher 
had overlooked this theme due to their previous analysis of the everyday insight data 
in Chapter 2, where a comparable theme of Time Away was also identified. In both 
studies participants described their insight at times when they were doing things 
unrelated to it, for example whilst driving or watching television. 
3.3.4 Mental Time Travel 
Often the negative insights described a convergence of ideas or 
knowledge from different times or contexts. Perhaps, but not always, a 
situational cue suddenly being linked to events from memory and/or related to 
future plans. As such these negative insights represent a moment of 
convergence between current thoughts with memories from the past and plans 
for the future, exemplified in the title name of mental time travel and the 
following insight description. 
I realised a colleague at work was breaking the law. It came absolutely out 
of the blue while watching the news on a hotel television, and had nothing 
to do with what I was watching or any obvious process. I connected 
comments by two people made days apart (and days previously) and 
realised that there was only one logical conclusion. I suppose the negative 
insight was that I knew I had to report. (M, 50yrs) 
It can be seen that there is an instantaneous putting together of different 
memories of conversations with a certainty of the future action that the participant 
must take. In this instance the participant does not consciously relate the negative 
insight to any situational cue. The following Uh-oh moment demonstrates how a 
situational cue (the rain) is related to both previous actions, in this case omitting to 
have done something and its future implications.  
Realising that as it was raining, I didn't have a lesson planned as my 
lesson was based on being outside. [I] felt slightly nauseous, heart rate 
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increased, sweaty palms followed by me talking myself round - it will be 
fine - everyone still alive type thoughts. (F, 46yrs)   
3.3.5 Gut Feelings  
The second excerpt seen above (in section 3.4.4) also highlights the current 
theme of Gut Feelings. This sees participants describe physiological aspects of their 
negative insight. As above, in terms of typical arousal responses of the sympathetic 
nervous system like elevated heart rate and sweating, but also some more unusual 
ways as seen below. 
I keep on thinking [of] things that I missed from my last assignment that I 
should have included. Each time I think of something, I think that it's a bit 
less over my overall mark and that I will fail and I get a horrible anxious 
feeling and my face prickles. (F, 27yrs) 
This theme was identified by both researchers, with the second researcher identifying 
sub-themes of "Oh Shit" and "It's Obvious". 
3.3.6 Sucking It Up 
Both researchers identified a theme that describes the active response that 
participants have to their negative insight. These represent both cognitively thinking 
about how to resolve the problem the Uh-oh moment has alerted them to or actual 
actions. The following negative insight demonstrates this initiation of problem 
solving.  
Earlier today I ordered a Mother’s Day gift for my mum from Amazon. 
Tonight I suddenly realised I hadn’t changed my default delivery settings, 
meaning I’ll be getting a cream tea hamper on Saturday whilst my mum 
gets nothing! I checked that the hamper had already been dispatched (it 
had) and laughed about it for a few min[ute]s with my partner. I then 
reordered - with the correct address! - and text my mum to apologise that 
she'll receive a late gift. (F, 27yrs) 
In addition, the second researcher highlighted how there was an element of resolve 
demonstrated in recognising a set-back and looking to overcome it, often in a very 
pragmatic way. In the words of one of the participants in response to being asked 
what happened as a result of their insight, they "sucked it up" (F, 22yrs). While for 
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the insight above the steps taken to solve the problem were relatively straight 
forward, for others the stakes were much higher likely involve far more 'sucking it up' 
as seen in this negative insight. 
The realisation that I had caused duplicate transactions to 750,000 bank 
accounts [whilst] trying to test a software patch. The incident was front 
page news in every newspaper. I had to explain the problem to the CEO 
of the bank that I worked for. It took 36 hours flat-out working for me and 
five colleagues to fix it. The bank lost £20 million as a result. I was not 
fired. (M, 56yrs) 
3.4 Discussion - Integrative Thematic Analysis 
The use of ITA, following methods outlined in Study 1 identified six themes 
within the everyday examples of negative insight collected. Five of the themes 
represented different aspects of incidences of sudden mental restructuring giving 
new negative representations: Social Environment; Time Away; Mental Time Travel; 
Gut Feelings and; Sucking It Up.  An additional theme, Uh-oh No Insight, where no 
mental restructuring was seen was also identified. These will be discussed in turn, 
characterising negative insight and highlighting implications for current theory 
relating to positive insight and creative problem solving. 
3.4.1 Social Environment 
As seen in Study 1 (section 2.4.5.3) everyday insight is embedded in the 
social environment, with cues from this facilitating the occurrence of insight. The 
theme of Social Environment seen for negative insight however differs in that it 
represents not only the facilitation of insights, but that in many instances the social 
environment is an integral component of the negative insight. So in the negative 
insight in section 3.4.2, the facilitation of the insight can be seen due to a 
conversation with a client. However, the insight content was also related to social 
cognition, a realisation about someone else. This is again seen in the negative 
insight in 3.4.4, however this example shows it was the recollection of social 
conversations, and the implications of these, rather than the immediate social 
environment acting as a cue that contributed to the insight. 
 Gilhooly et al. (2007) developed a set of real-world problem solving 
tasks as an alternative cognitive test for older adults. They made the distinction 
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between everyday problem solving and socio-emotional problem solving that had an 
interpersonal focus. This distinction maps to the insights in the Social Environment 
theme, furthermore that negative insights typically represent the moment that the 
participant became aware of an interpersonal problem or social faux pas. 
As such this theme again emphasises the point made in section 2.4.5.3 that 
exploration of insight as a social process should be considered alongside research 
which focuses on the individual problem solver. The role of negative insight as 
problem finding (see section 3.4.5 below) identified by Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 
(1995) should also be further explored in the context of the everyday social 
environment. 
3.4.2 Time Away 
The Time Away theme seen in section 2.4.5.2 for general everyday insight 
experience was discussed explicitly in relation to problem solving and representing 
the realisation of a solution to a problem that had been put aside, therefore seeing it 
being solved during an unrelated task. However, in negative insight the sudden 
realisations were not problem solutions; in fact most often these identified issues that 
until the point of the insight participants were not aware of. The theme Time Away in 
this instance represents the second part of the definition, in that the negative insight 
was unrelated to the activity being undertaken and without any particular reference 
to unresolved problem solving. 
 In section 2.4.5.2 Time Away is discussed in relation to incubation in 
problem solving. As outlined previously (1.1.5.3) Gilhooly (2016) suggests that 
facilitation in problem solving through incubation is likely due to the implicit spreading 
activation that continues once problem solving attempts have been suspended. The 
insight moment occurring due to activation of a solution in relation to a goal-to-be-
solved (activation having continued to spread during incubation) creating a positive 
feedback loop that raises the activation levels above the threshold of awareness. 
This would be experienced as the solution suddenly appearing in consciousness. 
However, in many of the negative insights shared in this study there was no (once 
conscious) goal that remained activated; the insight is the first time the participants 
become aware that there is a problem with a goal to be solved, in the words of one 
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participant it appears "out of the blue" (M, 50 yrs). This experience cannot therefore 
be explained by current incubation theories.  
However, perhaps thinking about this idea in a slightly different way might 
explain incidences of negative insight. One possible explanation for the continued 
activation is that the problem had emotional salience (this is the reason it is seen as 
a problem in the first place (see point made by Runco (1994) in section 2.4.3.2). The 
incidences that contribute to a negative insight, if emotionally salient may have 
likewise continued to cause spreading activation. When two or more disparate 
spreading activations associate and activate a goal-to-be-solved, this might again 
cause positive feedback in a way comparable to Gilhooly's (2016) description and 
consequently, a sudden awareness of the problem and the goal to be solved. The 
example identified in 3.4.4 demonstrates these ideas, the negative insight putting 
together separate conversations with different people to identify criminal activity by a 
work colleague and the need to report this. 
An alternative explanation is that the negative insight in fact represents a 
solution to a problem, not recognised as such by the participant. So, in the case of 
negative insight discussed in section 3.4.4, the different conversations recalled may 
have been labelled by the cognitive systems as problems in the sense that they were 
unusual or had unexplained aspects to them. The negative insight resolving the 
disparities identified in each of the conversations, so while the participant recognised 
the problem of lawlessness at the insight point, this in fact provided a solution fully 
explaining the previous conversations. Thinking about this in terms of spreading 
activation, the implicit goal states were the separate, unexplained conversations. The 
negative insight, new to the conscious awareness of the participant actually 
represented spreading activation of these unresolved goal states; putting the 
separate conversations together to recognise the superordinate problem of a 
lawbreaking colleague. This highlights that further research exploring theories of 
incubation in negative insight is warranted, both in terms of everyday experience and 
experimentally controlled incubation and insight solutions. 
3.4.3 Mental Time Travel 
The insight described above and in 3.4.4 furthermore demonstrates the theme 
of Mental Time Travel: where participants are making associations between events 
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in different time frames; past events, present cues and future plans. Jung-Beeman et 
al. (2004) discuss the role of remote association in insight and accordingly 
developed the Compound Remote Associates (CRA) task (see section 1.1.4.1 and 
5.2.2.3 for further detail). The remote association of different events, thoughts and 
plans over time, possibly through spreading activation processes described above 
(in section 3.4.2) present interesting additional considerations for theories of creative 
problem solving and insight. 
3.4.4 Gut Feelings 
This theme sees participants describe their insight moment in terms of 
physiological components. Many theories of emotion incorporate physiological 
aspects (see section 5.1.3 for more in depth discussion). Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-
Moreau and Aronson (2004) used implicit language cues to measure the extent 
people focus on arousal aspects in their emotional experience (see section 5.4.4 for 
a more detailed explanation). This theme likewise reflects an implicit focus on 
emotion arousal and physiology in insight experience. At no point was attention 
drawn to this aspect of emotional experience. The definition of insight given only 
refers to emotion in terms of valence (it being negative and an Uh-oh moment). This 
contrasts to the general experience of insight in everyday life (where most insights 
shared were positive) where very few descriptions related to physiological aspects, 
as such there was not an analogous theme. This may therefore point to a difference 
between positive and negative insight worthy of further investigation, both in 
everyday experience and using lab-based tasks (see Chapters 5 and 6 which 
explore positive and negative insight in relation to physiological aspects of emotion). 
3.4.5 Sucking It Up: problem finding insights  
As discussed previously in section 2.4.3.2 the case of negative insight 
highlights that insight might not be restricted to the solution moment of the problem 
solving process (as outlined by stage models of creative problem solving such as 
Wallas (1926) (see detail in Chapter 1, section 1.1.3). Sucking It Up sees 
participants attempting to solve the problems identified by negative insight, as such 
framing negative insight as the moment of problem identification. In this instance it 
positions insight before Wallas' (1926) preparation stage. Runco and Nemiro (1994) 
suggest that stage models of creativity are problematic if taken literally to mean that 
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the creative process occurs in a linear progression through the prescribed stages. 
They propose that a more helpful interpretation (see Figure 3.1) is to consider 
interactions between stages in a non-linear fashion incorporating feedback loops and 
out of sequence progressions.  
 
Figure 3.1 Two-tier model of creative thinking Adapted from Cognition and 
creativity by M.A. Runco & I. Chand, 1995. Educational psychology review, 
7(3), 243-267. Copyright 1995 by Springer. 
  
Runco (2000) highlights the importance of problem finding both as part of 
Wallas' (1926) preparation stage and within his own Two Tier Model of Creative 
Thinking (Runco and Chand, 1995). In this, problem finding represents one of a set 
of skills (along with ideation and evaluation) in the primary tier (see Figure 3.1). 
Runco and Chand (1995) highlight that problem finding embodies a number of 
different but related aspects including problem identification, problem definition and 
problem formation. However, no mention is made of insight as a possible problem 
finding process, or in the context of these three problem finding aspects. Runco 
(1994; Runco and Chand, 1995) discusses insight purely in terms of the solution 
moment rather than initiating it.  
One research team who have identified a duality in the role of insight in 
problem solving is Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer (1995). They firstly identified 
"presented insight problem solving" (Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, 1995, p 337) 
which is analogous to insight elicited in experimental research and complying with 
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stage models that frame insight as the solution moment in problem solving. They 
contrasted this with "discovered insight problem finding" where creative individuals 
described insights that initiate a new area of research or unite previously disparate 
ideas or approaches in novel ways. In the latter type of insight, it can be seen to 
initiate efforts rather than as the culmination in endeavour. 
As identified in section 1.1.5.5 Weisberg's (2014; Fleck and Weisberg 2004, 
2013) Stage Model of Problem Solving (see Figure 1.3) can be seen to include 
possible mini Aha moments that occur along the problem solving process. In 
consideration of the Negative Feelings theme, some of these might be more 
appropriately labelled as possible mini Uh-oh moments. For example, at stage 1B 
and 3B, the moment where the proposed solution fails may result in an Uh-oh. In 
these instances the new information that results from the failure to find a solution 
causes the problem solver to reinitiate a stage in the problem solving model. Again 
this demonstrates that negative insight may serve to (re)initiate problem solving 
rather than conclude it.  
Examining Weisberg's (2014; Fleck and Weisberg 2004, 2013) model in this 
way highlights a key problem with naturalistic research into problem solving: that real 
life problems do not happen in isolation, so it is not easy to parse experience into a 
neat series of problem solving episodes. There is also the question of scale, efforts 
in solving many separate problems may contribute to the satisfaction of a longer 
term, superordinate problem. Congruent to this point, Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 
(1995) identified that Discovered Insight Problem Finding represented the initiation of 
prolonged efforts towards a goal over a much greater duration of time than 
Presented Insight Problem Solving. Chapter 6 describes efforts to elicit positive and 
negative insights in a continuous problem solving context of the game Connect 4. 
Here the positive and negative insight and search move decisions represent efforts 
towards the superordinate goal of winning the game. 
3.4.6 Uh-oh No Insight  
The theme Uh-oh No Insight highlights a strength of ITA and a qualitative 
approach in enabling the researcher to check the events that participants reported 
were actually those of interest to the research question. If this was not verified, for 
example had participants completed a multiple choice questionnaire, these examples 
would have been reported by participants in their answers to questions. The 
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researcher would have assumed that as they had been given a definition, the 
participants were describing the phenomenon of interest (in this case negative 
insight) leading to possible confounding data. This is particularly problematic when 
research is exploratory and no other literature is available to provide a comparison of 
results that might highlight irregularities. As demonstrated by this theme, it appears 
that some participants only attended to part of the definition, the Uh-oh moment, and 
did not describe incidences where the essential cognitive restructuring element of 
insight was apparent (see 1.1.4.2). As discussed in section 2.4.5.1 this supports the 
notion that caution should be employed in making the assumption that participants 
are answering purely in response to the definition a researcher has given them. 
Discussion in Chapter 2 identified that while participants responded solely based on 
their own conceptions of a phenomenon in the no definition group (to provide a 
check on the effects giving a definition, see section 2.2.3.2), it is also conceivable 
that they also draw in this when definitions are provided. This highlights that in 
addition to only focusing on one aspect of a definition, participants are likely also 
drawing on their own conceptions to respond and these may not match the 
researchers'. As such, the use of qualitative, open questions and responses can be 
seen to serve as a mechanism to detect any disparities between the two and avoid 
the introduction of resulting confounds into data. 
3.4.7 Evaluation of ITA 
The use of ITA in this study provided an opportunity to further evaluate it as a 
methodology in the exploratory study of everyday experience of insight. As 
discussed above in section 3.4.6, the identification of the theme Uh-oh No Insight 
highlights a strength of using qualitative methods to verify that participants are 
reporting experiences congruent to the research definition. Further benefits that 
related specifically to ITA as a qualitative method were also demonstrated.  
Firstly, as described in section 3.3.3, the first researcher did not identify Time 
Away as a theme, perhaps overlooking this obvious trend in the data due to it being 
a theme in the previous study. The ITA process (see Figure 2.4) enabled this theme 
to be identified by the second researcher who was taking a naïve, data driven 
approach. The merits of the theme were then discussed between the researchers 
during the integration of themes. This protected the analysis from undue influence of 
a single researcher's previous knowledge and experience. 
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Conversely, whilst the theme Gut Feelings was identified by the first 
researcher it was important that it be independently recognised by the second 
researcher. This is because it maps very closely to the overarching research theme 
of this thesis; emotional experience and insight. As such, it was possible that the first 
researcher would see this theme through increased vigilance to emotion related cues 
in the data. The second researcher did not have such biases in their assessment of 
the data, again offering protection in the analysis from researcher expectation. 
 
3.5 Results - Content Analysis 
Each description of insight was coded for its Process and Content; examples 
of insights coded for each of the themes are reported in Table 3.3. Figure 3.2 shows 
the percentage of negative insights coded for the process and content that they 
demonstrate. Just under a third of the descriptions (n=21) shared were coded as Not 
insight (using the new definition which incorporated descriptions where there was 
uncertainty, in other words insufficient evidence to code for insight). In terms of 
contents, the largest proportion of negative insights (n = 26) had Intellectual content 
with the same proportions of Practical (n = 10) and Personal (n = 10) contents. Most 
of the negative insights coded for Process represented examples of Time Away (n = 
22), followed by Active Search (n = 19), and a small proportion being categorised as 
Social Facilitation (n = 5).  
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Table 3.3 Coding scheme for Directed Content Analysis of Negative Insights 
for Contents and Process, based on definitions of themes from Study 1. 
Title Description Negative insight example 
Uh-oh Not 
Insight* 
Description of emotional 
response to immediate 
stimulus without mental 
restructuring or not enough 
information to code as 
insight** 
    Standing up to a boss [whilst] 
emailing. [As a result] I was 
ignored (M, 42yrs).** 
Content Themes 
   Suddenly realising that I had an 
excess to my insurance policy 
upon which I was about to make 
a claim (F, 45yrs). 
Intellectual 
Insight related to theoretical 
problem or conceptual 
thoughts. 
Practical Insight related to physical manipulation of objects. 
     I realised I did not have 
enough materials to finish the 
roof I was working on (M, 42yrs). 
Personal Insight related to the self, or the self in relation to others. 
     I realised that along with all 
the giddiness and excitement for 
my upcoming wedding, I'm also 
scared. I called several friends to 
talk about it. But the one thing 
that reassured me was seeing 
my fiancé and feeling the 
connection. (F, 25yrs). 
Process Themes      Talking to my partner about 
something unrelated [to this 
insight]. I suddenly remembered 
that I hadn't changed the delivery 
address, and checked my 
Amazon account to confirm I was 
right (F, 27yrs). For insight 
description see section 3.3.1.6. 
Time Away 
Engaged in activities 
unrelated to insight they 
have. 
Active Search 
Insight directly related to 
current thinking/ 
attention/activity engaged in. 
     Realising how bad staffing 
crisis is [whilst] working out 
shifts/rotas (F, 26yrs). 
Social 
Faciliation 
Insight occurring as a result 
of social interaction. 
     I was talking to a client and 
realised comments I had made 
earlier had been misinterpreted 
and that that client was going to 
react in a way that would make it 
harder for us to work together (F, 
37yrs). 
*Code added to both Process and Content coding schemes in account of theme 
identified in ITA of negative insights.  **Added on review of Codes 
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Figure 3.2 Content analysis of everyday negative insights (n = 67) using codes 
from Typology of Insight identified in Chapter 2. The additional category of 
negative insight was identified during the thematic analysis of the data. 
In addition to considering the proportions of each aspect of the typology seen 
in the reports of Negative Insight made, representation of each combination of 
categories within the typology was also considered, as shown in Figure 3.3. As 
identified in section 2.3.2 the typology identified combinations of Contents and 
Process not evidenced for Negative Insight in the data set. A revision, in light of data 
from this study, shows that only Social Facilitation in the Practical domain for 
Negative Insight is yet to be evidenced in everyday insight. 
 
Figure 3.3 Review of Typology of Insight incorporating data from both Study 1 
and 2: light grey cubes, strong support in Study 1; dark grey also 
corresponding to research literature; stripped cubes represent supporting 
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data from Study 2; white cubes remain theoretical with no strong support from 
everyday examples of insight collected. 
3.6 Discussion - Content Analysis 
As discussed above in section 3.1 the Directed Content Analysis aimed to 
provide a comparison between the negative insights shared in this study with the 
typology of insight identified in Study 1. The majority of insights in Study 1 were 
positive and so such a comparison could be argued to highlight aspects that are 
similar or different between positive and negative insight in everyday life. The 
examples of negative insight analysed demonstrated all of the contents and process 
themes identified for general insight experience suggesting that positive and 
negative insight are comparable in terms of these aspects.  
3.6.1 Intellectual / practical distinction in problem finding 
The majority of negative insights were of an intellectual nature. It is important 
to note that the label, Intellectual, in this study referred to generalised cognitive 
processes relating to conceptual thoughts or thinking about a problem in theoretical 
terms. The term was not pertaining to a person of high intelligence or in reference to 
any other personal attribute. As seen in the example in Table 3.3 the Intellectual 
insight was about a mundane every day realisation, not intellectual in the sense of an 
activity representing high intelligence, but in relation to its cognitive content. 
As discussed above in section 3.5 negative insight operates as a problem 
finding mechanism in everyday life, the negative insights with an intellectual content 
see problem finding in a conceptual sense. This contrasts with Practical negative 
insights, where the problem identified is in physical form, or a mentalisation of real-
life physical objects. As discussed in section 2.4.4.1,  a distinction is made between 
different types of insight problems, some being related to more conceptual problems 
based on reading, while others being visuo-spatial problems (Gilhooly and Murphy, 
2005). If negative insight does represent problem finding, it would be expected that 
the domain distinctions of the problem would likewise apply to the insight identifying 
it. The Content Analysis demonstrates such a distinction in the negative insights in 
this study, supporting this idea. 
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3.6.2 Personal negative insight: personal problem finding 
As discussed in section 2.4.4.2, Personal insight was related to counselling 
psychology literature identifying it as problem finding about the self, seen as an 
adaptive behaviour desirable to enable problem solving to begin. As such it would be 
expected that personal negative insights would be reported in this study as moments 
where personal realisations led to problem solving behaviour. As demonstrated in 
the example in Table 3.2, the personal negative insight led to the participant seeking 
help by talking about the realisation with friends. The help seeking can be seen to 
represent a functional, problem solving response to the identified worry, an example 
of personal 'mastery' in everyday problem solving skills that Hillis (2015) aims to help 
clients develop through their therapeutic process.  
However, quite a small proportion of the descriptions collected represented 
personal negative insights (under 15%). As reflected in the ITA reported above 
(section 3.4) this did not lead to a comparable theme being identified for the negative 
insight data. It may be that personal insight is not seen as negative in terms of the 
definition given for this study; that things are worse than originally thought. The 
personal problem finding seen in Study 1 (section 2.3.2.3) was in the main 
interpreted positively as a reconciliation of the way things are enabling subsequent 
identification of a way to move forward. As such, this may explain why personal 
insights were less reported in this study. 
In terms of future research it may be interesting to explore reporting of 
everyday negative insights in the personal domain for different populations. For 
example comparing non-clinical to clinical populations or waiting list to treatment 
groups. As highlighted in section 3.4.1, Gilhooly et al. (2007) identified real-world 
problem solving tasks that had an interpersonal focus. The identification of positive 
and negative insights relating to intrapersonal problem solving could extend the 
kinds of real-world problems into this domain. 
3.6.3 Time away/ Active Search  
Many of the everyday examples of insight in Study 1 represented moments 
where solutions were found to previously known problems.  Within these, a 
distinction was made between those where the person was still attempting to solve 
the problem when they had their insight (Active Search) and examples where 
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attention had moved to other things, unrelated to the problem which was then 
unexpectedly solved through insight (Time Away). However, as identified through 
ITA above, many of the negative insights in this study occurred out of the blue where 
participants were not aware of a problem before their negative insight. This created a 
problem in coding for Time Away or Active Search, where the participants' attempts 
to solve the problem were central to the definitions of the two processes themes.  
However, the similar theme of Time Away was identified in the ITA for this 
study that encapsulated these 'out of the blue' experiences (see section 3.4.2). In 
this context it was described as negative insight occurring when the participant was 
engaged in a task unrelated to the content of the insight. Extending this idea enabled 
coding of negative insights as Active Search when participants were actively 
engaged in the activity that they had their insight about, rather than actively involved 
in problem solving attempts. 
The identification of these comparable distinctions for negative insight again 
highlights potential similarities with theory relating to positive insight. As discussed in 
section 3.4.2, the demonstration of negative insight during Time Away raises 
questions for incubation theories in insight. Furthermore, the occurrence of negative 
insight without an impasse, both whilst actively engaged in tasks related to the 
insight, and whilst doing other unrelated tasks provides evidence that is problematic 
for theories that assert impasse is necessary in order for insight to occur. This is 
because in both instances there is not an initial problem representation to be re-
structured through an impasse (see discussion in Chapter 1, sections 1.1.4 and 
1.1.5). As such this adds weight to the argument made in section 2.4.5.1 that insight 
moments in everyday life can occur without an obvious or conscious experience of 
impasse. 
3.6.4 Evaluation of use of directed Content Analysis 
The use of directed content analysis has enabled a direct comparison between 
the everyday insight experiences shared in the first study, that were predominately 
positive to the everyday negative insight experiences seen here. Reviewing the 
typology of insight, Figure 3.3 demonstrates that this study offered further support for 
categories identified as conceptually possible in Study 1, but lacking in actual 
everyday examples. As reflected by the remaining unshaded section, negative 
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insight of a practical nature rendered through social facilitation is as yet unsupported 
by data collected in the two studies. However, such incidences are identifiable: the 
example seen in Table 3.3 coded as a Practical negative insight saw the participant 
identify problems in the amount of materials they needed to complete a roofing job. 
The report did not identify that this realisation occurred through conversations with 
others on the building site, however this would be perfectly plausible and so then 
would have represented the missing category. As such, the use of directed content 
analysis has provided further substantiation of the typology of insight identified in 
Chapter 2. 
3.7 General Discussion 
This study collected and analysed everyday negative insights using text 
responses to open questions for the first time. A strength of the qualitative methods 
employed was demonstrated in the identification of a portion of the reports that did 
not correspond to the research definition of interest, these were represented in the 
theme Uh-oh No Insight. This highlights that care should be taken in making the 
assumption that having been given a definition, participants will respond exclusively 
in line with it. Specific strengths of ITA were additionally identified in protecting 
against various biases potentially introduced due to the researcher's knowledge (in 
having conducted literature reviews), experience (in analysing data from a previous 
study) and expectation (paying attention to data salient to a specific research 
interest). 
Five additional themes resulted from the ITA providing a characterisation of 
everyday incidences of a sudden new understanding of a negative nature. These 
were discussed in relation to the literature for positive insight and creative problem 
solving, helping to identify potential avenues for further study of both positive and 
negative insight. Furthermore, the discussions relating to spreading activation 
theories for incubation highlight the need to incorporate negative insight moments 
into these, extending the theoretical discussion relating to incubation facilitation and 
insight. 
 A further comparison was made directly to everyday experience of insight (in 
the main positive) provided in Study 1 using directed content analysis. This 
demonstrated comparable themes for everyday experience in negative insight 
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enabling the conclusion to be reached that many aspects identified as pertinent to 
everyday experience of positive insight can also be applied to negative insight. 
Future work now needs to explore exactly what aspects are common or different 
between positive and negative insight in everyday situations and using experimental 
comparisons. 
Finally, in relation to the third question posed in the introduction which aimed 
to identify participants' functional explanations of negative insight, the role of 
negative insight as problem finding was identified as a theme through ITA (labelled 
Sucking It Up) and discussed in section 3.4.5. Future research could look to further 
explore this function of negative insight. Firstly, through exploration of the everyday 
experience of negative insight, but also using laboratory based tasks to test 
predictions based on findings from this study, for example in terms of the utility of 
negative insight (see Chapter 7 for further discussion). 
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4 Everyday Experience of Insight: Diary Study 
4.1 Introduction  
4.1.1 Prevalence of Insight in Daily Life 
Study 1 outlined in Chapter 2 has served to render examples of insight in daily 
life. These provide a tentative step towards an understanding of naturalistic insight 
experience. This, Ohlsson (2011) suggests is necessary to assess how experimental 
derivations of insight "conform" (p. 92) to reality. However central to Ohlsson's 
(2011) argument regarding the validation of experimental insight research is not only 
the importance of a comparison in terms of the content and context of insight in daily 
life, but also in identifying its prevalence. As discussed in section 2.4.1 the snapshot 
collection methodology employed by the questionnaire does not enable any 
assessment to be made of the frequency of insight experiences in everyday life 
within or between individuals. 
4.1.2 Problems in the Recall of Insight Moments 
As outlined in section 2.4.7 there were a number for problems identified in the 
reporting of insight moments using an anonymised questionnaire. This section will 
explore these issues in more detail. 
4.1.2.1 Short textual responses in daily life of insight questionnaires.  
One problem identified in the collection of qualitative insight experiences 
using an anonymous questionnaire (as in Chapter 2) was the difficulty in 
interpretation of the descriptions given (as seen in section 2.4.7). Congruent to this, 
Ovington et al. (2015) also identified that their participants' qualitative, questionnaire 
responses likewise lacked detail (see section 2.1.5 for further description of this 
study). For instance in Chapter 2, when participants were asked to indicate what 
they were typically doing when their insight occurred they gave short and 
generalised responses such as "working". The ability to probe participants' 
responses would help to ensure all details of the insight occurrence are shared in 
order to achieve a richer understanding of their experience, both in terms of the 
content of the insight and the context in which it was experienced. 
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A more interactive contact with participants might also help to explore why a 
high proportion of participants in Chapter 2 were unable or unwilling to provide a 
description of an insight experience, even when they had indicated that they had 
experienced insight within the last 24 hours (see 2.2.1). Having a dialogue with 
participants whilst exploring their insight experiences might expose reasons behind 
their reluctance to share insight experiences or difficulties they had in sharing. 
Furthermore it may explain the difference seen between those in Chapter 2 who 
were offered insight definitions to prompt their responses compared to those not 
given one, with more responses seen from those given a definition. 
4.1.2.2 Memory effects in insight.  
Finally, Study 1 (Chapter 2) sought to minimise retrospective memory effects 
by in the first instance capturing insight experiences less than a day old. However it 
might still be argued that this time delay could have impacted on reports.  
Ebinghaus' (1885/1913) classic memory study identifies a logarithmic decline 
in recall through post memory event time; suggesting that the biggest reduction in 
memory happens immediately after the event, with the rate of decline then slowing 
as time progresses. However his studies did not focus on autobiographical memory 
which is used in the recall of personal life experiences (such as insight experiences). 
In fact, Rubin and Wenzel (1996) on reviewing data for 210 studies found that 
autobiographic memory was the exception in not following Ebinghaus’ (1885/1913) 
described pattern. Surprisingly few studies focus on autobiographical memory 
decline in the first few hours after an event. One which has attempted to explore this 
is Kristo, Janssen and Murre's (2009) investigation of autobiographical memory 
recall. In an internet study they tested participants' recall from two to 46 days after 
they described a personal every day event. They identified that memory for details 
declined more rapidly than for the basic content (the what, who and where) or time of 
the event. As identified in section 2.4.7 of this thesis, and highlighted by Ovington et 
al. (2015), it is the detail of the insight experience rather than a basic content that is 
necessary to obtain a complete picture of how insight occurs in everyday life. 
However a problem with Kristo et al. (2009) can be seen: the events that they 
asked participants to initially share were already up to a week old, and so subject to 
any immediate memory effects of interest in relation to the current research question. 
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So, while no definitive answer is offered as to autobiographical memory decline in 
the short term (less than 24 hours) it would seem reducing the time between an 
event and reporting of it, is the best way to reduce memory effects due to forgetting 
over time. There is no reason to assume that the inverse relationship between post 
event time and autobiographical memory recall seen for over 48 hours post event 
would not also occur earlier, even if the exact rate of decline is uncharted. As such, 
this would suggest that recording accounts of insight as close to the time of 
occurrence would likely render more accurate and detailed descriptions. 
A more detailed representation of an insight event in memory may also 
prevent other distortions highlighted by Gruber (1995) see 2.1.4.2. For instance, 
memories are suggested to be embellished through the process of rationalisation 
and this may be particularly the case where memory detail is deficient. As suggested 
by Kristo et al.'s (2009) study above, it is the memory for detail which most quickly 
declines, thereby increasing the risk of rationalisation effects. If recall is richer in 
detail there is likely less need to make additions so reducing rationalisation. 
Accordingly, it would seem sensible to ask participants to record their insight 
experiences as close to their occurrence as possible and so: reduce many factors 
likely to introduce error in reporting; maximise the accuracy of the accounts of insight 
in everyday life collected; and minimise interpretation necessary from researchers. 
4.1.3 Research methods for studying daily life  
There are several ways in which researchers employ diary type 
methodologies to record experiences in daily life. Moskowitz and Sadikaj (2011) 
outline the basics of event-contingent sampling, the collection of self-reports of a 
specific behaviour of interest when it occurs in daily life. The report is triggered by 
the participant experiencing an event, identifying it as the phenomenon of interest 
and so making a report on it immediately. This can be contrasted with the 
predominant approaches of the experience sampling method (ESM. 
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987) or ecological momentary assessment (EMA, 
Stone and Shiffman, 1994): self-reports are made at random times determined by 
the researcher, for example participants are alerted by a pager to make a report or 
via an electronic data collection method such as PDA or mobile telephone. As 
identified above, collection of an insight description as proximate to its occurrence as 
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possible is desirable, meaning that event contingent sampling would appear the 
most suitable method to employ for this research. 
Reis (2011) highlights that a problem with event elicited methods in 
comparison to ESM or EMA is that daily life experiences may not be overwhelming 
or even noticed and so not reported. For example, in attempts to characterise 
daydreaming in daily life, the phenomenon of interest by definition occurs when 
attention lapses (Kane et al., 2007). However, one of the defining characteristics of 
insight is the surprise attached to it (see section 1.2.3.2). In Chapters 2 and 3 the 
theme of Time Away incorporated many insight moments that were described as 
occurring out of the blue (see sections 2.3.2.5 and 3.3.3 for further description). 
Similarly, Perkins (2001) coined the term 'breakthrough thinking' to describe insights. 
This illustrates how contrary to the example of day dreaming, that insights are 
noticeable events and so event contingent sampling would be an appropriate 
methodology to collect them. 
4.1.4 Event-contingent sampling using mobile phone technology 
No studies have explicitly investigated everyday insightful experience in real-
time using any of the methods outlined above. However one study has undertaken a 
naturalistic exploration of serendipity (Sun, Sharples and Makri, 2011). Fine and 
Deegan (1996) cast serendipity as a special case of insight where the individual 
attributes its origin to a chance occurrence, for example a fortuitous social 
connection or timed event leading to an insight. Many of the examples of insight 
described in Chapter 2 might be argued to be serendipitous. For instance, the 
description of insight presented in section 2.3.2.1 sees the participant identify an 
association between something in an article she is reading with her usual area of 
study. The theme Social Facilitation (see section 2.3.2.6) reflects many instances 
where the insight resulted from a social interaction. None however (in Study 1) were 
identified by participants as fortuitous. 
Sun, Sharples and Makri (2011) developed a mobile diary application ('app') 
to enable their participants to record their experiences of serendipity as they 
occurred over the course of a week. Similar to insight, they suggest that as 
serendipitous experiences are by their nature unpredictable a diary method is 
particularly suited to their collection using event-contingent sampling. The data 
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collected by participants in the 'app' was then used to initiate discussions at a de-
briefing interview. Transcripts of these interviews formed the basis of the authors' 
conceptualisation of serendipity, supporting the value of event-contingent sampling. 
The resources necessary to build a specific mobile phone 'app', as Sun et al. 
(2011) did, may unfortunately be seen as prohibitive. In addition, in their study each 
participant was provided with a mobile phone on which to use the 'app' meaning they 
had to carry two mobile devices (their own as well as the researcher's) for the 
duration of their participation. Sun et al. (2011) identified this as problematic for their 
participants in their discussion and recommended the use of the participants' own 
mobiles to make reports in future research. This criticism can also be seen as 
applicable to the use of other electronic collection devices such as Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDA) which have also been used in past diary studies (for examples see 
Burgin, Silvia, Eddington and Kwapil, 2013; Le, Choi and Beal, 2006). However, 
aiming to get participants to use their own mobile phones in data collection 
complicates and likely increases the cost in developing an 'app': meaning it would 
need to be developed in multiple formats to match which ever type of mobile 
operating system that a participant owned. 
An alternative would be to revert to a more traditional, pen and paper diary 
format as Kosslyn et al. (1990) did in their investigation of the everyday occurrence 
of another creative aspect, imagery. However, Stone et al. (2002, 2003) highlighted 
problems with this method. They used light sensors to record the times their 
participants opened their paper diaries (presumably to make an entry) and found that 
a substantial proportion (75%) had entries in their diary on days when they were not 
opened (shown by the light sensor log). This suggests that these entries were not 
made temporally close to the point of the experience they were recording, likely 
increasing errors in their reports through the memory loss and distortion processes 
outlined previously. At the very least, drawing participants' attention to the fact that 
their entries are time logged and explaining the impact of time on reporting accuracy 
are steps which could be taken to mitigate these behaviours. 
4.1.5 Reactance in diary studies. 
Bolger, Davis and Rafaeli (2003) raise a possible concern of the use of real-
life diary studies in respect of participant reactance. This asserts that participants' 
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behaviour or thoughts are changed by their involvement in the diary study. Sun et al. 
(2011) suggest that this might have been the case, with their participants reporting 
increased awareness and experience of serendipity compared to pre-study 
incidence.  Interestingly, Sun et al. (2011) saw this as a positive outcome, and 
suggested that such methodology might be used as a tool to increase serendipitous 
experience in everyday life. Asking participants to process their [serendipitous or 
insight] experience at a deeper level could be argued in itself to change the 
experience so it is no longer representative of daily life. Unfortunately, this criticism 
might be directed at any research (both naturalistic and experimental) where 
informed consent is sought. Generally researchers take a pragmatic approach that 
rights of participants [usually] outweigh such concerns and so aim to recognise and 
design studies to minimise such effects. In the instance of diary studies there 
therefore is balance to be made between capturing an event as close to its 
occurrence and in as much detail as possible against the intrusion that the recording 
process makes in the participant's everyday life. Sun et al.'s (2011) dual approach 
can be seen to employ such balance: the immediate capture of an event using 
technology to minimise memory distortion coupled with follow up de-brief interviews 
to elicit richer detail of the experience.  
4.1.6 Research Rationale and Aims of Study 
This research therefore proposes to take heed of the above and utilise the 
proliferation in smart phone ownership and mobile access to the internet in 
conjunction with an online questionnaire [Survey Monkey] platform. With adaption, 
this medium will be used as an online portal for participants' to record their 
experiences of insight over a week (in line with Sun et al.'s (2011) study period) 
through either their mobile phones, tablets or other internet capable devices. As 
highlighted, Sun et al. (2011) de-briefed their participants in a semi-structured 
interview at the end of the study so eliciting additional rich information about the 
experiences their participants' recorded. Following a few participants intensively over 
a short period will likely elicit rich detail of their experience and an indication of how 
often they experience insight. In summary this study aims to capture real-time insight 
experience and explore this experience through post-event de-brief interviews in 
order to again validate the themes identified in Chapter 2. Additionally it may 
136 
 
elucidate further on some of the other observations from the previous study which 
could not be explained, for instance the high participant drop out at the point where 
asked to provide an insight description. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants  
Participants were eleven volunteers approached by the researcher from a 
non-student sample local to the university. The mean age of participants was 37 
years old (SD = 14.3 years, range 19 - 62 years).  
4.2.2 Materials 
The Survey Monkey online questionnaire package was used to develop an 
online portal for participants to use to make their reports of insight over the course of 
the week. Participants were issued a unique password to identify their online reports, 
along with QR code links to the log on page to aid ease of accessibility. On 
accessing the portal the participant could then: record details of an insight 
experience; view reminders of insight definitions; or send a message to the 
researcher. The 'insight log' page was similar to that used in Study 1, incorporating 
three questions to enable capture of the participant's insight experience as quickly as 
possible in their own words.  An additional question was included asking participants 
to indicate how long ago their insight occurred. This was to account for occasions 
when a report was delayed (option of responses; "just now, a few minutes ago, in the 
last hour, in the last four hours, today, yesterday"). The survey enabled repeat visits 
from the same URL to ensure that participants could make multiple reports of insight 
over their participation period. Each report made was time and date stamped 
enabling a temporal record of insight logs to be made for each participant. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Before giving consent, participants were provided with an information and 
consent sheet outlining the requirements of the study. Face to face demonstrations 
using the 'Insight Log' and an induction to ensure understanding of the insight 
definitions and examples was given. On providing consent, participants completed 
demographic information. Over a week (seven consecutive days) they recorded all 
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incidents of insight as near to the time of occurrence as practicable (and safe). A 
final de-brief was given, including a face to face (or via Skype for two participants) 
semi-structured interview for a selection of the participants (n=5) who reviewed their 
own log with the researcher. One participant falsely logged their insight experience 
using the online questionnaire from Study One. The relevant log was located and 
removed from the questionnaire data set and added to the insight logs evaluated in 
this study. 
4.2.4 Analysis of data 
4.2.4.1 Content analysis.  
A directed content analysis was planned, coding each insight recorded 
against the themes (see Figure 2.5) identified in Chapter 2 (Hsieh and Shannon, 
2005) (see also 3.6.1). 
4.2.4.2 Integrative Thematic Analysis.  
An Integrative Thematic Analysis (ITA) (see 2.2.3.2) was conducted on the 
transcriptions of the de-brief interviews and insight logs. A different researcher (from 
those used as second researchers in Chapter 2 and 3), naïve to insight research 
literature and the purpose of this study was used to carry out ITA alongside the main 
author of this thesis. 
4.2.5 Ethical considerations 
This study obtained ethical approval under the University of Buckingham, 
School of Science and Medicine Ethical Committee’s terms of reference. All 
participants were aged 18 years or older and gave their full informed consent to 
participate in the study. Participants were able to choose the level of contact they 
had with the researcher during their participation week or withdraw from the study at 
any time. Their responses were treated confidentially by the researcher and 
anonymised subsequent to the end of their data collection period. No additional 
physical or psychological harm was incurred in participation in this study over real-
life experiences. As such it was felt that no ethical concerns were raised by this 
study 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Use of the Insight Log 
A total of seventeen insight logs were made by the eleven participants over 
their week, with the mean rate of 1.55 responses per participant (SD = 1.57). The 
pattern of response across participants is shown in Figure 4.1, illustrating that while 
one participant made no logs, another recorded six experiences of insight over their 
participation week. 
Figure 4.1 Graph to show number of insight reports made on each day of the 
study. Note participants' study weeks did not run concurrently, and commenced on 
different days of the week, so day 1 represents the first day of each participant's 
study week. 
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of insight logs made across the study week. 
It should be noted that participants did not all take part in the study over the same 
seven days. Individual participant's study weeks began on different days, the data 
displayed below represents the day in the individual's study week on which the 
insight was logged.  
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Figure 4.2 Graph to show number of insight reports made on each day of the 
study week.  
Participants, in addition to logging details of their insight were also asked to 
record how long it had been since their insight experience. This was compared to the 
time and date stamp recorded by Survey Monkey for their entry. All stamps 
corresponded to the reported time frame. One participant indicated that two of her 
logs were made outside of the offered options, giving the time frame in the 'other' 
box. This was three days previous to the log stamp. From Figure 4.3 it can be seen 
that participants took different times to log their experience, with logs being between 
three days old to one made 'just now'. 
 
4.3.2 Directed Content Analysis of Insight Logs 
Figure 4.4 shows how the insight reports made in this study relate to the 
themes identified in Chapter 2. Initial plans to conduct a full content analysis were 
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confounded by the low number of reports made. Additionally, as discussed in section 
4.3.2 the themes identified were shown to fit superordinate aspects of insight: 
content, process and emotion. Categorising against these interacting themes leads 
to eighteen possibilities. With only seventeen insights collected from a small sample 
reflective of the predominately qualitative approach taken in this study renders such 
an analysis as meaningless.  
However, the categorisation of insights shown in Figure 4.4 did illustrate 
firstly, that no negative insight examples were seen. Secondly, it identified three 
reports that could not be categorised using the scheme from Chapter 1. Two saw 
participants recording their Aha moment at having remembered that they needed to 
complete the log. A third describes her recalling a name: "couldn't remember a name 
of a Children's T.V. programme whilst talking to friends. Then it came to me. A bit of 
an Aha moment" (F, 36). These do not constitute insight in terms of the necessary 
novelty of the new thought, understanding or idea. As described by the above 
participant it seems that the Aha feeling rather than the constituent cognition led 
them to complete the insight log, this therefore might argued to constitute an 
additional theme of Aha Without Restructuring. 
 
Figure 4.4 Categorisation of insights against themes identified in Chapter 2. 
Frequency of insights for each categorisation shown in relevant cube. No 
negative insights were described so only the positive aspects is shown. Three 
insights were did not fit this categorisation scheme. 
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4.3.3 Integrative Thematic Analysis of De-brief Interviews 
Carrying out an Integrative Thematic Analysis of the logged insights and de-
brief interviews led to the identification of the following themes: Individual 
differences; Facilitation or Blocking; and Solution Finding. Table 4.1 shows how the 
researchers' candidate themes were combined to provide the final representation of 
the participants' insight experiences. 
Table 4.1 Integrative Thematic Analysis: candidate themes identified 
independently by two researchers (one naïve to the research question or 
related literature) were then integrated into final themes which were labelled 
and described. 
Final Themeb Description 1st Researcher 2nd Researcher 
Individual 
differences 
Similarities and 
differences within and 
between people in relation 
to insight experience. 
Insight less 
reality 
 
Individual 
differences 
Comparisons 
Facilitation or 
blocking of insight 
Factors seen to support or 
lead to having an insight 
Facilitation or 
blocking 
Situation: 
unusual 
incidents 
 
Aspects associated with 
the inhibition of insight 
 
 
Society 
 
Routine 
Solution finding 
Attention focused on 
attempting to resolve a 
current situation or solve a 
problem. 
 
 
Solution 
finding 
a ITA stage iii : candidate themes      b ITA stages iv & v     (see Figure 2.4) 
 
4.3.3.1 Individual Differences.  
This theme encompasses the idea that there is variation in insight experience 
between individuals' and within an individual's own life time. Furthermore, there was 
a general expression among the participants that their experience of insight over the 
week fell short of what they expected, or what they perceived as normal. This aspect 
was identified by the first researcher as a distinct candidate theme, Insight Less 
Reality. Participants described a desperation to have an insight: "it got to the point 
that I thought I wouldn't have any [insights] and I'd be [stupid] for not having any 
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insights all week" (F, 26). The participant saw her lack insight as reflective of a 
personal deficiency. She perceived that other people have a certain level of insight 
occurrence which by comparison, her experience was below average. Furthermore 
she seemed to equate an absence of insight with a lack of intelligence. Other 
participants also identified that they didn’t have many insights, one explaining, "I just 
carried on like normal, I just sort of waited but nothing happened" (F, 36). 
A number of participants reported no clear examples of insight over their 
week. One participant made no reports at all, while others made a single report, 
classified above (section 4.3.2) in the Content Analysis as Aha Without 
Restructuring. The participant who made no reports reflected on this: "I think I don't 
understand what it is, what we're supposed to be looking for, but I don't know 
whether we all really have them [insight experiences] so I don't know what I'm 
looking for" (F, 56). Again, this description supports the idea that there are 
differences between people in their experience of insight. The participant musing that 
insight might not be a universally experienced phenomenon. 
The second researcher's candidate theme of Comparisons captures 
participants' attempts to compare themselves to the different experiences of others. 
This is demonstrated by a participant musing over why he classified an experience 
as insight: "because it was an Aha moment, um, okay, I'm not like [my partner], I 
don't necessarily go Aha!" [accompanied by a jazz hands type action] (M, 25). The 
participant makes comparisons on how his interpretation of an event may be 
different to his partners; suggesting that this relates to dispositional aspects, such as 
personality traits, for example emotionality. Such comparisons see between person 
individual differences being explored in relation to insight. 
Participants also made within person evaluations. For instance many 
participants suggested that they perhaps experienced more insight when they were 
younger. "I don't know because I'm older whether I get all these wow moments or a 
lot of down moments but less wow moments." This describes a proposed within 
person difference in insight experience with age. Another sought to clarify what 
aspects of this were pertinent to insight experience.  
When you are younger […] you sort of have more social outgoing and I 
think things happen. So when I was younger you don't plan things and 
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things happen and you just […] Where now when you're older everything 
is sort of planned isn't it and you just can't go, ah I'm going out. (F, 36) 
This exploration is captured in the theme of Facilitation or Blocking of Insight (see 
below, section 4.3.3.2). 
4.3.3.2 Facilitation or Blocking of Insight.  
This theme describes the participants' reflections on aspects that impacted on 
their insight experience. It sees them identify various factors that they saw as helpful 
or a hindrance to them having insight. For example one participant discusses, 
"because we all do the same things or similar things every day you might not have 
as many [insights] whereas when you vary different things every single day, every 
week you might have more" (F, 36). Another participant mused, "because I 
think…age, and I live in a bit of a bubble" (F, 56). Attributing everyday routine to the 
inhibition of insight was also identified as a candidate theme by the second 
researcher. In addition, the candidate themes of Situation: Working or Unusual and 
Society reflects the participants' exploration of factors that improved or decreased 
insight experiences. Firstly the idea that the daily routine of work served to block the 
potential to have insight, whilst unusual situations promoted them. Secondly, that 
social conditions or expectations in society would also have an influence. One 
participant explains: "because the majority of the time we're working alone and 
there's nobody else to have a wow moment with or you know to think oh yeah - wow" 
(F, 56). 
In terms of facilitation, most participants were underwhelmed with the number 
of insights they had over their research week (see above, section 4.3.3.1), so 
discussions relating to this were focused on their reflections on a perceived past with 
more insight experiences. They explored these to try and identify aspects that 
facilitated them, as seen in this excerpt: "it was because it was something where I 
wasn't expected to know anything, I was under no pressure because it was all new" 
(F, 62).  
4.3.3.3 Solution Finding.  
This theme sees participants describe how their insights occurred during an 
active search to find resolution to an undesirable current situation or the solution to a 
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problem. It sees a focus on problem solving where they are thinking about the 
current quest. It was identified by the second researcher, whilst being overlooked by 
the first. This aspect might have been too obvious or familiar to the first researcher 
and so unnoticed due to their experience analysing the data in Chapter 2 where 
analogous themes relating to problem solving were identified (Time Away and Active 
Search, see 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.2.5 respectively). Furthermore, the tacit assumption in 
many definitions of insight is that this occurs within a problem solving paradigm. 
However, justification of Solution Finding as a theme was determined during the 
integration phase of ITA, with the second researcher presenting a body of excerpts 
from across participants and interview questions to support their case. 
4.4 Discussion 
In general, the results in this study were a surprise in terms of the low number 
of insights collected. However, the follow-up interviews provided corroboration and 
elaboration on the experience or lack of experience of insight in daily life from 
previous questionnaire or laboratory based studies (see sections 2.15 and 2.4). It 
identified a number of findings of interest relating the individual differences in insight 
experience, situational factors relating to insight and insight prevalence. These are 
discussed in the sections below.  
4.4.1 Individual Differences  
4.4.1.1 Tendency to experience insight. 
As highlighted by this theme, lay perceptions of insight include the notion that 
there may be quantitative and qualitative differences in people's experience of 
insight. In terms of quantitative differences, how often people experience insight, this 
study has highlighted that in general people appear to overestimate their insight 
experience (see section 4.3.3.1). Recent research has raised the notion of a 
continuum in tendency to experience insight. Kounios et al. (2008) contrasted a 
tendency to solve through insight with a preference for analytic solving, suggesting 
that these individual differences reflect underlying variation in information 
processing. This contrasts to the lay opinion in this study that differences may stem 
from emotionality and so experiential differences. Kounious et al. (2008) compared 
participants resting state EEG for those who reported more insight or more search 
145 
 
solutions during an anagram task. They found increased activity in lateral areas in 
high insight reporters that they attribute to associative processes. However, the 
explanation for this difference could also incorporate emotional aspects (but see 
section 1.2.5 for discussion regarding the function in these brain areas as cognitive 
or emotion related). Regardless of the explanation for the differences, congruent to 
this study, Kounios et al. (2008) recognise that individual differences in insight 
solving tendency be an area of research to further explore. 
Ovington et al. (2016) likewise have begun to research individual differences 
in insight disposition, reporting the creation of a trait scale for tendancy to solve 
problems through insight, the Dispositional Insight Scale (DIS). This is a 5 item scale 
measuring self-rated reports of everyday problem solving, asking participants to rate 
their tendency to experience solutions as: Aha moments; unexpected; being solved 
unconsciously; and whilst doing mundane activities. Due to a lack of previous insight 
tendency measures, validation against existing measures was problematic. 
Furthermore, as identified in this Chapter's study, people's perceptions of the amount 
of insight they have may not be accurate (see section 4.3.3.1). Using event 
contingent sampling of everyday insight experience (as seen in this study) could be 
used to offer a preliminary validation of the DIS in future work, but this would need to 
be done with larger sample, so perhaps without a de-brief interview, perhaps using a 
de-brief questionnaire including questions based on the findings from this thesis. As 
such, without further validation against actual behavioural measures the DIS 
currently can be seen to provide a measure of individual differences into participants' 
perception of insight, with further validation to confidently say it measures actual 
insight disposition. 
4.4.1.2 Emotionality.  
The theme of Individual Differences highlights perceived differences between 
people not only in quantitative terms, but additionally in qualitative experience. As 
seen in section 4.3.3.1, one participant suggested that he experienced problem 
solving and insightful moments in a different way to his girlfriend. He suggested that 
she was perhaps more emotionally intuitive or expressive, or attributed more 
emotion to such cognitive processes.  As noted in earlier chapters, some 
researchers have discussed the contribution of emotional responses to insight. For 
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instance in terms of emotion giving salience to certain cognitions leading to them 
being perceived as problems (Runco,1994). However this is very much as an aside 
to their main focus on cognitive processes. Little attention has been given to the type 
of affective responses, why or how they occur in relation to problem solving and 
specifically insight. This raises an interesting point that is not addressed by current 
research, the question of if and how affective responses to cognitive problem solving 
processes vary between individuals and how this relates to whether an incident is 
labelled as insightful or not. This aspect is explored further in Chapter 5. 
An additional consideration in respect to individual difference is how the 
affective experience of insight varies within an individual between different situations 
or throughout their lifespan. This was raised by participants who were looking for 
explanations for their perceived lack of insight, identifying that they perhaps 
experienced affective aspects in general and in relation to insight differently when 
they were younger. This is in contrast to the responses of participants in Ovington et 
al.'s (2015) study. Here participants felt that they gained insight with age. However, 
Ovington et al. (2015) asked participants to think and describe their general 
experiences of insight. These could again be influenced by memory distortions (see 
2.1.4.2). In this study the participant's retrospective comparisons to insight 
experience in their past would likewise be susceptible to recall biases. This highlights 
the need for further empirical, longitudinal investigation into the age effects, both in 
terms of experimental and everyday insight experience. 
4.4.2  Not all Ahas are insight moments.  
As seen in section 4.3.2, three of the insights shared did not fit the 
characterisation made in Study 1 or classic definitions of insight that feature an 
element of novelty, an insight being described as a sudden and new, idea or 
understanding (see 1.2). These experiences could all be described as sudden 
remembering without restructuring. The participants appeared to be using the Aha, a 
response to the suddenness of the event or emotional component to classify things 
as insight rather than the cognitive descriptions. Shen et al. (2015) demonstrated 
that participants differentiated between insight and non-insight problem solving trials 
for the emotional aspects of happiness but not for the more cognitive components 
such as certainty. Curiously, they contend that their findings, exploring emotional 
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components of insight still support the idea that restructuring is the essential 
component for identifying insight moments. However, they do not clearly present a 
case for this assertion, as they did not measure ratings of re-structuring or surprise. 
It would appear that this assertion reflects the underlying assumption that insight is 
primarily a cognitive event with an incidental emotional component (see further 
discussion in section 5.1.2). This highlights that further work needs to be done to 
tease apart what and how emotion relates to insight moments. It furthermore 
demonstrates that while insight is often classified by its Aha moment, not all Aha 
moments necessarily equate to insight. Cranford and Moss (2010, 2011, 2012) 
demonstrated problem solving trials in the CRA that were solved immediately (within 
the first 15 seconds after presentation of the problem). They similarly hypothesise 
that these are examples labelled as insight due to the experience of an Aha, not due 
to any perceived restructuring of the problem or breaking of an impasse.  
An alternative explanation may be that these Ahas due to remembering 
responses reflect a desperation that some participants felt to have an insight 
experience to report (see section 4.3.3.1). However, if this was the case it might be 
expected that such sudden remembering reports be made later in the participant's 
study week. From Figure 4.2 it can be seen that most reports were made earlier in 
the participation week, suggesting that rather than desperation being a motivation for 
recording these types of experiences, misunderstanding or difficulty in reconciling 
experience to the definitions given as discussed above may be a more likely 
explanation. This finding is comparable to the theme identified in Chapter 3 (see 
section 3.3.1) as Uh-oh No Insight, where participants appeared to reporting Uh-oh 
experiences that were not insight. In sum, this demonstrates that further empirical 
investigation of these ideas is necessary to qualify the roles of cognitive and 
emotional aspects in the labelling of an experience as insight. 
4.4.3 Situational factors 
Participants also discussed situational factors which might affect insight 
experience resulting in the theme Facilitation / Blocking. Experimental studies have 
investigated various situational and experiential aspects in relation to insight 
experience. As described in section 1.1.5.3, facilitation effects in problem solving 
have been explored for different incubation tasks between episodes of problem 
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solving attempts. A further facilitation of insightful problem solving is suggested to 
relate to mood, with positive affect (both naturally occurring and elicited) suggested 
to enhance problem solving through insight (Isen, Daubman and Nowicki, 1987; 
Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish and Jung-Beeman, 2009). 
Less has been considered in terms of the situations which may lead to an 
inhibition of insight. Schooler, Ohlsson and Brooks (1993) suggested a verbal 
overshadowing effect on insightful problem solving. That describing one's thinking 
out loud whilst trying to solve insight problems was detrimental to performance in 
solving the problems: both in terms of solution rates and reaction times.  However 
subsequent studies using verbal protocols to investigate cognition during insightful 
problem solving tend to challenge this finding (for discussion and recent study see 
Fleck and Wiesberg, 2013). Whilst this is not strictly a situational factor, it does 
demonstrate how factors that inhibit insight may be explored experimentally. 
Furthermore, with in business and management literature there are discussions in 
general terms as to the situational aspects that might stifle corporate creativity (for 
instance see Amabile, 1998), however comparable research has not been a major 
consideration for experimental insight research. 
One of the inhibiting factors for insight that participants in this chapter 
identified was pressure. Many of them mused that one explanation for their lack of 
insight experience might have been the very fact that they were looking and hoping 
to experience insight. The Facilitation / Blocking theme therefore might be seen as 
an artefact of the methodology, reflecting not the participant's experience of insight 
but their experience of participating in this diary study. Additionally, this might explain 
the disparity between expectation and experience identified (see 4.4.4.2 below). It 
being nothing more than reflective of participants desire to please the researcher by 
having lots of insight to report and discuss. However, were this the case similar 
themes or observations would be expected from comparable studies. Sun et al. 
(2011) (discussed above in section 4.1.4) did not see a similar inhibition in their 
participants experience of serendipity. In fact their participants reported the 
converse, feeling that they were experiencing more serendipity than usual due to 
their participation, not less.  
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4.4.4 Prevalence of Insight in Daily Life 
One of the aims of this study was to explore the prevalence of insight in 
everyday experience. Comparing the number of logs made by different participants 
(see Figure 3.3) suggests that there is individual difference in the incidence of 
insight, with one participant making six reports of insight over their diary week while 
one made none. The total number of logs, seventeen reports made by the eleven 
participants is comparable with Sun et al. (2011) who collected 23 diary entries from 
their identical sized sample. This would seem to support Ohlsson's (2011) assertion 
that insight in daily life is relatively rare.  
4.4.4.1  Universality of insight experience.  
A further striking and unexpected feature highlighted by this study is the 
notion that maybe not everyone experiences insight, at least not in the way current 
research descriptions conceptualise it. One of the eleven participants made no 
insight logs in her diary, during her de-brief interview questioning if she really knew 
what insight was or had ever experienced it. Intuitively it would seem that 
understanding the notion and recognising insight (particularly with the help of the 
definitions and examples provided) is straight forward. The difficulty in understanding 
demonstrated by some participants in this study perhaps challenges the assumed 
universality of insight experience (in the way current definitions describe). 
Additionally, the identification that three further participants did not experience 
insight, but rather reported incidences of remembering over the week can be seen as 
pertinent to this. This suggests that they likewise struggled to reconcile their 
experience to the descriptions of insight given, despite indicating through their 
induction that they understood the examples and descriptions provided. 
A sizable minority (20%) in Ovington et al.'s (2015) study congruently reported 
never having experienced insight. This finding was published after the current study 
was designed and data collected. Ovington et al. (2015) indicated that this was 
contrary to their expectations, in deed there is little discussion in literature of the 
possibility that some individuals do not experience insight. Likewise this eventuality 
was not considered in the design of the current study. Insight is an intuitive and 
appealing idea to researchers and scientists. As mentioned previously, most 
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anecdotal evidence and supporting cases studies come from this community (see 
section 2.1.2).  
One of the initial aims of the first two studies in this thesis was to provide 
evidence of insight as a phenomenon experienced in daily life as well as in the 
laboratory. This surprising finding offers corroboration to Ovington et al. (2015). 
Furthermore, it does so using a methodology that provided the opportunity to probe 
participants about their reports, enabling the researcher to clarify their lack of insight 
experience. It is also interesting to note that many experimental insight studies report 
excluding participants for reasons including not experiencing insight (see Table 4.2). 
These observations previously to this current research are made as notes in 
Methods sections, and have not been explained or really commented on. This finding 
provides a potential explanation for these exclusions. Additionally, it might also 
explain why a proportion of participants in the questionnaire study in Chapter 2 failed 
to give descriptions of insight, perhaps they too did not experience insight. 
This finding has possible implications for wider theories of creativity. For 
instance, proponents of everyday creativity including little-c and mini-c described in 
section 2.4.4.3 (Kaufman and Beghetto, 2009). Little-c creativity does not exactly 
equate to every day insight. For example, artistic endeavours, creative writing or 
adventurous cookery are not contingent on Aha, insight moments (Silvia et al., 
2014). It follows that not experiencing insight would not exclude individuals from 
everyday creative acts. However, when describing mini-c, Kaufman and Beghetto 
(2009) also use the term intrapersonal insights. As discussed in section 2.4.4.2, 
insights shared by participants in Study 1 included those that describe realisations 
about themselves or others in relation to themselves. This has potential implications 
for therapeutic settings. As highlighted in 2.4.4.2, self-insight has a central role in the 
therapeutic process. If a substantial minority report that they do not experience 
insight, this may impact on their therapy. Further investigations of the population who 
report not experiencing insight in daily life would seem pertinent, both generally and 
in the specific context of therapy. 
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Table 4.2 Review of participant exclusions in insight studies. 
Study n Participants data excluded 
No. % Reason /  comments 
Kounios et al. 
(2006)* 44 1 2 
Expt 1  - n=19 ,  Expt 2 n=25 (1 participant replaced as 
reported all as insight) 
Bowden & Jung-
Beeman (2003)* 44 2 5 
Assigned a single [insight] rating to nearly all trials (doesn't 
state what rating) 
Cranford & 
Moss (2012)* 31 4 
1
 Reported as solving all by insight or search, not both 
Jung-Beeman et 
al. (2004)* 18 4 
2
 
Experiment One Only. Provided fewer than 10 insight or 
non-insight responses 
Cranford & 
Moss (2010)* 31 6 
1
 
1 reported 'other' too often, 5 reported only as insight or 
non-insight (no breakdown of proportion) 
Subramaniam et 
al. (2009)* 79 0 0 
From examination of scatterplots appears that 2 
participants report over 90% trials as insight no 
participants appear to report under 10% of trials as 
insightful, i.e. have low insight 
Kounios et al 
(2008)* 26 0 0 
From examination of Figure 1. One participant with very 
low ratio (visually interpretation of about 0.1, aka 10% 
insight), this would have counted as exclusion using 
parameters set in many of other studies. 
Collier & 
Beeman (2012) 57 0 0 Exclusions only made for bias in Tip of Tongue reporting 
Daneck et al. 
(2014) 48 0 0 Exclusions only made for low solving rates 
Chein & 
Weisberg (2014) 54 0 0 No mention of exclusions 
Mc Carthy., 
Malony & 
Morrison (2013) 
80 0 0 
None cited as being excluded due to response bias 
towards all insight or non-insight 
Haarman et al. 
(2012) 76 0 0 No mention of exclusions 
Jarosz, 
Coldflesh & 
Wiley (2012) 
40 0 0 
None cited as being excluded due to response bias 
towards all insight or no-insight 
Webbreit et al. 
(2012) 41 0 0 No mention of exclusions 
Cranford & 
Moss (2011)* 22 0 0 
None cited as being excluded due to response bias 
towards all insight or non-insight 
Sandkuhler & 
Bhattacharya 
(2008)* 
21 0 0 
None cited as being excluded due to response bias 
towards all insight or non-insight 
Hare et al. (nd) 
poster 68 0 0 
None cited as being excluded due to response bias 
towards all insight or non-insight 
 
4.4.4.2 Inflated lay perceptions of insight prevalence norms.  
While researchers recognise that insight is rare (Ohlsson, 2011), the thematic 
analysis of participant de-brief interviews suggests that lay perceptions of insight 
prevalence may be in contrast to this. Participants described how their experiences 
of insight were deficient compared to their expectations both in terms of the amount 
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they anticipated of themselves and what they considered to be a normal level for 
people in general. This is an interesting disconnect, and again worthy of future 
investigation. Firstly, exploring if the participants' had inflated expectations of insight 
above what they typically experience. This could provide an additional characteristic 
of memory effects in insight to consider alongside those raised by Gruber (1995) 
(see sections 2.1.4.2) that include telescoping, embellishment and 
decontextualisation.  The alternative possibility is that participation in this study 
impacted on insight experience, reducing it. However, as discussed in section 4.1.5 
which considered reactance effects to participation in research, it was concluded that 
participants might notice more insight, having been tasked to report it. This was in 
line with Sun et al. (2011) who outlined a perceived increase in serendipity 
experience reported by their participants. Yet, while serendipity might be argued to 
be a special case of insight the two are not directly analogous phenomena. As such, 
further research into people's experience versus expectations regarding everyday 
insight experience would serve to validate this initial finding.  
The disparity highlighted by this study between actual experiences compared 
to expectations might also provide an explanation for the participants in Chapter 2 
who indicated having insight within the last 24 hours, but then withdrew when asked 
to describe it. When asked if they had recently experienced insight participants' 
affirmative responses were based on their expectations of insight experience (of 
themselves or of general norms.) and the assumption that 'of course, I must have 
experienced insight in the last 24 hours'. Participants only realised when asked to 
describe their insight on the next page of the questionnaire that in actuality they were 
unable to provide an example. Either they had not experienced it or could not 
remember their insight. 
4.4.5 Limitations of the study 
 One limitation outlined above in the context of content analysis is there 
not being enough data to conduct a meaningful analysis (see 4.3.2). However, as 
discussed this research was designed to take a qualitative approach. While it was 
not possible to conduct a full content analysis, categorising the insights following the 
methodology outlined by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) served to highlight a 
characteristic of the insight reports perhaps overlooked through the use of thematic 
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analysis in Chapter 2. The necessity to categorise every excerpt (which is not the 
case in thematic analysis) identified a proportion of reports not fitting any of the 
themes identified in Chapter 2. The resultant new category was cursorily named Aha 
without adaptive re-structuring, a theme that was congruent to the Uh-oh No Insight 
theme seen in Chapter 3. 
Participants did report feeling pressure to produce insight in their de-brief 
interviews. In future, one possible way to reduce this could be to extend the period 
over which diaries were kept and so increase the likelihood that participants have an 
insight experience to report. However, this would not have remedied the situation for 
the participant who reported not experiencing insight, who came to realise through 
her participation that she never had. Also, as discussed above it may be that the 
pressure resulted from the difference between participants' expected and 
experienced levels of insight rather than from their need make logs and please the 
researcher. Extending the study therefore would not likely reduce this feeling or alter 
levels of insight experienced. Furthermore a balance needs to be struck between 
giving enough time to collect a reasonable number of insights against the intrusion 
an extended participation period might have on participants' lives. This would 
possibly increase the likelihood of drop outs or missed reports. An alternative way to 
reduce this potential demand characteristic would be to recruit and manage diary 
participants through online methods, avoiding the personal contact with the 
researcher that possibly exacerbated the feeling of a need to please. However, this 
would mean losing one of the key aspects of the study, the ability to probe 
experience through de-brief interviews which served to identify the key findings 
made, such as highlighting individual differences in insight experience, and verifying 
the possibility that insight experience is not universal. Accordingly, any advantage 
gained from a distancing of the researcher and participants can be seen to be 
outweighed by the need to probe responses and elicit a rich understanding at this 
exploratory stage of the research. 
4.4.6 Future directions 
In sum this Chapter highlights the need for further research on individual 
differences in insight experience, both in terms of emotionality, age and situation. As 
the key interest of this thesis is the exploration of emotion and insight, Chapter 5 will 
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further explore individual differences in emotional and insight experience. It will also 
consider different aspects of emotion (physiological and psychological) in relation to 
insight. Further investigation of factors such as age and situation fall outside the 
remit of this thesis so will not be included, but do serve as promising avenues for 
future research beyond this thesis. 
Another key finding from this Chapter was the notion that insight may not be 
universally experienced, corroborating and adding rich qualitative evidence in 
support of similar findings by Ovington et al. (2015) and some results from earlier 
work in this thesis relating to participants' behaviours when completing the 
questionnaire in Chapter 2. This is likely an important finding (as outlined in section 
4.4.4.1), that further research taking both qualitative and quantitative approaches 
should look to validate. However this again falls beyond the central focus of this 
thesis that is to explore the experience of insight and emotion. 
Finally, the identification of an additional theme, labelled Aha Without 
Restructuring (see section 4.3.2) where participants were responding with examples 
of their experience that did not meet the definitions of insight given to them 
independently corroborates findings from Chapter 3 in this thesis. This has 
implications for future work that asks participants to make self-reports regarding their 
everyday experience. Researchers need to incorporate checks in their research 
design to ensure that participants are making reports regarding the actual 
phenomenon of interest to the researchers. This is particularly pertinent to online, 
quantitative questionnaire designs where there are no open response questions or 
face-to-face instruction and debriefs to check the actual experience participants are 
reporting. 
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5 Psychological and physiological factors in Compound Remote Associate 
Problem Solving 
5.1 Introduction 
Study 1 (Chapter 2) demonstrated that lay perceptions of everyday insight 
incorporated feeling aspects of insight in addition to cognitive ones. This focus on 
emotion in insight is echoed in recent attempts to capture the phenomenology of 
insight including emotion through self-reports from participants in experimental 
paradigms (Danek, Fraps, Von müller, Grothe & Öllinger, 2014b; Shen, Yuan, Liu & 
Luo, 2015 see more in section 2.1.5). These studies build on theoretical discussions 
of emotion and insight outlined in Chapter 1 (see section 1.2). A number of studies 
have also considered how state emotion impacts on peoples solving of insight 
problems, either leading them to solve more classic insight problems, or seeing an 
increase in the labelling of problems as insight rather than search (see also section 
4.4.3). While these offer validation and identification for the first time of an 
experienced emotional component to insight, they tell us little about the nature of 
emotion at the insight moment.  
Furthermore, the identification of the theme Gut Feelings in Study 2 (Chapter 
3) again reinforces the experience of emotions in insight, but also raises the question 
of exactly how bodily changes relate to insight experience and emotion (see Section 
5.1.4). As highlighted in Chapter 4 the role of individual differences in trait 
emotionality may be pertinent to the experience of emotion and insight (see section 
5.1.6). An additional aspect to consider is the prevalence of insight. Until now this 
question has been posed in terms of the general prevalence of insight in everyday 
life, with the identification in Study 3 that there are likely individual differences, such 
as the disposition of insight (Ovington et al., 2016) (see also section 4.4.1.1). 
Together these all highlight that little is known about aspects of emotion at the insight 
moment. As such the exploration of everyday insight experience from a qualitative 
perspective seen in studies 1, 2 and 3 has provided interesting avenues from which 
this thesis will now further explore using a quantitative approach. This study will 
firstly aim to investigate insight and emotion related measures using an established, 
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laboratory based, insight elicitation task, the Compound Remote Associates task 
(Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b). 
5.1.1 Compound Remote Associates 
Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems have been widely used to elicit 
insight and non-insight problem solving in controlled conditions (see also section 
1.1.4.1). Interestingly, congruent to everyday insight findings seen in this thesis 
(reported in Chapters 2, 3, and 4) and by Ovington et al. (2015), the CRA task 
consistently appears to produce a proportion of participants for whom no insight was 
experienced (see Table 4.2).  
A recent study by Salvi et al. (2016) compared performance in CRA problems 
with other tasks that elicit both insight and analytic, search-based solving 
experiences (anagrams, rebus puzzles and picture completion). They identified 
comparable patterns of performance across the different tasks. Furthermore, they 
demonstrated in line with ideas introduced by Kounios et al. (2008) that solutions 
labelled as insight were more likely to be correct than those labelled as search. This 
finding is interpreted in terms of the different processing that is proposed to occur in 
insight and analytic solving (Kounios et al., 2008; Salvi et al, 2016). This approach 
sees insight as an all or nothing process where processing occurs unconsciously 
and so is not available until the solution is reached. Whilst analytic solving through 
search offers partial solutions to participants on which they may draw to offer an 
incorrect answer. As such, Salvi et al. (2016) infer that insight solving is more 
accurate than analytic. 
In addition to the increased accuracy seen for CRA solutions reported as 
insight compared to non-insight, insight solutions have also suggested to be solved 
more quickly than non-insight (e.g. Cranford and Moss, 2010, 2011, 2012;. Kounios 
et al 2008; Sumramaniam et al., 2008; Shen et al. 2015). However, Cranford and 
Moss (2010, 2011, 2012) in a series of studies built the case for two different types 
of insight being elicited, immediate and delayed insight (see also section 1.1.5.4). 
They argued that the latter represent insight resulting from an impasse, the former 
labelled as such due to phenomenological experience of suddenness and surprise. 
However, even within their own research the distinction between immediate and 
delayed insight varies. Cranford and Moss (2010) identify problems solved in the first 
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15 seconds (of a 30 second period) as immediate insight, whilst in their later, 2011 
study they considered those in the first 10 seconds, again reverting to 15 seconds in 
their 2012 paper. While they do not explain this inconsistency in time selection, their 
overall rationale for making a distinction was to exclude trials without impasse, 
making the assumption that only these represent true insight. In their recent study, 
Salvi et al. (2016) also separated immediate insight trials, defining these as where 
problems were solved within two seconds of problem presentation. This is a far 
shorter period than seen in the Cranford and Moss (2010, 2011, 2012) studies, and 
highlights that there is no accepted distinction between immediate and delayed 
insight.  
Cranford and Moss (2010) identified through protocol analysis that more 
impasse and restructuring was seen in delayed insight compared to search 
solutions, making the assumption that this was why participants labelled solutions as 
insight. Yet it may equally be the case that the impasse led to the same 
phenomenological experience, a rapid and surprising awareness of the solution as 
seen in immediate insight; and the participants were basing their labelling of trials as 
insight or not on this experience, not the antecedent cognitive processes. Taking this 
interpretation when thinking about the phenomenological experience of insight there 
seems little need to discriminate between the two types of insight. Particularly 
considering the arbitrary nature and variance of timings used to make such a 
distinction in previous research. 
The recent studies discussed above again demonstrate the CRA to be a valid 
and robust method to elicit problem solving behaviour that is experienced as insight 
or search. Additionally, the similarity in terms of a proportion of the sample/ 
population not reporting insight both in CRA experiments and in self-reported 
everyday experience suggests comparability with real-life solving (see section 
4.4.4.1). Furthermore, the CRA builds on the notion that insight represents a sudden 
synthesis of remote ideas, as seen in the mental time travel theme identified for 
everyday negative insights (see section 3.4.3). 
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5.1.2 Theories of Emotion in Relation to Insight. 
5.1.2.1 Conceptual Act Theory of emotion. 
The idea of integration of different mental components, seen above in insight 
and the CRA task can be explored in relation to theories of emotion. The conceptual 
act theory of emotion (CAT) posits a similar integration of experiential and perceptual 
aspects in embodied cognition, some of which are labelled as an emotion (Barrett, 
2014). This approach argues that domain general processes integrate input from 
external and internal sensation (c.f. exteroception and interoception distinctions 
discussed in section 5.1.5) with knowledge (from memory) to provide the content of 
conscious awareness. The use of the terminology 'Conceptual Act' refers to this 
moment to moment integration (series of acts) of top down knowledge (conceptual) 
with bottom up sensory information (from the body and external world) to build a 
mental event, the sequence of which represent conscious flow (Barrett, 2014). The 
themes from Study 2 identified similar components, Mental Time Travel seeing an 
association of current environmental cues (external world information) with 
knowledge from remote memories and future plans (conceptual information) 
alongside the theme of Gut Feelings which described an awareness of bodily cues. 
Barrett (2014) argues that it is attention that determines how each mental 
event (Conceptual Act) is labelled. So a focus on the external world would lead to the 
experience of a perception, whilst a focus on mental content would be seen as a 
cognition. When attention is paid to the internally generated sensations of the body, 
the mental event will be seen as an emotion. This may provide an alternative 
framework to explain how participants determine if a solution is labelled as insight or 
search. When attention is paid to the cognitive processes and the participant 
recognises using search strategies and being aware of these, the solving event 
according to CAT would be seen as cognitive. In contrast when attention is paid to 
bodily processes CAT would suggest that this be an emotional experience and so 
labelled as insight. 
However, there is not yet evidence of where attention lies at the insight 
moment (in terms of towards mental processes, external perception or bodily 
changes); determining (according to CAT) if it is experienced as a cognition, emotion 
or sensation. As discussed in Section 1.2 insight has long been assumed a cognitive 
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event but without research explicitly testing this notion, or exploring how emotional 
experience might unfold within this experience. For example, Gick and Lockhart 
(1995) discussed affective aspects making the assumption that they were in 
response to an insight moment. Topolinski and Reber (2010a), in a more recent 
theoretical paper likewise see affect as a by-product of the cognitive process of 
insight. This stance was subsequently adopted by Jarman (2014) who again 
dismissed affective aspects when designing scales to measure everyday experience. 
As highlighted here and also discussed in section 2.1.5, such assumptions appear to 
be based on insight researchers' intuition about the relationship between cognitive 
and emotional events; that cognitive events lead to emotional responses. 
5.1.2.2 James (Lange) Theory of Emotion (JATE, 1884).   
Emotion theorists have a long history of challenging this assumed order of 
cognitive events and related emotion. James (1884) theory of emotion (JATE) 
proposed a counter intuitive sequence to the feeling of emotion, contrasting it to the 
common sense notion that we think, then feel and then respond. He suggested that it 
is the physiological response to a detected stimulus that causes emotional feelings. 
James (1884) demonstrated the lay assumption of emotion through descriptions of a 
person encountering a bear: they firstly see the bear and so feel frightened 
(experience of emotion); leading them to tremble (physiological response); and 
perhaps run away (behavioural response). JATE proposed that conversely, the 
person felt fear (experience of emotion) because they were trembling in response to 
the perception of the bear rather than trembled because of their feeling of fear. While 
aspects of JATE are still debated (see journal edition for contemporary perspectives 
on JATE introduced by Russell (2014)), in particular the extent to which 
physiological, and psychological perspectives contribute to emotional experience 
(see section 5.1.3.2). James (1884) original challenge to the common sense 
sequence prevails; physiological changes are widely accepted as contributory to 
emotion experience rather than simply being a product of it (Barrett 2014; Craig, 
2015; Damasio, 2000; Ekman, 1992). 
The examples from insight literature highlighted previously (in section 2.1.5) 
would appear to follow the common sense sequencing criticised by James (1884): 
an individual suddenly sees a solution to a problem (think); which they are surprised 
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by, and happy about (feel): and so jump in the air [possibly run naked down the 
street like Archimedes] and exclaim "Eureka" (respond). As such this positions 
emotion as a secondary consequence of the cognitive insight experience. 
It could be argued that such implicit assumptions have little impact on insight 
research. However there are some examples where changing these underlying ideas 
could change the interpretation of findings made. For example, Kounios et al. (2006) 
assert from their neuroimaging research on EEG analysis of insight problem solving 
that "a sudden burst of gamma-band oscillatory activity … does not reflect subjects' 
affective or surprise reactions following solutions, because the onset of this activity 
coincides with, rather than follows, the conscious availability of the solution" (p. 883). 
Here they discount emotional explanations due to the assumption that emotion is a 
consequence of insight and so neural activity at the time of the insight could not be 
attributed to it. However, taking a theoretical standpoint such as CAT opens up an 
alternative interpretation of the neural activity at the point of insight.  This approach 
relates the experience of insight (labelled as emotional, cognitive or as a perception) 
to the components that contribute to it, so bodily, sensory or knowledge based 
activity. By this account, neural activity seen at the time an insight occurred could 
therefore be ascribed as emotional, cognitive or perceptual. That is not to say that 
CAT is necessarily the standpoint taken in this thesis, but it does demonstrate how 
alternate conceptions of emotion and cognition can change interpretation and so are 
important to understand. 
There has been little experimental research conducted into emotion and 
insight to explicitly test these ideas. Moreover, the sequencing of other obvious 
common sense behavioural experiences have been similarly challenged. For 
example, common sense understanding asserts that a decision is made to press a 
button, leading to a message being sent by the brain area responsible for motor 
action to the finger, causing it to move. However, carefully designed 
psychophysiological experiments have identified a counter intuitive sequencing that 
sees activity in motor areas of the brain initiating finger movement before the 
conscious decision to press the button was made (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet, 
Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983, but also see Roskies, 2010). Such unchallenged 
assumptions highlight the need to begin to explore insight and emotion 
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experimentally and carefully control aspects to differentiate between emotional and 
cognitive components. 
5.1.3 Gut Feelings and Insight. 
5.1.3.1 Physiological responses to problem solving. 
While the various theories of emotion encompass bodily changes in different 
ways, the majority do not dispute a physiological component is associated with the 
experience of emotion (for example, Barrett 2014; Craig, 2015; Damasio, 2000; 
Ekman, 1992; James 1884). The theme of Gut Feelings identified in Study 2 
highlights a comparable focus on bodily changes in negative insight that participants 
interpreted as emotional.  
A few insight studies do identify physiological aspects, however none consider 
these in relation to emotion. The free report accounts of participants' insight 
moments collected by Danek et al. (2014b, see section 1.2.3.1) identified what the 
researchers termed "somatic reactions" (p. 10) to solving problems through insight. 
These were categorised separately to the emotional and cognitive aspects that were 
identified across participant responses. It is interesting to note that the researchers in 
this study assumed the somatic descriptions were reactions to insight rather than an 
integral part of it. Whilst, on examination of the actual textual responses given by 
participants, for example "Like a shot through my body" (p. 10), they do not describe 
any kind of sequence to the somatic descriptions in relation to other aspects of the 
insight moment. However as the authors identify, participants were not asked to 
provide descriptions of their non-insight solution moments, so it is difficult to attribute 
these findings solely to the insight moment rather than a generalised response to 
solving the magic tricks. 
Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995) suggested that there are contrasting heart 
rate signatures demonstrated by participants solving different types of problem. 
Participants solved four types of problem (two of each): divergent problems; dialectic 
problems; insight problems and; search problems. The authors classified the 
problems according to Wakefield (1989) with both divergent and dialectic problems 
having open solutions whilst insight and interpolation having closed solutions. They 
measured participants' heart rate whilst they attempted to solve the problems, having 
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five minutes for each problem. In the first study giving feeling of warmth ratings 
during this time, in the second study using Verbal Protocol Analysis. The researchers 
presented graphs for the last minute of problem solving before a solution is reached 
(time periods range from 45 - 70 seconds before the solution) for average HR 
change (from a baseline HR measure taken during a rest period prior to problem 
solving) in solving the different types of problem. It is unclear though, how a solution 
point was determined and verified for the open ended problems (in contrast to closed 
solution problems with a single identifiable solution). As such, and in line with others 
discussing these findings, results will only be considered for the search and insight 
problems (e.g. Lackner et al., 2013; Ovington et al., 2016; Shen et al., 2015). 
For both studies, Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995) showed similar patterns of 
HR (see Figure 5.1a). Search problems seeing a gradual increase in HR through the 
problem solving period until the solution was found. In contrast, HR remained stable 
during insight problem solving until the last 15 seconds before the solution moment 
when a steep increase occurred. Accordingly, this pattern showed intriguing 
congruity with the feeling of warmth (FOW) ratings reported in their study and 
elsewhere (e.g. Metcalfe and Wieble, 1987), where a more gradual increase in 
feeling of warmth ratings is seen for search while insight typically shows static FOW 
ratings until just prior to the solution.(see Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1 Original graphs from Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995) showing a). 
heart rate and b). feeling of warmth ratings through time (t=0 being the solution 
point) for insight (black line, star) compared to search (grey line, plus) problems. 
Results for two open ended problems were also presented (triangle - dialectic; 
hourglass - divergent). Adapted from What Can Heart Rate Tell Us About the 
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Creative Process? By N. Jausovec & K. Bakracevic, 1995, Creativity Research 
Journal, 8(1), 11. Copyright 1995 by Taylor & Francis. 
A recent study by Lackner et al. (2013) also reported heart related measures 
during the moment of understanding humorous cartoons. Participants were 
presented line drawings, each for six seconds. Half of the drawings were of a 
humorous nature which the authors argued required an insight moment of 
comprehension of the joke. Control cartoons contained incongruous material where 
no comprehension, so no insight moment was elicited. Participants indicated 
whether they understood the joke (only trials where understanding was indicated 
were included as humorous trials in data analysis) or not for each picture presented 
and rated their amusement. Comparisons of changes in heart rate (HR), stroke 
volume and cardiac output (CO) and blood pressure were made during the picture 
presentation compared to baseline. For all physiological measures there were effects 
of time, with heart related measures decreasing on presentation of the drawing and 
then increasing after approximately three seconds. There were smaller changes in 
HR and CO for humorous images compared to controls both across the presentation 
period and in the half second time frame before comprehension was indicated (the 
same time point was used in the control trial as indicated by the participant for the 
humorous cartoon). This smaller change interpreted as a relative increase in HR for 
humorous compared to non-humorous was attributed to activation of the behavioural 
approach system, linked to the intrinsic reward and pleasure of humour and insight 
(Lackner et al., 2013). 
However, it is problematic to attribute the heart rate changes reported in both 
the studies above purely to the insight moment. Jausovec and Bakracevic's (1995) 
participants did different problems to elicit the alternative types of solving 
(interpolation versus insight), meaning the differences in HR may be due to the task 
variances rather than due to insight compared to search solving. Whilst Lackner et 
al. (2013) did provide control trials where participants were undertaking the same 
activity, the differences seen may be due to humour effects, insight effects or a 
combination of both elicited in the experimental trials. It would therefore be desirable 
to explore these effects using a task that elicits both insight and search based 
problem solving and so eliminates task effects and enables any differences to be 
more confidently attributed to the different types of solving reported. The CRA task 
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selected for this study has been shown to provide such a comparison (see section 
5.1.1). 
A very recent study (Shen et al., 2016) explored differences in electrodermal 
activity (EDA) and heart rate variability (HRV) between insight and search trials 
elicited using a Chinese language version of the CRA. Specifically, reporting a higher 
EDA for insight trials than search, but no difference in HRV. It should be noted that 
this article was published after the data was collected for this study. Detail is 
included here for completeness of the literature review. Further evaluation will 
explore the similarities and differences between this and the current research 
findings in the discussion (section 5.4.2). 
5.1.3.2 Physiological responses to emotion.  
By comparison to the paucity of physiological studies for insight there is more 
research relating to emotion and physiology. As highlighted previously, different 
approaches to emotion (see section 1.2) can be seen in efforts to explore related 
physiological responses.  
Taking a basic emotions approach, Ekman's research team (e.g. Ekman, 
Levenson and Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman and Friesen, 1990; Levenson, 
Ekman, Heider and Firesen, 1992) used Directed Facial Action (DFA) where posed 
emotional facial expressions elicit emotional experience. This draws on the idea that 
basic emotions are evolutionary, discrete, hard wired phenomena with distinct 
physiological and behavioural responses. Changes to average physiological 
measures were calculated between each emotional expression and a neutral pose. 
In the first of these studies Ekman, Levenson and Friesen (1983) reported 
discriminating HR and finger temperature between happy, disgust and surprise 
which saw low heart rates with anger, fear and sadness which showed high heart 
rate. Skin temperature was then further suggested to differentiate between anger 
(higher temperature) and fear and sad (lower temperature). However these results 
were in a small sample (n = 16) consisting of actors and scientists. These findings 
were replicated in a larger sample (Levenson, Ekman and Friesen (1990) collapsed 
results from three slightly different studies giving sample, n = 62) and in a cross-
cultural comparison to a sample from West Sumatra (Levenson, Ekman, Heider & 
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Friesen, 1992), again demonstrating differences in HR, EDA and skin temperature 
patterns for the different basic emotions elicited through DFA. 
However, the effects of HR seen in DFA has been suggested to be an artefact 
of the method reflecting the effort required to produce a particular expression 
(Boiten, 1996). So expressions of anger, fear and sadness requiring more effort and 
so increased heart rate compared to happy, disgust and surprise expressions. 
Levenson (2014), in reviewing the role of the ANS and emotion from a basic 
emotions perspective highlights the shortfalls of previous attempts to map emotion to 
ANS, suggesting that more accurate recording and sophisticated analysis of the 
temporal occurrence of emotion and corresponding ANS pattern would lead to more 
definitive conclusions to be made. Interestingly, and in addition to issues identified in 
section 1.2.3.2, Levenson (2014) does not include surprise in this review. Yet, 
surprise is one of the few basic emotions discussed in the literature in relation to 
insight. Furthermore, Kreibig's (2010) conclusion from a review focusing on basic 
emotions and ANS was that there was no one-to-one relationship with discrete 
emotions, stating further that changes in physiology and feeling of emotion were both 
possible independently. As such, and coupled with issues identified in section 
1.2.3.2,  a consideration of physiological changes in insight in relation to emotions 
taking a dimensional approach may be more appropriate to the research question 
and approach being taken in this thesis. 
An often cited, classic study taking a dimensional approach to emotions saw 
Lang, Greenwald, Bradley and Hamm (1993) measure self-reported arousal and 
valence of emotional and neutral images (International Affective Picture System 
[IAPS] Bradley and Lang [2007]) presented to participants for six seconds. During 
presentation they recorded heart rate; electrodermal activity (EDA); and activity of 
the corrugator and zygomatic facial muscles (using Electromyography (EMG)) that 
relate respectively to frowning and smiling facial expressions. Lang et al. (1993) 
compared the half second interval with the largest heart rate change (acceleration) 
for each picture presentation for each participant using this measure in all of their 
heart rate comparisons (see Figure 5.2 below for overview of different HR measures 
used). They found that overall there was a relationship between HR acceleration and 
valence ratings, with the largest acceleration seen in response to positively rated 
images, followed by neutral then negative images. Furthermore a significant positive 
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correlation was seen between arousal and HR change. However looking at both 
valence and arousal relationships to HR within individuals saw only a small 
proportion of the participants demonstrate significant correlations (9% to valence and 
3% to arousal ratings) with stronger relationships demonstrated within individuals to 
EDA (significant positive correlation between conductance and arousal in 33% of 
participants). Despite the small proportion of participants demonstrating the effects 
overall these findings have been interpreted as demonstrating that if interested in 
valence aspects of emotion, as this thesis is for positive and negative insight, then 
HR would offer better discrimination than EDA. 
A factor analysis was also run for the different measures taken for each 
picture (rather than participant's response). This identified two factors relating 
respectively to valence and arousal. Heart rate acceleration and facial muscle 
activity loaded with the valence factor, while skin conductance mapped to arousal. 
As such, subsequent researchers have taken these results to suggest that EDR best 
measures emotional arousal while HR is best for valence. Sánchez-Navarro, 
Martínez-Selva, Torrente and Román (2008) again obtained two factors through 
factor analysis of their measures which included eyeblink startle rather than EMG. In 
contrast to other studies they found that HR change loaded to the arousal factor 
rather than to valence. This may reflect the different measure of HR that they used 
(they do not say why), unusually comparing the last three seconds of IAPS 
presentation whilst most other studies focused on maximum HR change (either 
acceleration or deceleration). 
Regardless of the differences in loadings, it is perhaps unsurprising that two 
factors were identified in these studies. The inclusion of self-report ratings for arousal 
and valence in response to each picture in factor analysis possibly driving this 
outcome. So the highest loading item on the factor named valence being the valence 
ratings, likewise for the arousal factor the highest loaded item was the arousal 
ratings.  It would be interesting to see if the two factor structure remained on 
omission of these, however this is not reported. As such it is pertinent to explore 
outcomes of other research focusing on HR, EDA and emotion to verify the most 
appropriate measure in relation to problem solving and valence of emotion, the focus 
of this thesis (i.e. positive versus negative solving). 
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Subsequent studies have replicated Lang et al.'s (1993) findings using similar 
methodologies but again with slightly different HR measures in human samples 
(Bernat, Patrick, Benning & Tellegen, 2006; Bradley, Cuthbert & Lang, 1996; 
Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert and Land, 2001) and non-human animals (Bliss-
Moreau, Machado & Amaral, 2013). For example, Bradley, Cuthbert and Lang 
(1996) introduced an eye blink startle (to a sound probe presented whilst participants 
viewed the different IAPS) measure in addition to EDA and HR. For heart rate they 
took the period of maximum negative heart rate change, finding that negative IAPS 
gave the greatest change, followed by neutral then positive images. Levenson, 
Patrick, Bradley and Lang (2000) explored physiological responses in a similar way 
in participants scoring high on psychopathy while Hempel et al. (2005) compared 
participants with schizophrenia to controls. In both cases, while the particular groups 
of interest in these studies fall outside the remit of this thesis, the control groups 
provide further corroboration of the effects of the earlier studies. Both replicating the 
relationship of arousal effects with EDA and implicating HR changes in valence 
(aggregate deceleration in Levenston et al. (2000) and acceleratory peak in Hempel 
et al. (2005)).  
Pastor et al. (2008) identified differing predictions for the effects on EDA and 
HR if presentation of IAPS was blocked into series of congruently valenced images. 
They hypothesised that blocking by image valence would lead to a reduced 
orientating response when images were of a similar (valenced) content, whilst have 
little effect on arousal. The expected reduction in HR change effects and no 
difference in EDA supported this proposed relationship between arousal and EDA 
and valence with HR change. This theoretically driven finding supporting the results 
of earlier studies would appear to confirm that HR be the physiological measure that 
best discriminates in terms of valence, so most applicable to the research in this 
thesis. 
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Figure 5.2 Classic biphasic HR response to emotional picture presentation 
with related HR measures reported in various studies. 
 
Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert and Lang (2001) proposed a defence cascade 
model (Lang et al., 1997) that explains a graded response to stimuli over time and in 
relation to its proximity. They describe a biphasic HR response to stimuli (see Figure 
5.2), where an initial HR deceleration relates to an orientating response where the 
stimulus is evaluated. The subsequent HR acceleration is then seen representing the 
action taken. This model was driven by animal research and the subsequent 
acceleration was related to the action (for instance fight or flight) in response to the 
stimulus. This pattern can be seen as consistent to the HR response seen in Lackner 
et al.'s (2013) humorous 'insight' condition (see section 5.1.3). Furthermore, as seen 
in Figure 5.2 the findings from studies using differing and seemingly contradictory 
HR measures outlined in the section above can be interpreted to support this model. 
In summary, of concern to the current research is which physiological 
measures are most appropriate in the exploration of effects of insight and emotion. A 
number of aspects are pertinent. Firstly, it should be noted that research into 
physiology and emotion typically explore externally elicited emotion via delivery of 
emotion eliciting stimuli (such as IAPS) or events. Little research considers 
endogenous emotion, in other words emotion generated from within. Shen et al. 
(2015) highlight that insight is an example of endogenous emotional experience, so 
caution should be taken in applying the current emotion research to insight. 
However, there is little literature on physiology and endogenous emotional 
H
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experience. As such the assumption will be taken that similar processes occur for 
emotion that is internally and externally generated. From the perspective of CAT 
(see section 5.1.2) this assumes that emotion is not a process but a focus of current 
attention on bodily information seeing emotion as a categorisation not a process, as 
such from this perspective the perceived experience and related bodily response are 
important, not the process. 
Of the measures previously explored, and as highlighted above, researchers 
have implicated EDA in emotional arousal. However, it is identified that only 
extremely arousing stimuli generate detectable EDA responses, with weak 
discrimination in mild or low arousal (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert and Lang, 2001). 
In terms of IAPS, extreme arousal is elicited by pictures that show positively 
valenced erotic images and picturing unpleasant scenes such as graphic mutilation. 
At the time this research was designed it was determined unlikely that responses to 
insight elicited in the laboratory would produce comparable levels of arousal, 
meaning that measures of EDA would not appear a sensitive enough in this 
situation. 
In contrast, heart rate change is suggested to be discriminatory for emotional 
valence across the range of emotional experience rather than at the extremes 
(Bradley et al., 2001). As this thesis is considering positive and negative insight 
moments it can be determined that that the valence aspect of emotion be the most 
pertinent dimension to consider. Furthermore, the few studies that have explored 
physiological aspects in insight (at the time of research design, so prior to the Shen 
et al.'s (2016) described above) also focus on heart rate.   
5.1.4 Individual differences in emotional expression. 
An additional aspect to consider building on results from the previous studies 
in this thesis is individual differences in emotional experience. This stems from 
Chapter 3, which found that lay perceptions of everyday insight included the idea 
that the extent someone experiences things as insight may relate to individual 
differences in emotionality, so their tendency to experience or express emotion (see 
section 4.4.1). So the more emotionally expressive they are, the more they would 
identify the Aha and Uh-oh moments in problem solving, labelling these as insight. 
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One approach might be to consider general individual differences in relation to 
personality. Many personality measures do contain scales that on face value relate 
to individual differences in emotion. For example Emotional Stability in the big five, 
Neuroticism in the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) or Emotionality in 
HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2009, Costa & McCrea, 1992 ; Eynsenck & Eynsenck, 
1991). Of these, the emotionality component of HEXACO might appear on face 
value to be the closest to emotional expression highlighted in Chapter 3. However, 
further examination of the scales within HEXACO sees aspects pertinent to 
emotional expression across the scales. For example Emotionality focuses on 
anxiety and sentimental attachment whilst tendency to be expressive is seen as part 
of extraversion and specific expression of anger is included as a component of 
agreeableness (Ashton & Lee, 2009). It may therefore be pertinent to consider 
measure that have a more specific focus on emotional expression. 
5.1.4.1 Emotional expressivity. 
Emotional expressivity is the extent that behavioural changes to the face, 
voice or posture (display behaviours) are displayed when experiencing emotion 
(Gross and John, 1995). Gross and John (1998) proposed a hierarchical structure for 
emotional expressivity that included five facets. Three made up core emotional 
expressivity, so the spontaneous and unchecked expression that would occur in 
everyday life. Two regulatory facets then act upon core expressivity, expressive 
confidence and masking. Insight, with its spontaneous experiences of Aha and Uh-
oh moments more readily aligns with core emotional expressivity.  
The three facets of core emotion expressivity originally identified by Gross 
and John (1995) were impulse strength, negative expressivity and positive 
expressivity. Impulse strength relates to the intensity that emotions are felt, so higher 
impulse strength would mean emotion was harder to hide or stop. The negative and 
positive expressivity facets of core expressivity demonstrate differential exhibition of 
behaviours relating to negative and positive emotions. So generally, there is higher 
expression of behaviours relating to positive emotion, such as laughter than for 
negative, for instance crying. However, individual differences are also seen in the 
expression of these facets (Gross and John, 1995; 1997). In relation to problem 
solving and insight the further breakdown of core expressivity to factors that relate to 
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the valence of emotion may be useful going forward when tasks are identified that 
elicit both positive and negative insight moments (see Chapter 6). 
5.1.4.2 Measures of emotional expression 
Gross and John (1995, 1997) validated a questionnaire, the Berkeley 
Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ) to measure emotional expressivity, identifying the 
three core factors: positive expressivity; negative expressivity and impulse strength. 
They compared self-report ratings to peer reports, behavioural responses to 
emotional film clips and average HR and EDA changes to validate this measure 
(Gross and John, 1997).  
Larsen, Diener and Emmons' (1986) Affect Intensity Measure (AIM) also 
measures the strength of emotion felt and provides a single score. However, as 
identified by Gross and John (1998) it includes both positive and negative related 
items similar to those seen in the BEQ. Furthermore, items for the two measures 
mapped to similar factors in Gross and John's (1998) factor analysis conducted on 
these and other measures to arrive at their five facet model described above.  
As such, either measure appears to effectively capture the core expressivity 
of interest in this study. However the BEQ might be preferable for a couple of 
reasons. Firstly the differentiation of core expressivity into three facets, two of which 
may be pertinent when exploring positive and negative insight. Secondly, Gross and 
John (1998) suggest that impulse strength represents the first stage of the emotion 
generation process, with differential translation of this to behaviour for negative or 
positive emotions. While emotional valence is of overall interest to this thesis, the 
physiological aspects of emotion and insight are particularly being explored in this 
study (see section 5.1.3). Impulse strength incorporates items such as "I have strong 
emotions" [BEQ 11] and "my body reacts very strongly to emotional situations" 
[BEQ7] that can be seen as relating to this aspect of emotion and insight. 
5.1.4.3 Gross's Models of Emotion Regulation. 
 Subsequent to their work focusing on expressivity, Gross' (1998) research 
shifted to explore the processes in emotion regulation that act on core expressivity. 
Gross (1998) proposed different processes of emotion regulation occurring at 
different stages of an unfolding emotion. Antecedent strategies aimed to avoid, 
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moderate, ignore or reappraise the possible emotional event, while response 
focused regulation looked to alter things once the emotional response was elicited. 
The tendency to regulate emotions through these processes impacts on the 
expressivity of emotion seen within and between individuals. Gross (2015) recently 
extended his model, emphasising a central role of valuation cycles throughout an 
unfolding emotion (see Figure 5.3a). The valuation cycle initiating with a world event, 
followed by a perceptual component, a valuation component and finally an action 
component. The world event could be either external or internal to the body/mind of 
the individual. Perception would then lead to a valuation of the perceived event as 
"good for me", "bad for me" or "indifferent" (p. 10). The valuation of either valence 
would lead to actions, either mental or physical. Gross (2015) suggests that cycles 
though this valuation process would continue until there is a change, for example the 
event being no longer present or evaluated as important. He further differentiated 
between first level valuation systems that generate emotions as core affect and, 
second order valuation systems that act upon them in regulatory processes. The 
specific emotion regulation processes identified in his earlier model acting within the 
second order valuation cycle to influence the first level core affect. Through the lens 
of this Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation, the insight moment can be 
considered (see Figure 5.3b). The world event being an internal experience, with the 
perception of a new idea, understanding or solution relating previously remote 
mental associates together. These would be judged as being salient: 'good for me' 
valuations seen as positive insight and 'bad for me' valuations as negative insight, 
labelling the insight moment as an emotional cognitive event.  
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Figure 5.3. Gross (2015) Extended process model of emotion regulation. a. First 
order as core expressivity and second order emotion regulation valuation 
system. b. Insight through the lens of Gross' (2015) model. 
The insight moment, a short lived momentary experience is congruent to this 
first order, initial experience of emotion termed core expressivity in Gross' (see 
Gross and John, 1995, 1997) earlier research. Later regulation (or not) might be 
seen as the insight unfolds. For example, the feelings of contentment that 
participants in Chapter 2 described as resulting from their insight would unlikely see 
any attempts to down regulate, savouring the moment and paying attention to the 
positive insight may represent attempts to up regulate or prolong the positive feeling.  
Accordingly, when considering the insight moment, individual differences in 
emotionality would likely stem from processes in the first order valuation. As 
described above in section 5.1.4.1 the emotional experience at the insight moment is 
the spontaneous generation of experience relating to a sudden new idea or 
understanding rather than subsequent modification of this experience. The BEQ, 
measuring core expressivity that can be seen as congruent to the idea of first order 
valuations discussed in Gross's (2015) later model could therefore represent one 
measure of such individual differences in insight and emotion. 
5.1.5 Individual Differences in Detecting Physiological Changes. 
Exploring within the first order valuation cycle, another aspect where there 
might be individual differences is in the extent that bodily responses relate to 
a.  b.  
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emotional experience. However, Gross (2015) is less clear where physiological 
aspects of emotion fit within the valuation system. He does suggest that 
physiological aspects are part of the core affect, first order valuation cycle. So taking 
a JATE or CAT perspective, the perception component of the first order valuation 
could incorporate bodily information that is then evaluated for valence. This is in line 
with research that demonstrates that the extent an individual perceives or pays 
attention to their bodily changes impacts on their perception of an event as emotional 
(e.g. Schandry, 1981; Pollatos and Schandry, 2008; Wiens, Mazzacappa & Katkin, 
2000 see full summary of findings below in 5.1.5.1); so for a problem solving 
realisation, how much of an Aha or Uh-oh moment they experience.  Alternatively, 
bodily changes could form part of the action component, so be a response to the 
valuation made, perception of which would contribute to the second order valuations 
then made. Either way, Gross's (2015) model allows for individual differences in 
perception of bodily signals to impact the emotional experience that could be 
explored in the context of insight. 
5.1.5.1 Interoception and Emotion   
Interoception, most broadly speaking can be described as perception of 
changes within the body, this in contrast to exteroception which is related to 
perception of the external world (Mirams, Poliakoff, Brown & Lloyd, 2012). Scandry 
(1981) related interoceptive ability to emotion by comparing to the self-reported 
personality trait of emotional lability and state anxiety measures. Emotional lability 
represented the extent that individuals reported experiencing changes in emotion, 
were excitable or had their attention distracted by emotion. He furthermore 
suggested that state anxiety represented a behavioural measure of actual emotional 
experience. Results demonstrated higher levels of both emotion related measures in 
participants with better interoceptive accuracy (HBC, see section 5.1.6.1). Schandry 
(1981) asserted that this finding supported the involvement of visceral perception in 
experiences of emotion.  
Building on this relationship between interoceptive accuracy and emotionality, 
a body of research has further explored interoception in relation to mental health. For 
example, Ehlers and Breuer (1992) proposed the Interoceptive Sensitivity hypothesis 
that posited increased interoceptive accuracy in people with panic disorder. However 
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such a focus is beyond the scope of this thesis, the following review will therefore be 
limited to interoceptive accuracy in relation to emotion and insight.  
Wiens, Mazzacappa and Katkin (2000) compared the responses of 
participants with good and poor interoceptive accuracy under experimental elicitation 
of emotions using film clips (Gross and Levenson, 1995). In addition, heart rate was 
measured at baseline and during the interoceptive accuracy task (HBD, see below 
section 5.1.6.2) showing no differences between accurate and poor interoceptive 
accuracy, this suggests that interoceptive accuracy was not simply reliant on more 
pronounced signals (such as higher heart rate). Electrodermal activity was measured 
at baseline and whilst participants watched the film clips. Participants rated the films 
for emotional intensity (arousal) and pleasantness (valence). Those with better 
interoceptive accuracy reported more intense responses to emotional film clips and 
showed pronounced electrodermal activity in response to amusing films. As such, 
the findings demonstrated differences in emotional behaviour (reported arousal to 
emotional film clips), with participants with better accuracy in interoception reporting 
greater emotional arousal and some enhanced physiological arousal. 
Concurrent results have been found by other researchers using different 
emotion elicitation stimuli. For example, Pollatos, Kirsch and Schandry (2005) 
presented emotional picture stimuli (International Affective Picture System, IAPS; 
Lang and Bradley, [2007]) to their participants. They likewise found that participants 
with high interoceptive accuracy (measured using HBC, see below section 5.1.6.1) 
tended to rate the emotional (but not neutral) pictures as more arousing. This result 
has been reliably replicated by the same research team in subsequent studies 
(Herbert, Pollatos and Schandry, 2007; Pollatos, Herbert, Matthias and Schandry, 
2007; Pollatos and Schandry, 2008). Pollatos, Herbert, Matthias and Schandry 
(2007) further demonstrated that increased interoceptive accuracy related to 
increased cardiac reactivity to emotional pictures, but not neutral ones. This further 
implicated interoceptive accuracy as having a role in emotion processing, with 
enhanced cardiac reactivity concurrent to reports of increased arousal in those with 
more accurate interoception. The demonstration of increased access to interoceptive 
information relating to enhanced emotional responses is in line with predictions 
made above (see section 5.1.4.3) from the Extended Process Model of Emotion 
Regulation (Gross, 2015b). Furthermore, increased HR activation (or earlier recovery 
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from HR deceleration) was implicated in insight problem solving. As such a similar 
HR response is seen in emotion eliciting events and insight, with enhanced 
activation seen for emotional stimuli and insight solving. 
5.1.5.2 Definitions of interoception. 
Finally, however there are disparities in the terminology used in relation to 
interoception that need to be clarified for the purposes of this thesis. For example, 
the terms interoceptive sensitivity and interoceptive awareness are used 
interchangeably within the literature, often when referring to abilities measured using 
the same task and by the same research teams (for example, Herbert, Herbert and 
Pollatos, 2011; Herbert, Pollatos and Schandry, 2007; Werner, Duschek, Mattern & 
Schandry, 2009; Werner, Kerschreiter, Kindermann & Duschek, 2013). Garfinkel, 
Seth, Barrett, Suzuki and Critchley (2015) recently sought to provide clarity in 
labelling, distinguishing between interoceptive accuracy, interoceptive sensibility and 
interoceptive awareness. They proposed that performance on behavioural tasks 
measuring interoception be termed interoceptive accuracy. Interoceptive sensibility, 
they suggested is the tendency of an individual to notice their bodily processes while 
interoceptive awareness represents judgement as to how accurate their perception 
is. Garfinkel et al. (2015) suggest that interoceptive accuracy is the core construct 
within these distinctions. Furthermore, Garfinkel et al. (2015) demonstrated 
congruence between the two main accuracy measurement tasks (heart beat 
counting and heart beat discrimination, see below section 5.1.6) suggesting that this 
supports the construct validity of interoceptive accuracy. In contrast they report 
difference in awareness measures between HBC and HBD based methods 
suggesting they represent different metacognitive processes. Accordingly this study 
will use the accuracy measure in its investigations of interoception. As such, unless 
specifically stated otherwise, the use of the term interoception will be made with the 
tacit understanding that it is a generalised reference to interoceptive accuracy. 
However, it may be noted that item 7 on the BEQ (see section 5.1.4.2) rating the 
extent participants feel their bodies react to emotion might be classified as a 
measure of interoceptive sensibility, which is the extent individuals notice their bodily 
signals. The following section will now evaluate the difference ways that 
interoceptive accuracy has been measured. 
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5.1.6 Measuring interoceptive accuracy 
The most established physiological feature used to assess interoceptive 
accuracy is heart activity. This is a convenient correspondence to above where heart 
rate is seen as the most relevant physiological measure to consider in relation to 
emotion and insight (see section 5.1.5). In terms of interoception, heart measures 
are likely favoured due to the fact that they can be easily, and through relatively non-
invasive methods, measured to compare participant reports providing an accuracy 
score. Two main tasks have been developed to measure interoceptive accuracy of 
heart activity: heart beat counting and heart beat discrimination. 
5.1.6.1 Heart beat counting task.  
This task asks participants to count their heart beats over different time 
periods (typically 25, 35 and 45 seconds) without the use of physical detection 
methods, such as taking their pulse (Schandry, 1981). Counts are then compared to 
recordings of actual heart rate activity (heart beats recorded on an ECG or heart rate 
monitor) to produce an average accuracy score between zero and one, with 
increasing accuracy indicated by an increasing score and absolute accuracy 
rendering a score of one (use of error scores and the inverse accuracy scores 
typically attributed to Ehlers and Breuer, 1992). Schandry (1981, also see Wiens, 
Mazzacappa and Katkin (2000) above in 5.1.5.1) checked that the differences in 
accuracy performance were not simply reflective of differences in heart rate, 
demonstrating that there was no difference in heart rates at rest and during the task 
between good perceivers (those who got a correct count within two heart beats at 
least once during the experiment) and poor perceivers (with high error scores). From 
this the principle of using percentage error (or accuracy) scores was developed (e.g. 
Ehlers and Breuer, 1992). While there is variation in the labelling of this task, with it 
often being referred to as either an interoceptive sensitivity task or interoceptive 
awareness task, many refer to it as a mental tracking task (as seen in Knoll and 
Hodapp, 1992). However this label still introduces room for misinterpretation as to 
what exactly participants are mentally tracking. As such, for the purposes of this 
thesis it will be referred to as the Heart Beat Counting (HBC) task in explicit 
reference to the actual behavioural measure.  
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Some have contested the validity of the HBC task, their main criticism being 
that participants might achieve an accurate score using counting strategies based on 
intuitive ideas of heart rate (Knoll and Hodapp, 1992; Ring & Brener, 1996; Ring, 
Brener, Knapp & Mailoux, 2015). This position was supported by research 
demonstrating that providing information regarding heart rate improved HBC 
accuracy (Ring, Brener, Knapp & Mailoux, 2015), and this was perhaps related to 
attention (Matthias, Schandry, Duschek & Pollatos 2009). However, it is unsurprising 
that improvement might be seen if participants are provided explicitly with 
information about their heart rate. Furthermore, experimental measures have been 
implemented to check against this. 
Schandry (1981) argued that participants were not employing such counting 
strategies, rationalising that more HR variation would see greater variation in HBC 
accuracy if participants were counting at the same intuitive rate. He found no 
correlation between these measures and so concluded that his participants were not 
using a counting strategy. Others likewise demonstrated that HBC accuracy was 
maintained between counts where HR was experimentally changed, through 
engaging in a cognitively demanding task or administration of caffeine (Stewart, 
Buffett-Jerrott & Kokaram2001; Zoellner & Craske 1999).  
 
A second counting task was also used to check for intuitive counting 
strategies in HBC (for example Dunn, Evans, Makarova, White and Clark, 2010 
(supplementary information); 2012; Ehlers and Breuer, 1992; Ehlers, Mayou, 
Sprigings and Borkhead, 2000; Knoll and Hodapp, 1992; Zoellner and Craske, 
1999). Performance was compared for the HBC task to a time perception task where 
participants were asked to estimate time periods using a counting strategy (so report 
how many seconds elapse). Reports of low correlations between performances in 
the two tasks likewise dispel the notion that a counting strategy was used in HBC, as 
it would be expected for there to be a high concordance between the two if they were 
measuring the same thing (participants' counting accuracy). 
5.1.6.2 Heart beat discrimination task.  
The second task commonly used to measure interoception is Heart Beat 
Discrimination (HBD) (Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman & Blackwell, 1977). 
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Participants judge whether tones played to them are in synchrony (200ms after own 
ECG R spike) with their own heartbeat or not (500ms after ECG R spike) (Eichler 
and Katkin, 1994). An interoception score is generated according to the proportion of 
participant's binary responses (synchronous or not) that are correct (maximum 
accuracy therefore being a score of 1). Kleckner et al. (2015) suggest that at least 40 
trials be used to ensure that the test has sufficient power and reliability. For less than 
40 trials, practice effects see participant's accuracy improve over time. The authors 
also highlight that the task is hard with about half of their sample performing no 
better than at chance. This would therefore suggest that this task is ill suited to 
studying individual differences in interoception as it does not provide measurement 
of abilities for half the sample (is too hard). Furthermore, Sedeño et al. (2014) 
criticise HBD for its reliance on integration of internal HR with external tones, 
suggesting that this may distract attention from the interceptive signal and so reduce 
abilities to detect it. 
5.1.6.3 Heart beat tapping (HBT).  
One research group has devised a hybrid of the two main heart activity 
accuracy tasks discussed above, where participants firstly tap along with a playback 
of their own heart signal, then continue with the playback removed (Sedeño et al., 
2014). They demonstrated reliability of the task over an 8 week test-retest. However, 
little further work has been done to validate this method. 
5.1.6.4 Comparisons of heart based accuracy measures.  
Knoll and Hodapp (1992) compared performance between the HBC and HBD 
task finding a significant correlation (rs=0.59). This would suggest that the two tasks 
were measuring a similar thing. However, the authors' conclusions were very much 
judged from the standpoint of HBD being the gold standard due to the possibility of 
counting strategies in HBC. The research outlined in section 5.1.6.1 serves to dispel 
the notion of effects of intuitive counting strategies. Furthermore, for this study which 
is interested in individual differences a task needs to measure an ability over the full 
sample, while Kleckner et al. (2015) suggests that floor effects see nearly half of 
participants performing no better than chance on the HBD task. In addition, this 
study is exploring endogenous emotion and insight, so internally focused processing 
of information. It would therefore be sensible to likewise use an interoceptive 
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accuracy measure that draws on the same processes. Both HBD and HBT rely on 
the integration of external perceptions of tones whilst in HBC participants focus 
entirely on internal signals. As such HBC would appear the most appropriate 
measure of interoceptive accuracy for this study. 
5.1.6.5 Other interoceptive abilities.  
The widespread use of heart activity accuracy measures take the assumption 
that these reflect a generalised interoceptive ability (Herbert, Muth, Pollatos and 
Herbert, 2012). In order to test this assertion other interoceptive abilities would need 
to be identified and measures developed. 
Daubenmier, Sze, Kerr, Kemeny and Mehling (2013) considered respiratory 
interoception between meditators and non-meditators, expecting meditation to 
improve interception. They measured participant's ability track their own breathing, 
and detect and discriminate different respiratory loads (restriction of air being 
breathed through tube) with results being suggestive of meditators being more 
accurate. Whitehead and Drescher (1980) measured gastric interoception, 
comparing participants discriminating between light flashes in synchrony or 
asynchrony to their stomach contractions. However, participants were required to 
swallow a stomach tube to take part in this study, making this a very invasive 
methodology. A likewise intrusive study reported measurement of bladder 
interoception (Jarrahi et al., 2015). Participants' bladder fullness was manipulated 
with water introduced using a catheter, whilst neurological activity (fMRI) and self-
reports of arousal (intensity of need to urinate) and valence (unpleasantness of 
feeling) were recorded. The focus of this study was to identify the brain areas 
relating to interoception and so no individual differences in detection were 
considered.  
Whilst these studies highlight the possibility of measuring different 
interoceptive abilities, none have yet been compared to each other or to HBC or 
HBD. Furthermore, the procedures used are often quite invasive, questioning the 
applicability of findings to everyday experience of prime interest in this thesis. As 
such, for the purposes of this thesis results will be discussed purely in terms of the 
measure taken (HBC) and not be referred to, or assumed to represent general 
individual differences in interoceptive accuracy. 
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5.1.7 Individual differences in insight 
The final aspect explored in this thesis, as identified in chapter 4 (section 
4.4.1) are individual differences in the experience of insight in particular in terms of 
the prevalence of insight. In chapter 4 this was considered in terms of a general 
prevalence of how often do people experience insight, or how many insight do 
people have in a week? Congruent to this, Ovington et al. (2016) recently (after the 
studies in this thesis had been designed and data collected) attempted to measure 
everyday insight disposition, so the extent that individuals experience and differ in 
their experience of insight in daily life (measured by self-report Disposition of Insight 
Scale [DIS]). Kounios et al. (2008) compared neural activity (EEG) with individual 
differences in the proportion of anagram solutions reported as insight compared to 
search. This can be seen to measure the tendency participants showed to 
experience/ report problem solving as insight. The general tenet of this work would 
seem to imply that insight solving be preferable to search, relating dispositions 
towards reporting or experiencing insight as measures of creativity. However, such 
approaches have seen limited exploration or validation and furthermore have 
explored insight from a purely cognitive standpoint. No work to date has considered 
individual differences in insight and emotional experience together. 
Cunningham and MacGregor (2013, 2016) (likewise not available at time of 
this research design), in a series of studies validated the Productive-Reproductive 
Thinking Inventory (P-R), a self-report scale that they suggest measures insight 
problem solving. However, this is problematic as it contrasts participants' productive 
and reproductive thinking. The authors identify that productive thinking is closely 
related to re-structuring seen in insight, whilst reproductive was defined as habitual 
and mechanical. It may well be that the scale does measure behaviours related to 
creativity that are under conscious control, so for example, "looking at a problem 
from a different angle" (p. 6). In fact many of those listed as productive thinking items 
map to behaviours that are training using creative problem solving tools targets 
(Vernon, Hocking and Tyler, 2016). However, by Cunningham and MacGregor's 
(2016) own definition of insight as discontinuous and not available to conscious 
thought, it is unclear how these conscious intentional behaviours lead to insight. 
Furthermore, their validation against classic insight problems does not check to 
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ensure insight occurred (see further critique of this approach in section 1.4.3). It is 
more parsimonious to suggest that the P-R Inventory measures creative behaviours 
in relation to performance in insight problems that may or may not be solved through 
insight.  
 
5.1.8 Rationale 
The above literature review, building on the findings from the previous studies 
in this thesis highlights the need for experimental research to explore emotion and 
insight. Furthermore, investigating the role of bodily changes in insight. Finally, 
exploring how individual differences in the experience of insight and emotion, and in 
detection of bodily changes might impact on solutions being experienced as insight 
or non-insight.  
Many aspects of this research question had little experimental work on which 
to build. Therefore where robust, established methodology was available it was 
favoured in the first instance over possibly more innovative but untested methods. 
For this reason the CRA task was chosen to elicit insight and non-insight problem 
solving (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b). Based on the findings summarised in 
section 5.1.1 the participants in this study would be expected to perform in a similar 
fashion. As such, Hypothesis 1 predicts that insight solutions will be solved faster 
than non-insight. Furthermore, following from the recent work of Salvi et al. (2016) 
finding more incorrect responses were recorded in non-insight compared to insight, 
Hypothesis 2 states that there will be more (commission) errors labelled as non-
insight than insight. 
In terms of the bodily changes, as outlined in section 5.1.3, HR was seen as 
the physiological measure most pertinent to the exploration of insight, particularly 
considered also in relation to emotion. Predictions were made based on the literature 
available at the time of research design (so prior to Shen et al., 2016). As such 
Hypothesis 3 identifies that mean HR change will alter over the problem solving 
period. Furthermore, in line with theoretical predictions and the findings from 
Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995) and Lackner et al. (2013). Hypothesis 4 asserts 
that Mean HR change will be different between insight and non-insight trials. 
Additionally, Hypothesis 5 predicts that mean HR change will alter over time in 
183 
 
different ways between the insight and non-insight trials. However, due to the 
difference seen in the two major papers in this field, specific predictions about the 
nature of the difference are not made. 
As identified in section 5.1.4.2 there are several measures of the tendency to 
experience or express emotion. These are relatively old in the literature and reflect a 
time prior to a focus on emotion regulation processes. However, examination of 
Gross' (2015a, 2015b) most recent model of emotion regulation in section 5.1.4.3 it 
was identified that the core affect component measured in the original BEQ is most 
pertinent to the emotion likely seen in insight (see also section 5.2.2.2 in method). As 
discussed in 5.1.5, individual differences in insight have yet to be explored in relation 
to individual differences in emotionality. As such this study aims to explore the 
relationship between tendency to express emotion and insight. As such Hypothesis 
6 predicts that higher emotional expression will see increased labelling of solutions 
as insightful. The direction of the prediction specifically aims to test the idea 
identified in Chapter 4 that according to a lay perception of insight, greater 
emotionality leads to more experience of events as insightful. 
As outlined in section 5.1.7 an additional aspect of individual differences 
identified that has been shown to impact of the experience of emotion is that ability 
to detect bodily changes. This further identified how the interoception task with a 
purely inward focus on heart activity, the Heart Beat Counting task (Shandry, 1981) 
(section 5.1.7.5) was most suited in the context of this experiment. As such the aim 
is to test the relationship between interoception and tendency to experience insight. 
Firstly, Hypothesis 7, that there will be no difference in HR between high and low 
HBC scorers will check that results are comparable with other studies. No difference 
in HR between conditions, eliminates alternate explanations for HBC scores based 
on accessibility of information being greater for those with a higher HR. With that 
check in place, Hypothesis 8 predicts that higher HBC scores will see increased 
labelling of solutions as insightful. This assumes that more accessibility to 
interoceptive signals would lead to solutions points being experienced as more 
emotional, and so be labelled as insight. 
In terms of the relationship between the two measures concerning emotion, 
interoception and emotional expression, Hypothesis 9 predicts that HBC and EE will 
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contribute differently to decisions as to whether a problem is solved through insight 
or non-insight. 
Finally, as discussed in section 5.1.4.2 the BEQ contains an item that 
explicitly asks participants to rate the extent they feel bodily changes are involved in 
their emotional experience. Despite Gross and John (2007) finding no difference in 
physiological measures for the overall BEQ scores, it might be assumed that people 
who detect more of their bodily changes would report a greater involvement or 
awareness of these when experiencing emotion. As such Hypothesis 10 asserts 
that there will be a positive association between HBC accuracy and BEQ07 ratings 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
80 participants were recruited for the study from a convenience sample of 
colleges and universities local to the researcher, one withdrew during their 
participation leaving 79 participants (female n = 50, Mage = 25.22, SDage = 8.68, 
range 18 - 55 years). The number of participants required was calculated a priori, 
based on effect sizes seen in previous research using G*Power (see Apendix 3). 
5.2.1.1 Inclusion criteria.  
Only adults over 18 years old were recruited for this study (see 5.2.7). 
Participants were all students, the majority being university undergraduate students, 
in line with previous research that has utilised the CRA task (see 5.2.2.3 and Table 
2.1). In addition participants were required to have English as their first language 
(see pilot study described in Appendix 1 and also 5.2.2.3).  
5.2.1.2 Exclusion criteria.  
Exclusion criteria were identified in relation to potential effects discussed in 
previous research using the Heart Beat Counting task that could impact on heart rate 
data being collected. Many studies had no exclusion criteria for participants relating 
to this (for example, Ainley, Maister, Brokfeld, Farmer and Tsakiris, 2013, Herbert, 
Pollatos and Schandry, 2007; Knoll and Hodapp, 1992; Schandry, 1981). However 
other studies excluded participants for different reasons, some based decisions on 
self-report information (for example, Meissner and Wittmann, 2011; Werner, 
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Kerschreiter, Kindermann and Duschek, 2013) whilst others conducted clinical 
interviews (for example Herbert, Herbert and Pollatos, 2011). Participants in this 
study were asked to self-report that they met the criteria to participate in the study 
and not have a diagnosed cardiac or neurological condition or be taking 
Benzodiazepines or antihypertensive drugs (Stewart, Buffett-Jerrott & Kokaram, 
2001; Werner, Kerschreiter, Kindermann and Duschek, 2013 
5.2.2 Materials 
5.2.2.1 Insight log.  
A paper form of the insight log was used. The Insight Log has three versions 
that include alternate explanations of insight (emotion focused definition, cognitive 
focused definition, no definition), see further descriptions of the development of the 
Insight Log in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.). Participants completed one of the three 
versions, describing their insight experience. 
5.2.2.2 Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ).  
The BEQ (Gross and John, 1995) is a 16 item questionnaire where ratings are 
made against statements such as “I laugh out loud when someone tells me a joke 
that I think is funny". Ratings are given using a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree), some of the items are reverse scored. The scores for each item 
are averaged (mean) to give an overall Emotional Expressivity score. The items form 
three subscales measuring: positive expressivity; negative expressivity; and impulse 
strength. Scores for each sub-scale are calculated from the average (mean) scores 
over the items that contribute to each. This measure has been shown to have good 
internal reliability (Gross and John, 1995, 1997), for this thesis’ study having a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .83 which again can be interpreted as good (Nunnally, 1978) In 
addition, comparisons between self-reported expressivity scores and ratings by close 
peers demonstrated concordance in the ratings suggesting that that self-reports 
were accurate representations of individuals’ public expressivity behaviour (Gross 
and John, 1997). Experimental comparisons were also made, demonstrating that 
self-ratings mapped to behavioural responses to laboratory induced emotional 
situations (Gross and John, 1997). 
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Alternative scales also measure relatively comparative constructs including 
the Emotional Expressivity Questionnaire (EEQ) (King and Emmons, 1990); 
Emotional Expressivity Scale (EES); The Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS) (Snyder, 
1974); The Affective Communication Test (ACT) (Friedman, Prince, Riggio & 
DiMatteo, 1980) and the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM) (Larsen, 1984). Gross and 
John (1998) identified three factors by conducting factor analysis on items from all of 
the scales. The BEQ and AIM showed the highest correlations with the three core 
expressivity factors which is of most relevance to this study (see section 5.1.6 for 
further discussion). Sixty-nine percent of the BEQ items contributed to the final 
factors, compared to fifty-five percent of the AIM. Additionally, item 7 within the BEQ 
directly asks participants to rate the statement, "my body reacts very strongly to 
emotional situations". This can be seen to relate to interoceptivity, another aspect of 
interest in terms of the research question in this study. As such, the BEQ was the 
selected measure for emotional expressivity in this study.  
5.2.2.3 Compound Remote Associate (CRA) task.  
The Compound Remote Associate task aims to elicit insight and non-insight 
problem solving in participants (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). Participants are 
presented with a triad of words and are required to find a word that forms a 
compound word or phrase with each of the three presented. For example, when 
presented with flower, luck and belly the solution is pot: The new word can pair either 
before (e.g. pot luck) or after (e.g. flower pot) the three words. On giving their 
answer, participants are then asked to give a feeling of insight. This can be done 
using a Likert scale where participants rate the degree to which they felt a solution 
was insight (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a), alternatively participants are given a 
forced choice response of insight or non-insight (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). As this 
research was looking to make comparisons between insight and non-insight problem 
solving, the second approach was adopted in line with a substantial body of previous 
work (see sections 5.1.1 and 1.1.4.1). The definitions used by Jung-Beeman et al. 
(2004) to make this distinction were used unchanged to enable direct comparison to 
previous research. 
187 
 
A pilot study was used to identify a corpus of 26 word triads for use in this 
study. See Appendix 1 for full details of the pilot study. The protocols described in 
the pilot were adopted.  
As discussed in section 5.1.1 the CRA provides scores and reaction times for 
solutions solved through insight and non-insight (search). However, in addition this 
study will also calculate each participant's tendency to solve/ label a trial as insight 
based on their performance on the CRA. This is an adaption of the method 
employed by Kounios et al. (2008), using the CRA rather than anagram puzzles to 
calculate the proportion of insight to non-insight (see section 4.4.1). 
5.2.2.4 Heart beat counting (HBC) task.  
In the Shandry (1981) Heart Beat Counting task actual heart beats recorded 
(using ECG or a heart rate monitor) are compared with a participant's count of their 
own heart beats over the same period. The following instructions were given to 
participants:   
You are asked to count your heart beats silently. The beginning and end of 
the counting phase will be signalled to you by the researcher. At the end 
you will be asked to verbally give your count to the researcher. Concentrate 
only on your heart beats. You cannot take your pulse or use any other 
physical manipulations to improve detection. You will do three counts, with a 
30 second break between each count to give an average. 
As described in the instructions, counts were repeated for three different time 
periods, 25, 35 and 45 seconds to give three sets of corresponding counts from the 
heart rate monitor and participant self-report. As no online data regarding heart beats 
recorded was available, neither the researcher nor participant had information about 
the accuracy performance during data collection. 
The Schandry (1981) HBC task is one of two main methods that purport to be 
a measure of interoceptivity, see discussion in section 5.1.6 regarding these 
methods. Summarising this, the HBC task was selected for due to its established use 
in research exploring interactions between cognitive and emotional aspects. 
Furthermore, although there is demonstrated congruence between these tasks (Knoll 
& Hodapp, 1992, also see section 5.1.7.3) the HBC task is suggested to be less 
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reliant on integration of internal and externally directed attention (Stewart, Buffett-
Jerrott & Kokaram, 2001) and more sensitive to individual differences (Dunn et al., 
2010). As the research question is focused on endogenous processes of insight and 
related emotion, a task that likewise focuses internally rather than the integration of 
external and internal information seems more suited in this instance.  
5.2.3 Apparatus 
5.2.3.1 Heart rate monitor.  
Heart information was recorded using a sports, frequency heart rate monitor 
(HRM), RS800CX (Polar Electro Oy, Kempele, Finland). The heart signal was 
detected via chest mounted electrodes and sampled at 1000Hz by the H3 sensor 
(Polar Electro Oy, Kempele, Finland) and transmitted and stored in a watch. Data 
was subsequently uploaded onto a secure password protected personal computer 
and analysed using Polar Pro Trainer 5 software which filters and corrects for missed 
beats and false positives (based on software built by University of Kuopio, 
Niskanenetal., Finland, 2004).  
A HRM was chosen over ECG as it offers increased portability; enables 
participants to fit the electrodes themselves; and will enable greater replication due 
to the commercial availability and relatively low cost of the equipment (Vanderlei, 
Pastre, Hoshi, Carvalho & Godoy, 2009). Successful use of the Polar HRM system 
has been seen in an increasing number of studies (for example: Durlik & Tsakiris, 
2015; Koch & Pollatos, 2014; Luque-Casado, Perales, Cárdenas & Sanabria, 2016). 
Furthermore it has been shown to have comparable reliability and validity to ECG 
across experimental settings in psychology, medicine and sports and exercise 
contexts (Kingsley et al., 2005; Nunan et al. 2009; Radespiel-Tröger et al., 2003; 
Vanderlei et al., 2009). It has also been seen as a 'gold standard' (Spierer, Rosen, 
Litman, & Fujii, 2015, p. 265) against which new heart rate recording technology is 
validated. 
5.2.3.2 Stimulus presentation and reaction time response software.  
The BEQ and CRA task were presented (on a 330mm screen), and typed responses 
and reaction times recorded using PsychoPy software version 1.80.03 (Peirce, 2007; 
2008). 
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5.2.4 Procedure 
To reduce any time of day effects on heart activity all participants were tested 
in the afternoon (Alibhai, Tsimakouridze, Reitz, Pyle, & Martino, 2016). On giving 
informed consent and completing demographic information participants fitted the 
Polar H3 sensor chest belt according to the manufacturer's instructions. On verifying 
that a signal was being sent to the receiver watch participants rested for five minutes 
to enable baseline heart rate to be recorded. Participants were given verbal and 
written instructions explaining the different tasks in the study. Instructions relating to 
the CRA task omitted the feeling of insight ratings at this stage to avoid confounding 
Insight Log responses. Participants then conducted their first three HBC sessions, 
timed by the researcher and recorded on the HRM watch using the Lap Timer 
function. Participants' gave their count for each session verbally which was recorded 
by the researcher. The HBC task was administered straight after the rest period to 
obtain a baseline HBC accuracy score. The participants then completed the BEQ 
and a hard copy of the Insight Log, the order off these counterbalanced across 
participants. Participants were then reminded of the instructions for the CRA task 
and given the additional instruction about giving feeling of insight ratings. After the 
three practice trials checks were made to ensure they understood the task. A time 
synchronisation was carried out by the researcher between the HRM using the Lap 
function and the CRA task recorded in PsychoPy. Participants then completed the 
CRA on the laptop. Immediately on completing the CRA the second HBC task was 
conducted. The CRA and second HBC were always delivered at the end of the 
experiment in order to explore HBC accuracy at a possibly elevated heart rate due to 
undertaking the CRA, seen as a cognitively challenging task (following approach by 
Stewart, Buffett-Jerrott & Kokaram, 2001). On completion of the experiment 
participants were fully de-briefed and given the opportunity to remove the chest band 
in privacy. 
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5.2.5 Data Clean-up Protocols 
5.2.5.1 Heart beat counts from HRM.  
Excel files were extracted using Polar Pro-trainer 5 software summarising 
heart rate and heart beat counts for Lap times. The relevant lap times were identified 
and corresponding counts for each of the HBC sessions. 
5.2.5.2 CRA data.  
PsychoPy .csv data files were cleaned removing rows and columns produced 
but not containing data pertinent to the research questions. Responses were 
compared to the answers given in Sandkühler and Bhattacharya (2008) by two 
independent markers. Responses that did not match the answer were either marked 
as incorrect or correct dependent on the subjective assessment of the marker. Inter-
rater reliability (Cohen's Kappa) was calculated for the two scorers, κ = .66 (95% CI, 
.22 to 1), p < .001 and it was found that there was substantial agreement between 
the scores (Landis & Koch, 1977). Therefore the scoring of the first researcher was 
used in further analysis. Correct trials were further sorted for each participant into 
insight and non-insight so that frequency scores and reaction times could be 
calculated. 
5.2.5.3 Heart rate data. 
For each correct trial, the time at solution point was calculated by adding the 
Laptime that was recorded when the HRM was synchronised to PsychoPy. The heart 
rate recordings at intervals through the problem solving process were then 
extrapolated, taking readings at the solution point, every second for five seconds 
after solution, and 25, 20, 15, 10, and each of the five seconds leading up to solution 
(note that HR were only recorded  for the length of trial. For example, when a 
problem took 17 seconds to solve heart rate data was taken from 15 seconds prior to 
solution). Change heart rate scores (ΔHR) were calculated by subtracting the 
baseline heart rate for the participant from the heart rate at each time point. Raw 
heart rates and ΔHR information was then sorted for insight and non-insight trials 
and averages 
191 
 
 Exclusion of outliers 
Outliers were excluded from datasets for values that fell outside 1.5 times the 
Interquartile Range following Tukey (1977). 
5.2.6 Analysis of Data 
5.2.6.1 HBC accuracy score.  
An accuracy score was calculated using the formula 1/3 Σ (1-(| HRM count – 
participant count |) / HRM count). This is a standard method adopted in studies using 
the Schandry HBC task (Ehlers and Breuer, 1992). 
5.2.6.2 Assumptions for inferential statistics used. 
Tests of normality (Shapiro-Wilkes test) were carried out on all variables. Where 
outliers were identified they were removed, apart from a few exceptions which are 
specifically detailed in the results below. The removal of outliers did not always lead 
to an indication of normality via the Shapiro-Wilkes test. However as discussed by 
Field (2016), in larger samples (in his discussion he indicates any sample of over 30) 
the Shapiro-Wilkes test can be overpowered leading to increased likelihood of a 
significant result. Furthermore, in such 'large' samples, the central limit theorem 
suggests that the assumptions of normality are less problematic to tests (Field, 
2016). As such, unless otherwise stated it can be assumed that analyses reported 
have been conducted on samples with outliers removed and using parametric tests. 
Additional assumptions in terms of sphericity are important for within participant 
ANOVAs. Where sphericity is shown to be violated (using Mauchly's test of 
sphericity) this will be reported and degrees of freedom corrected using using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (Field, 2016). 
5.2.6.3 Reporting and analysis of effect sizes. 
According to recommendations outlined by Bagley (2009) this thesis will 
present and focus interpretation on simple effect sizes and confidence intervals with 
descriptive statistics. For completeness, significance (p-values) and standardised 
effect sizes will also be reported, and to some extent used in interpretation. 
Standardised effect sizes used will be uncorrected. Whilst this is at odds with 
Baguley's (2009) suggestion to favour corrected effect sizes, there a number of 
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reasons for this approach. Firstly, there is widespread poor practice in the reporting 
of corrected effect sizes, particularly in relation to eta squared measures for ANOVA 
(Baguley, 2009; Levine and Hullet, 2002). Secondly, there are contrasting opinions 
on the best measure to report. Whilst the most widely reported measure is the 
corrected effect size partial eta squared, Levine and Hullet (2002) advocate eta 
squared (but note their discussion is in the main relating to between participant 
ANOVA) whilst Bakeman (2005) propose general eta squared. As there is a lack of 
consensus, and to avoid the introduction of any spurious assumptions/ corrections 
this thesis will report the most conservative, uncorrected Eta squared. 
5.2.7 Ethical Considerations 
Participants were all over 18 years old and were given information sheets to 
ensure they gave informed consent. It was made clear in the information sheet that 
the researcher was not medically trained, and that heart information would only be 
analysed in relation to the stated aims of the study. Participants were directed to 
address any concerns regarding their health to their own GP. All data was 
anonymised, and clear instructions were given as to withdrawal procedures that 
were possible up to the point that data analysis took place. This research was 
approved by the University of Buckingham, School of Science Ethics Committee. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 CRA data  
T-tests were conducted on the CRA data. Solutions reported as insight were 
solved faster (M = 8.7s, SD = 3.7) than non-insight (M = 11.8s, SD = 4.4s). This 
difference, 3.26s 95% CI [1.91, 4.62], was significant t(71) = 4.80, p < .001, d = 0.80. 
There were more incorrect solutions reported as non-insight (M = 1.77, SD = 2.42) 
than insight (M = .52, SD = .85). This difference, 1.25, 95%CI [.72, 1.79], was 
significant t(78) = 4.70, p < .001, d = .75. 
5.3.2 Heart Rate Change  
Tests of normality were conducted on the Heart Rate Change (∆HR) variables 
for insight and non-insight solutions at each time point. Significant Shapiro-Wilks test 
results and inspection of normal Q-Q plots suggested that the data did not meet 
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assumptions of normality for ΔHR variables: insight, time -2s and +5s; non-insight, 
time -5s; non-insight, solution point (0s) and; non-insight times 3s and 5s. Removal 
of four outliers common to these measures left all ∆HR variables demonstrating 
normality. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted comparing ∆HR for solution 
type (insight versus non-insight) and time (in 1 second intervals from 5 seconds 
before to 5 seconds after the solution point). Mauchly's test of sphericity indicated 
that the assumptions of sphericity was violated for the effects of time, Χ2(54) = 
604.48, p < .001,  and interaction effect of solving x time, Χ2(54) = 489.43, p < .001; 
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates 
of sphericity (respectively ε = .33; ε = .34).  
A significant effect of solution type was seen, F(1, 65) = 14.25, p < .001 , η2 = 
.01. Heart rate change was less for insight solution (m = -3.51, SE = .53) compared 
to non-insight solutions (m = -4.47, SE = .53) where the difference was .95 bpm, 
95% CI [.45, 1.46]. 
There was also a significant main effect of time, F( 3.28,213.31) = 23.62, p< 
.001, η2 = .04. Planned polynomial contrasts suggest a quadratic relationship, F(1, 
65) = 56.74, p < .001; this can be seen in Figure 5.4. Furthermore, no interaction 
effect was seen between solving and time, F(3.35, 217.66) = 2.00, p = .11, η2 = .003. 
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Figure 5.4 Plot showing mean HR change (compared to resting baseline) for 
different solving types, Insight and Non-insight over time (t = -5 through 1 sec. 
intervals to t = 5, where t = 0 is point of solving). Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
5.3.3 Emotional Expression (BEQ)  
There was no relationship between emotional expression (BEQ score) and 
solution labelling, r = .05, 95%CI [-.28, .19], p (one-tailed) = .34. This can also be 
seen through visual inspection of Figure 5.5.  
Δ
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Figure 5.5 Scatterplot showing BEQ Total score in relation to proportion 
solved by insight. 
5.3.4 Heart Beat Counting Accuracy (HBC)  
Visual comparisons were made between the number of heart beats counted 
by participants and measured by the HRM. Out of the 79 participants, only four 
consistently counted more heart beats than was measured, the rest provided 
underestimates in the heart beats counted.  
Outliers for HBC accuracy were identified on the dataset with outliers already 
removed as described in section 5.2.6.2. On removal of these further two outliers 
from the dataset (in addition to those removed to normalise ∆HR scores) the HBC 
accuracy measure was then found to meet assumptions of normality as determined 
by the non-significant nature of the Shaprio-Wilk test, W(71) = 0.985, p = 0.552.  
196 
 
 HBC scores were converted to a nominal variable split at the median 
score (M = .62) giving a dichotomous measure of more accurate and less accurate 
heart beat counters. An independent t-test was conducted between baseline HR for 
more and less accurate HBC, t(69) = 2.16, p = .03, d = .51; finding that less accurate 
HBC had higher baseline HR (M =  83.06, SD = 12.42) than more accurate HBC (M 
= 77.17, SD = 10.40). The mean difference was 5.86bpm, 95%CI [.47, 11.28]. The 
standardised effect size can be interpreted as a moderate effect, furthermore the 
confidence intervals suggest there was a difference in the baseline heart rate, with 
less accurate heart beat counters having a greater heart rate than more accurate. 
No relationship was seen between Heart Beat Counting accuracy (HBC1) and 
labelling of solutions as insight, r = -.05, 95%CI [-.28, .19], p (one-tailed) = .34. This 
is also demonstrated graphically in Figure 5.6. 
As there was no relationship demonstrated between either HBC or BEQ 
scores to solution labelling, further planned regression analyses to compare the 
relative contributions of each measure were not conducted. 
Finally, there was no relationship between HBC accuracy and ratings for 
BEQ7, rs = -.12, 95%CI [-.34, .12], p (one tailed) = .16. 
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Figure 5.6 Scatterplot showing HBC accuracy in relation to proportion solved 
by insight. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
This study aimed to draw on the qualitative findings from earlier studies in the 
thesis and literature review conducted to experimentally explore how individual 
differences in the experience of insight and emotion, and in detection of bodily 
changes might impact on solutions being experienced as insight or non-insight. An 
established insight elicitation task was used, the CRA and results to hypotheses 
outlined in section 5.1.8 are discussed below in relation to the previous findings of 
this thesis and related current literature. 
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5.4.1 Compound Remote Associates 
Hypothesis 1, that insight solutions would be solved faster than non-insight 
solutions was supported by the data in this study. This is congruent to the 
performance seen in previous samples (Cranford and Moss, 2010, 2011, 2012; 
Kounios et al 2008; Sumramaniam, Kounios, Parrish and Jung-Beeman, 2008; Shen 
et al., 2016). However, while many report descriptive statistics for solution reaction 
times, only Cranford and Moss (2010) and Subramaniam et al. (2008) conduct 
statistical analysis on these results. As such this provides further replication of this 
effect in CRA problem solving. Furthermore, both the studies were conducted in the 
U.S.; therefore this study demonstrates comparable performance in a non-U.S. 
sample. 
Hypothesis 2 was also supported, this study again demonstrated that there 
were more (commission) errors labelled as non-insight than insight. This is in 
congruence with the findings of Salvi et al. (2016) who interpret their results as 
showing that insight solving is more accurate than analytic processes (see section 
5.1.1). However, an alternative explanation might be offered based on how 
participants label each solving episode, drawing on their phenomenological 
experience. For example, they may have made judgements based on feelings of 
certainty, the more certain they were, the more likely to label the trial as insight. Such 
a process could also account for the higher correct solutions seen in insight. As such 
this offers the alternative interpretation; that rather than insight simply being more 
accurate (as suggested by Salvi et al, 2016), solutions that are felt to be more 
accurate are therefore labelled by participants as insight.  
For this alternative interpretation to be true, that insight is judged as such 
based on increased certainty regarding a solution, it would firstly need to be 
demonstrated that certainty was higher just prior to a solution being given. Hedne et 
al.'s (2016) study may offer findings that support this. They presented magic tricks 
for participants to solve, measuring feeling of warmth (see section 1.1.4.4) ratings 
during solving and a confidence rating for the solution (after it had been given). 
Hedne et al. (2016) assert that while post solution confidence was rated higher for 
insight than search, there was no difference in FOW during solving. However, this 
post solution confidence rating was an absolute measure, while the FOW 
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comparison this conclusion was drawn from represented a change score from early 
to late in solving FOW. Furthermore Hedne et al. (2016) following earlier approaches 
(by Metcalfe and Wieble, 1987) did not include the last FOW rating considered too 
close to the solution point. This makes sense when aiming to detect differences in 
confidence in solving, as a rating of confidence at the point of insight associated with 
the insight solution would mask the earlier lack of ideas regarding the solution. 
However, Hedne et al. (2016) did report that there were higher FOW for this last 
rating in insight compared to search. Supporting the idea that the feeling of certainty 
(how close to a solution or confidence in a solution) is higher immediately before and 
after a solution labelled as insight  
In a final comparison of note, Hedne et al. (2016) made inferences about 
metacognitive aspects using the participants' reason for choosing their multiple 
choice solution. One of the options being that it was similar to their own solution. 
They took this as an indication of the participants' assessment of their own solution, 
suggesting that for trials labelled as insight, participants were more likely to stick with 
their own solution despite it being incorrect. At face value this would seem at odds 
with the idea presented above, that participants might be labelling solutions as 
insight because of their correctness. However, on further consideration this may still 
be the case. If the participants made judgements based on their feeling of 
correctness, not actual correctness (which they had no way of actually knowing) and 
insight trials were labelled as such because of this feeling of certainty or correctness; 
then it is logical that for insight, more would stick with their identified solution. Whilst 
for non-insight, if labelled as such due to a decreased feeling of certainty, a 
subsequent change of mind would be more likely. 
The work of Hedne et al. (2016) and possible interpretations regarding 
accuracy of insight and search solutions highlight that reports of the certainty of 
participants would further inform this discussion. As such, future research could look 
to compare ratings of certainty in insight compared to search solving (see section 
6.1.5). Danek et al. (2014b) included a rating of certainty in their phenomenological 
reports of insight, however did not collect comparable ratings for search solutions 
with which to compare (see section 1.2.3.1). 
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5.4.2 Heart Rate Change in Problem Solving  
Hypothesis 3 was supported, there was a significant main effect of time on the 
HR change seen, with a decline in HR from five seconds prior to solution with an 
increase through the solution button press and in the five seconds post solution. 
Neuroscience studies using the CRA methodology typically made adjustments of 2 
seconds to allow for the latency of button press following awareness of a solution 
(Cranford and Moss, 2011; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Sandkuler and Bhattacharya, 
2008; Submramaniam et al., 2009). This timing appears to roughly coincide with the 
lowest part of the 'U' shaped quadratic relationship which though visual interpretation 
of the time series plot seen in Figure 5.1 occurs just prior to the solution button 
press. 
This pattern is in contrast to those reported by Jausovec and Bakracevic 
(1995) who reported an increase in HR in both insight and interpolation (search 
based, non-insight) problem solving in the run up to the solution moment. However, 
by visual examination of the time series for HR reported in Lackner et al.'s (2013) 
study a comparable 'U' shaped response can be seen, with an initial decline in HR 
on presentation of the cartoon and the lowest point of the curve occurring around 
three to four seconds after presentation. This also coincides with the reported mean 
response time for participant indicating they understood the joke (argued by the 
authors as being an insight moment, see section 5.1.3.1 for further discussion). 
This bi-phasic pattern of HR response is similar to that seen on presentation 
of emotional stimuli described by Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert and Lang (2001) (see 
also section 5.1.5) and also comparable to the HR response to oddball stimuli that 
occurs alongside the P300 ERP (Guerra et al. (2016) (see further description in 
section 1.9.1). Bradley et al. (2001) suggest than an initial deceleration of HR on 
presentation represents an orientating response to the stimuli, where attention is 
paid to aspects of a potential problem to determine whether they need to cascade 
and produce an appropriate behavioural response (for example fight or flight) (Lang 
et al., 1997). A prolonged deceleration to negative stimuli was suggested to 
represent a stalling of the cascade response. This is where a stimulus is evaluated 
as negative but not increasing in threat, as in the presentation of a negative IAPS. 
The orientating response is maintained because of the continued presence and so 
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evaluation of the picture but without a change in threat no progression down the 
defence cascade is necessary. Essentially the orientating response, can be seen to 
as a problem evaluation. Prior to the solution moment, a similar problem evaluation 
is seen in the CRA task which might explain the similar deceleration pattern, with 
restoration of HR occurring on resolution of the problem, so at and subsequent to the 
solution being recognised. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted a difference in mean HR change between insight and 
non-insight, this was supported with a smaller HR deceleration seen in insight 
compared to search trials. This is again comparable with the pattern reported by 
Lackner et al. (2013), with a smaller decrease (from baseline) in HR for the humour 
condition compared to control cartoons. 
Guerra et al. (2016) saw a reduced initial HR deceleration and late HR 
acceleration for larger P300 responses. Larger P300 responses have been 
suggested to relate to emotion or an orientating response towards an object of 
interest or salience (McCarthy & Donchin, 1981; Guerra et al., 2016; Herbert, 
Pollatos and Schandry, 2007; Pollatos, Kirsch and Schandry, 2005; Pollatos, 
Gramann and Schandry, 2007; Verleger, Jaskowski & Wauschkuhn, 1994). As 
summarised in section 5.1.9.1, the more emotional, salient or surprising the event 
the larger the P300 response. This is congruent to the notion that insight experience 
is more emotional and surprising (see section 1.2.3) than non-insight solving, thus 
seeing the associated neurological and physiological response, namely a dampened 
biphasic HR response in insight compared to non-insight. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted a different HR response over time between insight and 
non-insight. Essentially, this hypothesis related to the pattern of HR reported by 
Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995), which saw a steady increase in HR for 
interpolation (non-insight) with a flat unchanging HR up until the point of insight 
marking a rapid acceleration. As such, an interaction effect for HR change over time 
between the two solving types would have been seen. No interaction was reported, 
and as discussed above and seen in Figure 3.1, patterns of HR over time did not 
map to the findings of Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995).  
Shen et al., (2016) recently explored EDA and HRV differences between 
insight and non-insight trials of CRA solving. This approach contrasts with the 
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measures chosen in this thesis. Shen at al. (in press) used EDA following decision 
making research, for example Bechara, Damasio, Tranel and Damasio (1997). They 
demonstrate a statistically significant difference in mean EDA in for problem solving 
periods reported as insight compared to search, with a greater EDA in insight. As 
discussed above (see section 5.1.3.2) research exploring EDA responses to 
emotional arousal demonstrated effects at extreme arousal but not intermediate 
(Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert and Lang, 2001). Assuming the insight experiences 
elicited using the CRA would not cause extreme arousal this measure was 
discounted. It is therefore interesting that Shen et al. (2016) found an effect, and may 
indicate that the assumption that insight experiences would not be arousing were 
incorrect. However, Shen et al (2016) compared means across the whole problem 
solving period, an exploration of EDA over time during problem solving may better 
help to explain the EDA differences seen. 
In terms of HRV, Shen et al.'s (in press) rational for its use is less clear. They 
discuss papers that actually use HR such as Jausovec and Bakracevic (1995) and 
Lackner et al.'s (2013) (see section 5.1.3.1) inferring the use of HRV. In terms of 
results, they found a difference in HRV between the problem solving and baseline 
rest measures, but were not able to discriminate between the solving types (insight 
compared to search). HR reflects a composite measure of combined sympathetic 
and parasympathetic nervous system activity (Tulppo et al., 1998). In contrast, HRV, 
particularly high frequency HRV provides a measure of parasympathetic activity, 
often treated as a state measure with low HRV related to poor health and life 
outcomes (Thayer et al., 2012). It may be the difference between solving and 
baseline rest HR seen in Shen et al.'s (2016) study related to the increased 
parasympathetic activity seen during rest. In the types of comparison where short-
lived effects of different solving experiences are considered, both of which involve 
activation and so sympathetic activity, a measure that incorporates sympathetic 
activity (such as HR) would seem more appropriate.  
In summary, the HR differences over time and between insight and non-
insight demonstrated in this study can be seen as representing somatic differences 
in problem solving. Furthermore, the finding has been related to research showing 
similar responses to emotional or surprising events. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the emotional aspects of insight have been highlighted through qualitative 
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methods. This provides a preliminary association between HR responses in emotion 
to insight. The findings will enable further exploration of emotion in insight, likely 
looking to manipulate the problem solving experience to elicit differing types or 
intensities of emotion to compare physiological responses. 
5.4.3 Emotional Expression and insight 
Hypothesis 6 aimed to explore the relationship between a tendency to 
express emotion and label solutions as insight. There was no evidence to support 
such a relationship. This prediction was in part made to test the lay perception 
identified in Chapter 4 that more emotional people would be likely to have more Aha 
moments and so identify more insight. A priori power calculations indicated that a 
sample of 62 would be necessary to detect a medium correlation. With 73 
participants this would suggest that the study was sufficiently powered to detect a 
relationship if one exists. It therefore may be interpreted that people's tendency to 
express emotion, incorporating the strength of felt emotion on which expression is 
based (Gross and John, 1995, 1998) has little impact on insight.  
This would seem to challenge the lay impression identified in Study 3. The 
notion that a more expressive person might experience more insight may be too 
simplistic. As identified by Gross' (2016) later work, the expressive behaviour seen 
by others, on which an opinion of the emotionality of an individual is based is a 
complex process incorporating core expressivity as measured in this study, but also 
emotion regulation processes that act on it. The relationship identified by the 
participant in Study 3 may reflect that those more likely to express emotion also see 
an increased tendency to express insight. As identified in models of emotion (e.g. 
Gross, 2016) experiencing and expression of an event (emotion or insight) may be 
distinct. Gross and John's (1995) original definition of emotional expressivity given in 
5.1.4.1 related to display behaviour. However, the CRA measures participants' self-
reported experience of a solving episode as insight or not, rather than their 
expressive behaviour in relation to an insight. As such it may be that there would be 
more of an association between the expression of insight, so behaviour or self-
reported and emotional expressivity. This is something for future research (beyond 
this thesis) to consider. 
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However, several questions remain that mean the experiment conducted here 
may not be a sufficient test to conclusively discount the presence of a relationship. 
Firstly, there are questions in terms of the insight tendency measure used. Following 
Kounios et al. (2008), the tendency measure calculated in this study compared the 
proportion of solutions labelled as insight to non-insight. However, research has not 
been conducted to explore the validity or reliability of this method. One way to 
explore its validity would be to compare an individual's tendency to experience 
insight on one task (be it the CRA, as in this study or anagrams as seen in Kounios 
et al. [2008]) to others. An alternative would be to compare performance on a lab. 
based task to other measures of insight tendency. One recently identified measure is 
the Dispositional Insight Scale ([DIS] Ovington et al., 2016) that provides a self-
report of the extent that participants think they experience insight. As highlighted in 
section 4.4.1, this task has not been fully validated through mapping to actual 
experience. As such it currently serves as a measure of subjective insightfulness, 
perhaps also a mark of insight expressivity. As discussed above, there may be more 
of a correspondence therefore between emotional expression and DIS scores that 
future research could explore (note that this scale was published after data collection 
in the final study of this thesis). 
As such it can be seen that there may be problems with the measure of 
tendency to experience insight used. Further research would look to test the 
reliability and validity of this measure (see Chapter 6) before strong conclusions 
could be made regarding the results from this study. 
The second issue regards the BEQ, which as identified in section 5.1.8  was 
validated against peer reports, behavioural data and other measures of emotional 
expression (see section 5.1.4). However further research might explore its reliability, 
as comparisons within individuals over time were not made. 
In sum, further research to better comment on the validity and reliability of the 
measures of tendency to experience insight and emotional expression would enable 
more conclusive comment to be made in relation to this null finding. 
5.4.4 Heart Beat Counting and insight 
Hypothesis 7 was to check that more accurate heart beat counters did not 
have higher baseline HR than less accurate. A significant difference was found, 
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however the difference with higher HR in less accurate HBC was opposite to the 
scenario that Schandry (1981) identified; with those who were worse at the task 
having the most available signal. As such this would suggest that participants were 
not exhibiting improved HBC due to greater availability of signal. 
In addition, as described in section 5.3.3, participants consistently under 
estimated the number of heart beats. This supports the notion that participants were 
actually detecting and counting their heart beats rather than using generic counting 
strategies (see section 5.1.6.1). If they were simply counting, based on an intuitive 
idea of heart rate, it would be expected that inaccuracies would be seen in both 
directions, overestimates as well as under. The predominance of underestimates is 
consistent with the explanation that participants were missing beats in their counting. 
Furthermore, those with higher baseline heart rates would likely miss more beats 
than those with lower, offering a congruent explanation to the difference identified 
testing hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that higher HBC scores would relate to increased 
labelling of solutions as insightful. That increased interoceptive signals would lead to 
solutions points being experienced as more emotional, so with a greater feeling of 
Aha, and so be labelled as insight. No relationship was identified in this study, which 
was sufficiently powered to detect a medium sized effect.  
However, Feldman-Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreua and Aronson (2004) 
demonstrated that the relationship between uses of physiological signals in 
emotional experience may not be a simple linear one, with increasing access to 
physiological signals meaning increased emotional experience. They used 
experience sampling methods (see section 4.1.3 further description of ESM) to 
collect reports of everyday emotional experience and compared this to interoceptive 
accuracy (HBD). They assessed participants' ratings of different emotional adjectives 
to produce measures for each participant's focus on emotional arousal or valence. 
They found that participants with good interoceptive accuracy focused on arousal 
aspects of emotion, whilst those with poor interoception reported emotion in a 
different way. For insight then, very accurate heart beat counters may use this 
information to judge emotion, and so as predicted in hypothesis 8 label more solving 
as insight as a result.  Participants with less accurate HBC scores, according to 
Feldman-Barrett et al.'s (2004) findings would use other cues in their experience of 
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emotion and insight. This dichotomous relationship may be hidden in the 
comparisons made in this study.  
The potential problems identified above (see section 5.4.3) with the measure 
of insight tendency would be equally problematic for this comparison. One study 
does report a test - retest for HBC over four weeks, finding a correlation of .58 
(Mussgay, Klinkenberg & Rüddel, 1999). This would suggest that the HBC is a 
reliable measure, however this study used participants from clinical populations, so it 
would be desirable to corroborate these findings in a non-clinical sample. 
5.4.5 Interoceptive Accuracy Versus Sensibility 
Hypothesis 10, specifically aimed to compare the extent that participants 
experienced bodily reactions in relation to emotional situations in comparison to their 
abilities to actually and accurately detect their heartbeats, predicting a positive 
relationship between the two. No relationship was found which may seem surprising. 
However, similar findings have been seen comparing interoceptive accuracy with 
self-reported interoception, for example Häfner (2013) found no relationship between 
HBC abilities and various questionnaires that measured how conscious people are of 
their bodies. Mehling et al. (2012) developed the Multidimensional Assessment of 
Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA), a self-report questionnaire that encompassed nine 
sub-scales. These measured the extent that unpleasant bodily sensations were 
noticed, strategies for coping with them and the extent that bodily sensations are 
attended too and trusted. Calì, Ambrosini, Picconi, Mehling, and Committeri (2015) 
found that the MAIA measuring interoceptive awareness showed a low correlation to 
HBC accuracy (interoceptive accuracy). This can be seen to show a congruent 
disconnect between reported awareness of bodily signals and actual accuracy seen 
in this study. The BEQ item 7 specifically relates awareness of bodily changes to 
emotional experience while the MAIA focuses more specifically on interoception. 
However, examination of the MAIA sub-scales see some explicitly linked to emotion, 
for example the emotional awareness scale, seeing further parity with the results in 
this study. 
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5.4.6 Limitations and Future Directions 
As highlighted in this discussion, a difference was identified in pre-solution HR 
change between insight and non-insight trials that might be considered a somatic 
marker for insight. A strength in this finding is that the insight and non-insight 
comparison was rendered using an established and widely validated method. 
However, it is not known whether findings will replicate in other tasks that elicit both 
insight and non-insight moments. Furthermore, the CRA only elicits positive insight 
moments (see section 5.1.1 for further discussion) meaning effects in negative 
insight are yet to be quantified. As such, one future direction (explored in the next 
study) will be to identify problem solving tasks that elicit positive and negative insight 
in order to compare results relating to heart rate change. 
Findings with regards to speed of problem solving and accuracy were 
consistent with other studies using similar problem solving paradigms. However, 
these all elicit discrete solving episodes culminating in a solution (or timing out). 
Participants then begin solving a new and unrelated problem, with no feedback from 
the last. This is not how solving happens in real-life. As highlighted by the Fleck and 
Weisberg (2004, 2013) there is a continuum of solving where attempts to solve are 
made, mistakes identified and renewed attempts made in light of this new 
information. As such, the findings that have been shown in this study and in line with 
others could be explored in a more naturalistic solving situation (see Chapter 6). 
One question that discussion regarding accuracy and insight highlighted in 
section 5.4.1 was that participants' ratings of certainty for solutions labelled as insight 
and search was not recorded. Moving forwards, where participants are making these 
distinctions, such ratings could also be collected. Danek et al. (2014b) included 
certainty as one of the phenomenological measures taken for insight solving, as 
such these scales could be adopted in future work to resolve this problem (see 
Chapter 6). 
Some criticisms of HBC were further demonstrated as unfounded based on 
findings from this study. Firstly the lower baseline HR in more accurate HBC 
suggests that accuracy is not due to an increased signal (see section 5.4.4). 
Furthermore, the participants consistently counted below their actual heart beats. 
This contrasts to expectations should intuitive counting strategies have been 
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employed. Together these provide further confidence in the interoceptive accuracy 
task used (heart beat counting).  
Other questions tested in this study involving both HBC (interoceptive 
accuracy), BEQ (emotional expressivity) and proportion insight found null results for 
which theoretical explanations are discussed above. While conducted with a sample 
size rendering sufficient power to detect a meaningful effect, problems identified in 
terms of validity and reliability of the measures used mean conclusions should be 
drawn with care. Further validation of the tendency to report/ experience insight 
calculation would increase confidence in findings relating to this measure. 
Addressing questions of reliability, with a particular focus on the BEQ, but also for 
the HBC would again be useful to inform conclusions made about these results. 
These will be explored further in Chapter 6. 
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6 Psychological and physiological factors in Connect 4 Problem Solving 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Elicitation of negative and positive insight 
As highlighted in section 5.4.6 the identification and verification of negative 
insight in everyday life presents a problem for current experimental methodology 
investigating insight in the laboratory. Current tasks only aim to elicit positive insight, 
although as discussed by Danek (personal correspondence) these are not 
universally experienced as positive. Accordingly new tasks need to be identified that 
elicit both positive and negative insight to enable controlled exploration and 
comparison between the two. Furthermore, it would be desirable to also produce 
comparable positive and negative non-insight, search experiences alongside insight 
to provide within participant comparisons of solving type (insight/ search) and 
valence (positive/ negative) in problem solving. 
Section 3.4.5 identified that negative insight occurred not as the culmination of 
problem solving but often as problem identification to initiate problem solving 
attempts. It is therefore unlikely that negative insights will result from the established 
approach of presenting problems and asking participants to come up with solutions 
that they then label as insight or search solving. As such a task more akin to real-life 
solving may be necessary, relinquishing some control that stand-alone problem 
presentation affords. One potential experimental domain could be that of games, 
where the superordinate goal of winning is underpinned by a succession of moves 
against an opponent that could each be considered episodes of problem solving in 
determining the best move. Chess has been suggested to be a game that enables 
higher order cognitive processes such as decision making and problem solving and 
can be explored in a controlled yet naturalistic way (Charness, 1992; Connors, Burns 
and Campitelli, 2011; Gobet and Simon, 1996). It is a dyadic game where moves 
might be made positively building towards a winning position, or negatively to 
prevent an immediate loss (Leone, Fernandez Slezak, Golombek, & Sigman, 2017). 
This challenge saw the establishment of the de Groot (1946/65) paradigm to study 
chess expertise, presenting an established board and asking participants for their 
next move or testing their memory of the board. Whilst this gives a high degree of 
control, such a snapshot approach has been argued to not capture the true 
experience of playing a game of chess (Friedlander and Fine, 2016). 
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Leone, Petroni, Fernandez Slezak and Sigman (2012) compared expert chess 
players HR as they played rapid chess (time limited games) against online 
competitors. ECG recordings were made of nine players over 25 games. The game 
platform enabled measures of response time for the player's move and opponent's 
move to be recorded and marked on the ECG feed. An introspective review of game 
was conducted with the player reporting moves that were remembered as strategic, 
either identifying a goal or searching through moves and blunders (so where 
mistakes were made). The contrast made between the two types of strategic thinking 
could be seen as equivalent to the distinction made in this thesis between positive 
and negative solving but in the search domain rather than insight. Positive search, 
looking for the best move whilst negative search representing goal identification. 
Comparison of time series (5 seconds either side of move point) showed a HR 
deceleration prior to moves labelled as non-blunders that was not seen for those 
labelled as blunders. For opponent blunders a difference was seen in post move HR, 
with no rise for non-blunders but rise for blunders. HR time series are reported for 
search compared to non-search and goal-seeking compared to non-goal-seeking, 
but no direct comparisons made. This demonstrates the utility of dyadic games to 
explore somatic correlates of naturalistic problem solving and decision making.  
However, this thesis focuses on everyday problem solving, not just in the 
sense of naturalistic solving situations, but in terms of everyday creativity in non-
expert populations. Chess research, as seen above, typically explores expertise 
where skill differentials between players can be controlled for using Elo (1978) 
scores. Furthermore, to play chess a knowledge of different moves for each piece 
permitted is necessary excluding individuals who have never played before and 
making control, in terms of ability problematic for knowledgeable yet non-expert 
populations. 
6.1.2 Connect 4. 
A game like chess that sees players taking turns to move and elicits both 
positively and negatively motivated moves, yet requires less knowledge/ experience 
to play would be more suited for the purpose of this thesis. One such candidate is 
Connect 4. Players take turns to drop counters into a vertical grid, the standard 
version being seven positions wide and six deep. The counter falls to the lowest 
position, so the first to be dropped into a column will occupy the lowest row, 
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otherwise it will sit above the previous counters in that column. The aim of the game 
is to be the first to get four adjacent counters in a line; this can be horizontally, 
vertically or diagonally. As such Connect 4 can be seen to be a relatively simple 
game, but also encompassing search strategies (Mańdziuk, 2012). Congruent to the 
distinction seen in positive insight elicitation tasks such as the CRA or magic tricks, 
decisions regarding a next move could therefore be arrived at through analytic 
means or in an experience of insight (Danek et al., 2014; Jung-Beeman et al., 
2003b). 
With a maximum of 21 moves leading to a full grid and stalemate, games of 
Connect 4 take far less time than chess, but retain the essential turn taking element 
to elicit positive, goal-orientated and negative, problem finding experiences during 
play. This study will therefore look to explore the feasibility of using Connect 4 to 
elicit positive and negative insight and search experiences. Little research has been 
carried out with Connect 4. Most that has falls in the applied computing field, looking 
at algorithms to compute the best moves to win (e.g. Allis, 1988). As such this study 
aims to develop the use of Connect 4 as a laboratory based problem solving 
paradigm with which to elicit positive and negative, insight and search experiences. 
Connect 4 would furthermore appear to avoid some problems identified by 
previous research and in this thesis in using language-based problems (Sandkühler 
and Bhattacharya, 2008; Webb, Little and Cropper, 2016). Webb, Little and Cropper 
(2016) recently demonstrated that a reliance on language in classic insight tasks and 
CRA puzzles led to a reduction in solving accuracy for non-native language 
speakers. Tasks such as CRA and rebus puzzles as well as being language-based 
also often require knowledge of language use that is quite colloquial, very culturally 
specific and used infrequently in daily life. For example the Rebus puzzle, L U N A ,  
with its solution being 'waning moon'; this is a phrase that someone learning English 
as a second language would be unlikely to be familiar with. Furthermore, Sandkühler 
and Bhattacharya, (2008) identified American English words included in the CRA 
developed in the U.S. may be unfamiliar to their European, English speaking sample. 
This demonstrates potential effects of local dialect within a population speaking the 
same language. All of the above demonstrates that the use of language-based tasks 
to elicit insight may mean that limited samples (for example excluding non-native 
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speakers) would have to be used. Connect 4, with its simple rules that are not rooted 
in a particular language should provide a task that has much wider accessibility for 
participants. 
Chapter 2 in this thesis identified different domains in which insight occurred, 
intellectual, personal and practical. Language-based tasks might be argued to fall in 
the realm of intellectual problem solving. Salvi et al. (2016) contrasted their language 
based tasks (CRA, anagrams and rebus puzzles) with a visual task, picture 
completion. Without a reliance on language it might be expected that this task be 
easier, but the contrary was found with the picture completion task showing lower 
accuracy, suggesting that this task may have been too difficult so likely to create 
floor effects. Many of the practical insights identified in Chapter 1 were of a visuo-
spatial nature (see section 2.4.4.1), likewise playing Connect 4 can be seen to 
incorporate these aspects with participants competing in the visuo-spatio 
environment of the Connect 4 grid. As such, in addition to eliciting both positive and 
negative solving, Connect 4 also expands the domains in which solving experience 
is elicited. 
6.1.2.1 Validity of Connect 4 as an experimental problem solving 
task. 
A novel problem solving task such as Connect 4 would need to be checked, 
firstly in terms of validity to ensure it elicits the experiences that are predicted. As 
seen in other problem solving tasks such as the CRA or magic tricks (see section 
1.1.4 and 1.1.5 for greater detail regarding the range of tasks used) participants are 
given definitions of the experiences they are then asked to report. Definitions for 
positive insight and search experiences are prevalent in the literature, however there 
is less available for negative insight (see Chapters 2 and 3). As such the definitions 
for negative insight used in this study will take into account findings from earlier 
studies in this thesis and align to the positive solving experiences in order for 
participants to label each solving experience (move made in the Connect 4 game).  
In order to validate Connect 4 in this context it would need to reliably elicit the 
range of solving experiences consistently for participants. Further congruence could 
be sought by comparing findings relating to performance in Connect 4 with other 
insight eliciting tasks such as the CRA in the previous study in this thesis, and work 
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of other research teams. Section 5.1.1 outlines these findings and particularly 
highlights the finding replicated in study 5 (see 5.4.1) that insight solving is faster 
than search based solving. This study will again provide an opportunity to measure 
the time taken to make each Connect 4 move and compare those labelled as insight 
to search. 
In terms of valence there is no research specifically incorporating negative 
insight on which to build predictions regarding move times for positive compared to 
negative. However, findings from decision making research may be informative. 
Lejarraga, Hertwig and Gonzalez (2012) highlighted that decision making research 
had in the main tended to present all of the information pertinent to making a 
decision (termed by Lejarraga et al. (2012, p.335) as "decisions from description"). 
This they argued is unlike how decisions are made in real-life, where a search takes 
place to identify information relevant to the decision, termed "decisions from 
experience" (p. 335). Their research has focused on the factors that impact on the 
length of search undertaken before a decision is made. Taking Yates et al.'s (2003) 
definition that a decision is a "commitment to a course of action" (p. 15), in the 
context of Connect 4 each move represents the culmination of problem solving 
where a final course of action  is arrived at (where to place the counter in the grid). 
The problem solving process, and so the length of search, perhaps could be 
considered in light of Lejarraga et al's (2012) findings. They identified that in 
conditions where loss is highlighted as more extensive (so longer) search is 
conducted compared to when gains are emphasised. This effect was recently 
replicated even in situations where a search was costly (so the more searching 
done, the greater the cost) (Lejarraga and Hertwig, 2016). Therefore in Connect 4, 
moves motivated by loss avoidance (labelled as negative in this study) might be 
expected to involve a more extensive search, and so take longer than moves 
motivated by gain (positively labelled moves). 
However, in Study 2 it was identified that negative insights typically identified 
a problem akin to Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer's (1995) Discovered Insight Problem 
Finding or Runco and Chand's (1995) Problem Finding. The identification of a 
specific problem, framed as awareness of impending loss in the Connect 4 context 
might be argued to provide a more concrete and immediate goal than the positive 
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moves which are focused toward the superordinate goal of winning the game. As 
such, this might predict that negative insight see faster moves than positive.  
6.1.3 Accuracy of Insight Compared to Search. 
In Study 4 a comparison was made between the accuracy of solutions 
labelled as insight and search. In Connect 4, there are up to seven (number of 
available columns until they begin to fill towards the end of the game) choices for 
each move, none of which are dichotomously correct or incorrect, meaning an 
accuracy score cannot be calculated in the same way when using Connect 4. 
However, an indication of the cumulative quality of moves and solving decisions 
would be reflected in winning a Connect 4 game. Therefore a comparison of games 
won could be made to the proportion of moves reported as insight for each player. If, 
as suggested in previous studies (In Chapter 4 of this thesis, Salvi et al., 2016), 
insight solving is more accurate than search, individuals who experience more 
insight should overall make better moves and so win more games.  
6.1.4 Validation of proportion insight against other measures/tasks 
Section 5.4.3 discusses the lack of validation of the proportion insight 
measure used by Kounios et al. (2008) and in Study 4. One possibility is to compare 
tendency to report insight for different problem solving tasks and explore if there is a 
task effect, so explore if some elicitation tasks lead participants to report 
proportionally more or less insight than search. Alternatively and perhaps more 
pertinent for the individual differences approach that Kounios et al. (2008) and this 
research has taken is to compare within participant effects over different tasks. The 
repeat participants in this study provides the opportunity for such a comparison, 
investigating if proportion insight scores are similar for individuals in different 
problem solving tasks. 
6.1.5 Phenomenological self-reports 
Danek et al. (2014b) aimed to further explore insight experiences elicited by 
their magic trick paradigm using post task ratings for fastness, certainty, 
pleasantness (referred to as happiness in their write-up), surprise and impasse (see 
further detail in section 1.2.3.1). They found that participants mean ratings were 
highest for happiness (pleasantness), followed by surprise, certainty, suddenness 
then impasse. However they only obtained ratings for solutions identified as insight, 
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so no comparisons were possible to search type solving. This current study provides 
an opportunity to replicate these ratings and obtain comparisons not only for solving 
type, insight versus search but also for positive compared to negative solving. The 
rating of pleasantness will additionally provide verification that the participants' 
distinctions between positive and negative moves made whilst playing Connect 4 
were rated as such when reflecting on the playing experience afterwards. The rating 
for suddenness will further provide an interesting comparison to the behavioural 
measure of move time discussed above (see section 6.1.2.1) exploring whether 
participants perceptions of suddenness for the different types of solving map to their 
actual move times. In terms of certainty, it has been suggested that this is one of the 
hallmarks of insight (for a more complete discussion see section 2.4.3.1), with 
everyday accounts of insight shared in Chapter 2 often encompassing certainty in 
their descriptions (see section 2.3.2.7). Section 5.4.1 highlights that certainty in 
insight compared to search may relate to confidence ratings such as feelings of 
warmth. The gradual increases in FOW seen for search solving over time reflect an 
increasing certainty about the problem solving attempt and solution being worked 
toward. This can be compared to relatively static FOW until the insight moment 
where a jump in FOW reflects the awareness of a solution accompanied by high 
certainty (Metcalfe and Weible, 2007 but also see section 5.4.1 for commentary on 
this in light of more recent findings). A measure of certainty in Connect 4 solving will 
again identify if similar experiences are seen for this paradigm as in previous insight 
tasks. The least applicable scale to this study is the rating of impasse. This would 
seem to be meaningless in the context of Connect 4 where participants are not 
seeking a single 'correct' solution (strictly convergent problem solving), so the feeling 
of getting stuck on the problem is unlikely (for full discussion of impasse see section 
1.1.5.3). Furthermore, whilst many have asserted that impasse is important (or 
necessary) for insight, in terms of phenomenology as highlighted above by Danek et 
al. (2014b) who demonstrated that it is the least important aspect. Therefore, taking 
Danek's (2014b) view (see also section 1.1.5.4 for discussion on insight without 
impasse), Connect 4 is considered appropriate for insight elicitation and the ratings 
of impasse will not be necessary 
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6.1.6 Heart Rate Changes for Insight and Search and Positive and Negative 
Solving. 
6.1.6.1 Replication of findings from Study 4 (Chapter 5). 
 Study 4 demonstrated a biphasic mean change HR response over time in 
positive problem solving. As seen in Figure 5.1 for both insight and search solving 
there was an initial deceleration leading up to the point of solution when a 
subsequent acceleration was then seen. This finding was discussed in section 5.4.2 
in relation to its congruence to HR patterns over time during exposure to emotional, 
salient or surprising stimuli (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert & Lang, 2001; Guerra et al., 
2016). The difference in mean HR change saw a smaller (negative) change for 
insight solutions than search, linking this finding to research showing stunted 
biphasic responses for positive and surprising events (Guerra et al., 2016; Lackner 
et al, 2013). However, no previous research has explored heart rate in relation to 
negative problem solving or problem finding. Connect 4 provides the opportunity to 
measure and compare HR change for both positive and negative insight and search 
moves, so enabling to replicate and extend the findings reported in Chapter 5. 
6.1.6.2  HR in negative and positive emotion elicitation 
Theoretical models and research comparing physiological activity during 
processing of emotional stimuli generally suggest that there is a greater negative HR 
change seen in response to negative stimuli compared to positive (for example 
Bradley et al. 2001) (see 5.1.3.2 for further evaluation of this).  Bradley et al. (2001) 
related physiological responses whilst viewing emotional pictures to the defence 
cascade model (Lang et al., 1997). This draws on an evolutionary, functional 
explanation for animal responses to aversive and appetitive stimuli. The model 
proposes a graded response to stimuli over time and in relation to the proximity of 
the stimulus. An initial orientating response is seen, where information about the 
stimulus is processed. This sees a reduction in HR, a moderate increase in EDA and 
dampened startle response. As such both the parasympathetic and sympathetic 
nervous system are activated. For negative stimuli, the freeze orientating state would 
move to activation as the proximity of the threat increases, this move to activation 
sees an increase in heart rate and further increases in EDA. In addition, a facilitated 
eye blink startle response would be seen reflecting increased attentiveness to the 
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whole environment in light of the threat. However, where there is no immediate 
increase in threat proximity but the threat remains, a sustained period of cardiac 
deceleration would be predicted (fear bradycardia e.g. Kapp, Frysinger, Gallagher 
and Haselton, 1979). Bradley et al. (2001) suggested that viewing affective pictures 
likely reflects such a situation, as viewing aversive images sees no increase to the 
immediate threat detected (the picture is unchanging) negating the trigger of later 
responses in the cascade.  
For pleasant appetitive stimuli, Bradley et al. (2001) again asserted that an 
orientating response would be reflected in an initial HR deceleration, cascading to 
action to approach the stimulus so then a HR acceleration (for example in the case 
of food or a (bonded or sexual) mate). Their results, later corroborated by Pollatos 
and Schandry (2008), see a mid-interval acceleration of HR subsequent to the initial 
orientating response leading to a triphasic pattern of HR response to positive stimuli. 
Bradley et al. (2001) are unsure of the explanation for this, positing that it possibly 
reflects success in the recognition/ coding process. This might explain the differing 
results seen for the effects of valence on HR depending on the measure used (see 
Figure 5.2 for details of different HR measurements taken in different studies). 
Measures of maximum negative HR change would therefore discriminate between 
the sustained cardiac deceleration seen for negative images compared to a reduced 
maximum deceleration for positive stimuli due to the mid-interval acceleration. When 
measuring maximum positive HR change, this would detect the intermittent increase 
in HR observed for positive pictures not seen for negative stimuli. However, rather 
than take a snapshot approach, it would seem preferable as done previously in 
Chapter 5, to measure and compare HR changes through time during an emotional 
event. This is particularly pertinent where not only mean HR changes but also the 
pattern of heart rate change may be useful in the discrimination of different valenced 
emotions.  
In terms of negative and positive problem solving, drawing on the perspective 
of Shen et al. (2015) who saw insight as an endogenous emotional event, it might be 
expected to see comparable HR change patterns for positive and negative solving, 
so a bi-phasic for negative solving and triphasic for positive. However, it must be 
noted that results from Study 4 (see section 5.3.2) saw a biphasic response despite 
both insight and search experiences incidences that were assumed to be positive 
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insight. However, no checks were made on this assumption. The use of 
phenomenological ratings (as described above in section 6.1.5) including the 
measure of how pleasant participants found each type of solving should provide 
such an assurance and so will be used in this study (see also section 6.1.5). 
6.1.7 Emotional expression - BEQ 
Chapter 5 (section 5.4.3) highlighted some questions regarding the test-retest 
reliability of the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ). Data collection for this 
study takes place approximately a year on from that in Study 4.The repeated 
collection of data in the same location provides an opportunity to target individuals 
who participated in the previous study and so explore this property of the BEQ. In 
addition it will also render a replication of the result seen in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.3), 
comparing emotional expression to problem solving behaviour.  
As Connect 4 will likely facilitate both positive and negative solving (see 
section 6.1.2), in addition to considering overall expressivity, a further comparison 
with the positive and negative subscales of BEQ can be made. These subscales 
represent the tendency to express behaviours related to positive or negative 
emotion, recognising that there are individual differences in these tendencies (Gross 
and John, 1997). As such a tendency towards expressing positive emotional 
behaviours may relate to the Aha moment when solving a problem and expressing 
negative emotional behaviours likewise be linked to Uh-oh moments during problem 
identification. 
6.1.8 Interoception - HBC 
As discussed in section 5.4.6, long term test-retest data for HBC accuracy 
would also be desirable for a non-clinical sample. Mussgay, Klinkenberg and Rüddel 
(1999) demonstrated a significant correlation between test-retest HBC accuracy over 
a four week period in a clinical sample. The use of repeat participants in this study as 
discussed in 6.1.7 should enable further longitudinal comparisons to be made. In 
addition, the prediction of a relationship between HBC and insight labelling made in 
Study 5 can again be tested against a novel insight elicitation task offering replication 
of the previous findings (see section 5.3.4). 
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6.1.9 Rationale 
As outlined above this study therefore aims to offer a replication of findings 
from Study 4 using a novel problem solving task, Connect 4. In addition, as 
highlighted in section 6.1.2 this provides the opportunity to extend analysis to 
compare both positive and negative valence in the elicited insight and search solving 
experiences. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1 suggests there will be a difference in speed 
of moves reported as the different types of solving. Specifically predicting that moves 
reported as insight are predicted to be faster than search (Hypothesis 2) while 
positive moves will be faster than negative (Hypothesis 3).  
As identified above in section 6.1.4, validation of within person proportion of 
insight scores is desirable, as such Hypothesis 4 aims to compare proportion of 
insight scores for participants in the CRA to Connect 4, predicting that there will be 
no difference in the proportion of insight reported between the two tasks. 
In study 4 predictions were made and tested regarding the number of errors 
labelled for different solving. However, unlike the CRA, the Connect 4 problem 
solving task does not present convergent problems with a correct/ incorrect 
response, as such a comparable hypothesis would be meaningless for this study. 
However the overall wins/losses of Connect 4 should be indicative of the quality of 
the individual problem solving seen in the moves made, as such Hypothesis 5 
suggests that participants who experience more insight (proportionally) will win more 
games. 
Furthermore, as highlighted in section 6.1.5 phenomenological ratings 
following Danek et al. (2014b) will also be collected to verify the self-report solving 
valence as well as provide comparisons regarding the experiential aspects of 
different solving types. Hypothesis 6 predicts that insight moves will be rated as 
more sudden (fast) than search, likewise negative moves more sudden (fast) than 
positive. This provides a direct comparison of perceived suddenness to actual 
behavioural responses. Hypothesis 7 and 8 relate to pleasantness. The former 
providing a check on assumed experience for the different valence labels (as per 
section 6.1.6), expecting positive moves to be rated as more pleasant than negative. 
Furthermore, the latter (Hypothesis 8) expects that the Aha moment seen alongside 
positive insight solving will be rated as more pleasant than positive search, while 
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negative insight and its accompanying Uh-oh feeling will be more unpleasant (so 
lower pleasantness rating) than negative search. Likewise, because of the Aha or 
Uh-oh moments, insight solving is predicted to lead to greater surprise than search 
(Hypothesis 9). In line with discussions relating to confidence and certainty (see 
6.1.5), Hypothesis 10 predicts that insight will be rated as more certain than search. 
Predictions regarding heart rate change (∆HR) again aim to firstly replicate 
findings from Study 4 for a different problem solving task. Accordingly, Hypothesis 11 
states that mean ∆HR will alter over the problem solving period, whilst Hypothesis 12 
asserts there will be different mean ∆HR in insight and search trials. As highlighted 
above, the elicitation of solving experience with different valence affords additional 
exploration, Hypothesis 13 therefore asserts that there will be a difference in ∆HR for 
positive and negative moves. The different patterns of ∆HR (biphasic versus 
triphasic - see section 0) seen in relation to negative and positive emotion suggest 
that mean ∆HR will alter over time in different ways between insight and search 
moves and positive and negative moves (Hypothesis 14). 
For BEQ, Hypothesis 15 expects there to be no difference between individual 
scores (BEQtotal) for participants taking part in study 4 (time 1) and this study (time 
2). Higher BEQ scores are expected to be associated with increased labelling of 
moves as insight (Hypothesis 16). As discussed in section 6.1.7, it is expected that 
as BEQpositive increases so too will the number of moves labelled positively (as 
positive insight or positive search) (Hypothesis 17), likewise as BEQnegative increases, 
then the number of negative moves will too (moves labelled as negative insight or 
negative search) (Hypothesis 18).  
A check to ensure there was not more availability of signals in more accurate 
heart beat counters will be made, therefore Hypothesis 19 tests that there will be no 
difference in HR between more and less accurate heart beat counters. Checks for 
test-retest reliability in HBC will also be made, with Hypothesis 20 expecting no 
difference in repeat participants' HBC accuracy at the two. Analogous to predictions 
in Chapter 5 (section 5.1.8), Hypothesis 21 predicts the higher HBC accuracy will 
relate to increased labelling of solutions as insight. Likewise, if correlations are seen 
in Hypotheses 18 and 21, the extent that each of these variables predict decisions in 
labelling of solving experience will be tested with the prediction that HBC and BEQ 
will contribute differently to predicting these decisions (Hypothesis 22). Also 
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replicating comparisons made in Study 4, Hypothesis 23 asserts that there will be a 
positive association between HBC accuracy and BEQ ratings for item 7. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants  
Participants were recruited via advertisement within the University and local 
community and on social media. As it required face to face data collection 
participants needed to be local to the university. In total, 80 participants (54 of which 
were female, Meanage = 30.63 years, SDage = 12.64, rangeage 18 - 66 years) were 
recruited. The number of participants required was calculated a priori, based on 
effect sizes seen in previous research using G*Power (see Apendix 3). 
To enable longitudinal comparisons, repeat participants (N = 25) were 
targeted from those who took part in Study 5 (time between participation, M = 361 
days, SD = 69). In contrast to the CRA, there were no language or difficulty 
limitations identified in playing Connect 4. As such the participation criteria widened 
the sample recruited to include those who were non-native English speakers and 
non-students. A breakdown of participants by these demographics are shown in 
Table 6.1. All participants gave informed consent, had the right to withdraw and were 
debriefed at the end of their participation. 
Table 6.1 Number of participants in different demographic groups. 
 Students Non 
Students 
Male 
Female 
13 
33 
13 
21 
Native English speaker 
English additional 
language 
36 
10 
31 
3 
 
6.2.2 Materials and apparatus 
To allow comparison between results collected in this study to those in the 
previous (Chapter 5, see section 5.2.2) the same materials and apparatus were 
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used, in the same way with the exception of the problem solving task employed 
(Connect 4 instead of CRA). See section 5.2.2 for methods relating to Materials; 
Insight Log, Emotional Expression (Cronbach’s Alpha, α = .82 for the BEQ in Study 5 
again being seen as good [Nunnally, 1978]) and Heart Beat Counting and 
Apparatus; Heart Rate Monitor and Stimulus Presentation Software. 
6.2.2.1 Connect 4. 
As outlined in section 6.1.2 Connect 4 was identified as a likely task to elicit 
positive and negatively motivated moves arrived at through insight or search (non-
insight) experiences. However, very little research has been conducted using 
Connect 4, and none in psychological experimental contexts. As such a 
commercially developed, computer based version of the game was used, Connect 
Four Fun developed by TMSoft (tmsoft.com, copyright 2008-2016). The game has 
single player or two player options, the former being used in this study. The 'night' 
theme was selected and used for all participants due to its relatively neutral 
background. The single game setting was used as this meant the player always 
made the first move and the level of difficulty could be designated because the game 
also gives options in its settings to choose the level played at: easy, medium, hard, 
pro and expert. The multi-game settings alternated opponent according to the 
previous winner and that could possibly introduce confounds to results. 
The game is played as subsequently described. In order to drop a counter into 
the chosen column the player needs to click on it. The counter then drops with the 
computer's move immediately following (and taking less than one second). On either 
the player or computer getting four in a row the game stops and the winner is 
identified. The game must then be re-set manually to play again. The number of 
wins/losses were therefore not remembered in the Connect 4 game, so were 
recorded manually by the researcher. 
6.2.2.2 Phenomenological self-reports. 
Phenomenological self-reports were collected through PsychoPy using a 
visual analogue scale to record the point on a line between two extremes, giving a 
measure between zero and one. The labels for the line, and corresponding question 
were delivered at random. For each type of solving (positive and negative, insight 
and search) ratings were collected for pleasantness, surprise, fastness and certainty, 
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following Danek et al (2014b). The questions asked were adopted as shown in Table 
6.2, reflecting the different task that participants had undertaken (moves in the 
Connect 4 game in this study compared to solving magic tricks in Danek et al. 
[2014b]). 
Table 6.2 Questions asked of participants providing phenomenological ratings 
for the different solving types. 
Phenomenological 
rating 
Question Label for extremes 
0                     1 
Pleasantness 
Please rate your positive 
insight experience: 
unpleasant 
 
pleasant 
 
Surprise Please rate your negative insight experience: 
not 
surprising surprising 
Fastness The negative search idea came to me:  slowly quickly 
Certainty I felt about the ideas I had through positive search: uncertain certain 
 Note: italic terms changed according to type of problem participants were rating: positive insight, positive search, 
negative insight or negative search. 
6.2.3 Procedure 
The same procedure was followed with participants as in Study 4 and 
described in section 5.2.4, but instead of the CRA task participants played Connect 
4. Instructions were given regarding playing Connect 4 at the beginning of the 
experiment in the same way as CRA instructions described in 5.2.4. Participants 
were advised that Connect 4 is a game played in pairs (or in this case against a 
computer) where players take turns in dropping counters in a grid. They were told 
that the winner has to get four in a row, with the horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
configurations demonstrated by the researcher on a picture of the Connect 4 grid. 
Participants were informed that they would be playing two blocks of three games (so 
six games in total) and could choose the difficulty level (see 6.2.2.1) they played at 
for each block. Finally experiences were outlined as shown in Table 6.3, and 
participants were informed that they might notice these while they played. These 
descriptions were based on definitions given in the CRA for positive insight and 
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search, but with the detail reduced to account for the four way choice being given in 
this study. 
 
Table 6.3 Solving type descriptions given to participants playing Connect 4. 
Solving type Description Cue available 
whilst playing 
Positive insight 
 
You suddenly have an idea for 
your next move or how to win 
 
Aha 
Positive search 
 
You work out your next move or 
how to win 
 
I've worked out a 
good move 
Negative insight 
 
You suddenly see a problem or 
that you are in danger of losing 
 
Uh-oh 
Negative search 
 
You work out a problem or that you 
are in danger of losing 
I've worked out 
there's a problem 
 
When it came to playing Connect 4, participants were reminded of the 
instructions and definitions. As they played, at the point they decided on their next 
move participants were asked to press the button on the HRM watch, recording a lap 
time at this point. They were then prompted to tell the researcher which process they 
used to arrive at their decision (Table 6.3) and indicate the move they had decided 
upon (which column to drop the counter). Whilst playing, a summary of the four 
solving types, plus the option to indicate a move that was for none of these reasons 
was displayed to remind participants. Participants played a practice game with the 
computer set to 'easy'. This enabled them to get used to playing against the 
computer and the procedure of pressing the button on the watch to indicate they had 
decided upon a move and then pointed to the solving type and column. During the 
practice, participants were able to verify with the researcher anything they were 
uncertain about, for example the definitions of solving type. The participant was then 
able to choose the level they wished to play their first block (three games) at. As they 
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played the researcher recorded the solving type for each lap time, and then made 
the move indicated. The final outcome of each game (win, lose or draw) was also 
recorded. Whilst playing the cursor is visible on the screen, therefore the researcher 
left the cursor in the position of the last move made (i.e. over the column of the last 
move), to avoid cueing the participant in any way. The participant was positioned 
facing the screen with the reminder sheet in front of them. They were seated next to 
the researcher, so no unintentional cues from eye movement etc., could be detected 
by the participant whilst playing the game. After three games the participant had the 
opportunity to stay on the same level or change. The final three games were then 
played following the same protocols. 
As outlined in section 5.2.4, the second set of heart beat counting data was 
immediately collected. A final addition from the procedure seen in Chapter 5 asked 
participants to rate the different solving experiences they had reported whilst playing 
Connect 4 on the computer using the Phenomenological self-reports described in 
section 6.2.2.2. Participants then removed the HRM and were de-briefed, again in 
the same way as outlined in section 5.2.4. 
6.2.4 Data Clean-up Protocols 
Data clean-protocols employed in Chapter 5 (see section 5.2.5) for the tasks 
repeated in this study were followed to enable direct comparison of longitudinal data 
for repeat participants.  
6.2.4.1 Heart rate during Connect 4. 
Data from the first move made in each game was not included as there was 
additional time associated with setting up the new game. Furthermore, first moves 
tended to be made due to habit, for example "I always start in the middle" whilst 
subsequent moves reflected the participants' in-game problem solving that the task 
aimed to elicit. It was initially planned to take mean recorded heart rates for the five 
time points (approximately 5 seconds) before and after the lap time recorded for 
each move in line with the time series used in Chapter 5 (see section 5.2.5.3). 
However the mean time for each move was 11.6s, (range 5.5 - 19.1s), so using the 
same time frame would mean overlap between moves in the heart rate comparisons, 
as such the timeframe was reduced to 3 seconds. As in Chapter 5 (see section 
5.2.5.3) measures of heart rate whilst problem solving (playing Connect 4) were 
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compared to the participant's baseline heart rate and average time series for heart 
rate change (∆HR) were then calculated for each type of solving (positive and 
negative, insight and non-insight). In addition, the time taken for each move (time of 
lap reflecting time from previous button press) was recorded to again give averages 
for each type of move. 
6.2.5 Analysis of data 
The same analysis of data protocols were employed in this study to those of 
the previous as outlined in section 5.2.6. 
6.2.6 Ethical considerations 
As highlighted above, procedures outlined in Chapter 5 were followed in this 
study, including the ethical considerations outlined in section 5.2.7. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Solving experiences elicited by Connect 4 
Table 6.4 shows the range of solving types experienced by the participants 
whilst playing Connect 4. Nearly two thirds of participants experienced all four 
solving types, whilst over 90% experienced at least three. 
Table 6.4 Breakdown of participants' reported solving as positive insight (+i), 
positive search (+s), negative insight (-i) and negative search (-s). 
Reported Nos. of participants  +i +s -i -s 
4 solving types 54      
3 solving types 19 6     
  1     
  5     
  7     
2 solving types 6 2     
  2     
  2     
1 solving type 1      
 
In terms of overall performance, participants on average won 3.1 games (SD 
= 1.5), the number of participants and the number of wins is shown in Figure 6.1 
Visual inspection of the frequency distribution suggests that Connect 4, played at 
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self-determined difficulty produces winning scores that are generally normally 
distributed. 
 
Figure 6.1 Frequency distribution of participant's wins in Connect 4 
6.3.1.1 Speed of moves in Connect 4.  
The overall mean time for a move across all participants for which move time data 
was available (N = 71) was 11.6s (SD = 4.4, range 5.5 - 19.1s). For nine participants 
the HRM lap presses did not map to the recorded moves made by the researcher so 
were not verifiable, these were therefore excluded from move time comparisons.  
Examination of normal Q-Q plots and tests of normality were conducted on the mean 
move times recorded for the data of 45 participants who reported all of the problem 
solving experiences: positive insight, positive search, negative insight and negative 
search. These identified that none of the measures were normally distributed (all 
rendering significant Shapiro-Wilks test results). Outliers were identified for each of 
the measures, and two that were identified for more than one variable were 
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excluded. Exclusion of all the outliers for each individual variable would have 
reduced the sample size, so taking this into account and with regards to Field (2016) 
(see full description in section 5.3.1) the move time data was assumed to be 
normally distributed and parametric tests used for the analysis. 
A repeated measures ANOVA compared move time (seconds) for solving 
type (insight versus search) and valence (positive versus negative). A significant 
main effect of solving type was seen, F(1, 42) = 25.37, p < .001, η2 = .07. Mean 
solving time for insight was 9.9s (SE = .45) compared to 11.9s (SE = .51) for search 
moves where the difference was 2.0s, 95% CI [1.19, 2.78]. According to Cohen 
(1988) the effect size can be interpreted as moderate, in addition a confidence 
interval that does not include zero provides further support for this effect. The 
confidence interval suggests that insight moves were on average faster by at least a 
second, as shown in Figure 6.2. There were no significant main effects of valence or 
interactions between valence and solving type. 
Figure 6.2 Graph to show mean time for Connect 4 moves identified as positive 
and negative insight and search. 
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6.3.1.2 Proportion of insight in CRA and Connect 4 
The proportion of moves reported as insight compared to search (non-insight) 
was compared for the participants who completed both Study 4 and 5. Two outliers 
were removed, one who reported no insight experiences in the CRA, and a second 
who almost exclusively labelled moves in Connect 4 as insight (proportion of insight 
score = .95). With a smaller sample size, considerations of normality are more 
important (Field, 2016), removal of the two outliers rendered data normal according 
to the Shapiro-Wilkes test and inspection of the normal Q-Q plots. 
A repeated measures t-test demonstrated a significant difference between the 
mean proportions of insight, t (22) = 7.32, d = 2.25, p < .001. The mean proportion of 
insight for the CRA task (M = .63, SD = .22) was higher than for Connect 4 (M = .22, 
SD = .15). The mean difference was .41, 95%CI [.30, .53]. Remembering that this is 
comparing proportions, the difference between tasks can be considered large. 
The association between an individual's proportion reported as insight for the 
CRA was compared to Connect 4. No association was seen, r = .09, 95%CI [-.34, 
.48], p = .70, N = 23 as demonstrated by visual inspection of Figure 6.3 and a low r 
value with confidence intervals that cross zero.  
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Figure 6.3 Proportion insight seen in CRA and Connect 4 
 
6.3.1.3 Individual differences in solving type and winning in 
Connect 4. 
The proportion of Connect 4 moves reported as insight compared to search 
was calculated (as described above in 6.3.1.2). Tests identified a single outlier, 
examination of this participant's data showed almost exclusive identification of trials 
as insight which is unlikely, more likely is a misunderstanding of instructions or 
definition of insight, therefore this data was excluded from analysis. 
There was no association between proportion of insight moves and number of 
wins in Connect 4, r = .09, 95% CI [-.13, .31], p = .21 as demonstrated by a low r 
value and confidence intervals that included zero, and shown in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4. Scatter graph comparing proportion of insight reported by 
participants with their Connect 4 wins. 
 
6.3.1.4 Phenomenological ratings. 
Fifty four participants reported all four types of solving (positive insight, 
positive search, negative insight and negative search) to enable direct comparison of 
their ratings for these. An outlier was identified for one participant's rating for 
pleasantness of positive insight (rated as 0.37), this was removed from the analysis 
of pleasantness. Tests of normality and visual inspection of Q-Q plots identified that 
some of the phenomenological ratings were not normal, however (apart from the 
aforementioned) no outliers were identified that could be removed to correct the 
data. Furthermore, as per section 5.3.1 with the sample size seen here the data was 
assumed to meet assumptions of normality so parametric analyses were performed.  
Perceived move speed, in a rating with extremes of fast (score of 1) and slow 
(score of 0) was analysed in a repeated measures ANOVA for solving type and 
valence. There were no main effects of valence or interaction effects. There was a 
significant main effect of solving type, F(1,53) = 15.1, p < .001, η2 = .07. Mean 
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fastness was greater for insight (M = .65, SE = .03) than search (M = .52, SE = .02), 
the mean difference was 14, 95%CI [.07, .21]. The standardized effect size might be 
interpreted as moderate (Cohen, 1988) however examination of the confidence 
intervals of the mean difference suggest that while they do not pass zero,  as shown 
in Figure 6.5 the difference is small when considered in real terms and the range of 
the possible ratings provided. 
 
Figure 6.5 Mean ratings for fastness for solving type (insight / search) and 
valence (positive/ negative). Note extremes of visual analogue scale were 
labelled, slow - 0 and fast - 1. 
A repeated measures ANOVA compared ratings of pleasantness for solving 
type and valence. A main effect of valence was identified, F(1, 52) = 162.09, p < 
.001, η2 = .57. Positively labelled moves were rated as more pleasant (M = .78, SE = 
.02) than negatively labelled moves (M = .33, SE = .26), with a difference in 
pleasantness ratings of .45, 95% CI [.38, .52]. Such a standardized effect size would 
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be seen as large (Cohen, 1988). Furthermore, the confidence intervals of the 
difference in ratings indicate that there was a real effect of valence on pleasantness 
reported. There was no main effect of solving type, however a significant interaction 
was suggested, F (1, 52) = 9,15, p = .004, η2 = .01. Interpreting the standardized 
effect size, this might suggest a small effect. However, examination of the interaction 
plot in Figure 6.6 shows that positive insight ratings were seen as more pleasant 
than positive search while negative insight ratings were seen as more unpleasant 
than negative search.  
 
Figure 6.6 Pleasantness ratings for positive and negative insight and search 
moves. Note ratings were made on a visual analogue scale with extremes 
labelled as 1 - pleasant and 0 - unpleasant. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA explored solving type and valence effects on 
ratings of surprise. There were no main effects of valence or interaction effects for 
valence with solving type seen. There was however a main effect of solving type, F 
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(1,53) = 13.52, p = .001, η2 = .05. Insight solving was rated as more surprising (M = 
.57, SE = .03) than search (M = .45, SE = .02). The mean difference in ratings was 
.12, 95%CI [.06, .19]. So while this is seen as significant, and the standardised effect 
size may be interpreted as moderate, the actual range of difference highlights a 
relatively small effect with insight solving being slightly more surprising than search 
as seen in Figure 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.7 Mean ratings for surprise for positive and negative insight and 
search solving. Note extremes of the visual analogue scale were labelled as 
surprising - 1 and not surprising - 0. 
 
Certainty ratings were compared using repeated measures ANOVA for 
solving type and valence. No significant main effects or interactions were seen. 
Furthermore, examination of Figure 6.8 illustrates the similarity of the ratings for 
different solving types and valences. 
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Figure 6.8 Mean ratings for certainty for positive and negative insight and 
search solving. Note extremes of the visual analogue scale were labelled as 
certain - 1 and uncertain - 0. 
 
6.3.1.5 Heart rate change whilst playing Connect 4. 
Two participants' data was excluded as they were identified as outliers in 17 
of the 21 variables (4 combinations of solving, positive insight, positive search, 
negative insight and negative search recorded over 7 times in relation to the move 
decision). A three way repeated measures ANOVA compared solving type and 
valence with HR change (ΔHR) over time (where t = 0 is the point a move decision 
was indicated). There was a main effect of solving type, F(1, 42) = 5.75, p = .02, η2 = 
.01, with a smaller mean ΔHR for insight (M = -.33 bpm, SE = .581) than for search 
(M = -1.24 bpm, SE = .52). The mean difference in ΔHR was .91 bpm, 95% CI [.14, 
1.67]. Interpreting the standardized effect size according to Cohen (1988) suggests 
that this is a small effect. The difference of around 1bpm likewise can be evaluated 
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as a minimal change in heart rate. The pattern of ΔHR seen in Figure 6.9 for insight 
compared to search trials might be interpreted as showing a trend to prolonged 
deceleration of HR in search compared to insight. 
 
Figure 6.9 Graph to show mean change in heart rate from baseline for insight 
and search moves before and after point of decision (t = 0s) for Connect 4 
moves reported as insight and search. 
 
There was no main effect of valence or any interactions highlighted by the 
ANOVA. Exploration of Figure 6.10, showing the ∆HR over solving time for positive 
versus negative solving sees a continued decline in heart rate through the solving 
time while for positive a triphasic pattern may be determined with initial decrease, an 
increase then final decrease. However, caution should be employed in any 
interpretation of the graphical information seen in Figure 6.9 and 6.10 due to the 
small changes actually shown (note that the y axis only has a range respectively of 
2bpm and 1bpm). 
237 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Graph to show mean change in heart rate from baseline for 
positive and negative moves before and after point of decision (t = 0s) for 
Connect 4 moves. 
 
 
6.3.2 Emotional Expression - BEQ 
6.3.2.1 Longitudinal comparison of scores. 
There were 25 participants who took part in both Study 4 (time 1) and 5 (time 
2) and had data for the BEQ. A repeated measures t-test identified that there was no 
significant difference, t (24) = -.14, p = .89, d = .01 between mean BEQ scores at the 
different testing times (Mtime1 = 4.84s, SDtime1 = .94 compared to Mtime2 = 4.85s, 
SDtime2 = .82), furthermore a very small mean difference can be seen of .01, 95% CI 
[-.16, .14]. 
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6.3.2.2 Emotional expression and proportion insight. 
There was no significant association between BEQ scores (recorded in this 
study) and proportion of insight moves, r = -.17, 95% CI [-.38, .05], p = .07, N = 78. 
This is shown in Figure 6.11, where the axis demonstrate the full range of possible 
data. 
 
Figure 6.11 Relationship between proportion moves labelled as insight and 
participants' emotional expressivity (BEQtotal). 
 
The association between the proportion of moves labelled positively and 
score on the BEQ positive sub-scale was explored and no significant relationship 
was identified, r = .06, 95% CI [-.17, .28], p = .31, N = 78. 
6.3.3 Heart Beat Counting - HBC 
Visual review of HBC performance showed that of the 80 participants, 3 
counted more heart beats, the rest undercounted (or were accurate in their counts).  
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6.3.3.1 Baseline heart rate in more and less accurate heart beat 
counters. 
An outlier was identified and removed from HBC accuracy data. A median 
split (median = .74) was then performed on the HBC accuracy scores to group into 
more accurate and less accurate heart beat counters. As shown in Figure 6.12 and 
using an independent samples t-test, t (73) = 1.87, p = .07, d = .43, there was no 
difference in baseline heart rate between more (M = 74.0 bpm, SD = 8.7) and less 
(78.3 bpm, SD = 10.9) accurate heart beat counters, the mean difference being 4.3 
bpm, 95%CI [-.28, 8.77]. 
 
Figure 6.12 Mean baseline heart rate for more and less accurate heart beat 
counters (median split accuracy = .74).  
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6.3.3.2 Longitudinal comparison of scores. 
Twenty four participants provided HBC scores during both Study 4 (Time 1) 
and 5 (Time 2), one the participants who took part in both studies had artefacts on 
their HRM recording during the HBC task so their data for this comparison was 
therefore excluded. A repeated measures t-test indicated that scores were 
significantly different between time 1 and 2, t (23) = -.07, p = .001, d = .68. Accuracy 
improved at Time 2 (M = .66, SD = .20) compared to Time 1 (M = .51, SD = .24). 
According to Cohen (1988) such an effect size could be interpreted as moderate. 
However, the mean difference was .15, 95%CI [.07, .23], the confidence intervals for 
this difference shows that improvements may range from very slight to considerable. 
 
 
Figure 6.13 Frequency distribution of HBC accuracy for repeat participants in 
a.) CRA Study and b.) Connect 4 Study. 
 
a. 
b. 
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Figure 6.13 shows the frequency distributions of HBC accuracy for the repeat 
participants in the CRA Study and Connect 4 Study. As well as an increase in 
means, the distribution can be seen to shift towards greater accuracy. 
To check for practice effects within participant comparisons were made 
between the first HBC session (prior to the problem solving task) and second HBC 
session (post problem solving task) in the CRA and Connect 4 studies. No 
differences were seen between the two sessions in either the CRA or Connect 4 
participants. 
 
Figure 6.14 Association between HBC accuracy for individuals who 
participated in both the CRA and Connect 4 study. 
 
To explore the individual differences in HBC accuracy between the two 
studies a correlation was conducted, r = .65, 95%CI [.33, .83], p < .001, N = 24. This 
association is interpreted as significant, not only due to the p value, but looking at the 
size and confidence intervals for the r value. This relationship can further be seen in 
Figure 6.14 with more accurate HBC scores in the CRA study seeing more accurate 
HBC in the Connect 4 study. 
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6.3.3.3 HBC accuracy and labelling of moves as insight. 
The association between HBC accuracy and proportion of moves labelled as 
insight was explored on data with outliers removed (as discussed above, see 6.3.3.1 
and 6.3.1.2). Little association was found between the two measures, r = .02, 95%CI 
[-.21, .24], p = .88, N = 75 as seen with the low r value and confidence intervals 
including zero. Furthermore, Figure 6.15 shows a spread of data across the two 
measures. 
 
Figure 6.15 Graph showing relationship between heart beat counting accuracy 
and proportion moves labelled as insight. 
 
6.3.3.4 HBC accuracy and ratings on BEQ item 7. 
The relationship between HBC accuracy and ratings for BEQ item 7 were 
explored, rs (1-tailed) = .27, 95%CI [.05, .47], p = .01, N = 75 rendering a significant 
result, moderate effect size and confidence intervals outside of zero, suggesting an 
association as shown in Figure 6.16. 
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Figure 6.16 Graph showing relationship between heart beat counting accuracy 
and BEQ item 7. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
This study firstly validated Connect 4 as a naturalistic task to elicit problem 
solving experience including positive and negative search and insight. Somatic 
markers for solving type were again identified in this task, replicating to some degree 
results reported in Study 4 for CRA solving. Within participant comparisons of 
phenomenological reports were recorded demonstrating comparisons for different 
solving types and valence, extending previous research in this area. Finally 
individual difference measures in relation to insight and emotionality were explored, 
with inconclusive results. Each of these aspects will now be discussed in more 
depth, with future research and limitations highlighted for each. 
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6.4.1 Connect 4 as an Experimental Problem Solving Task. 
This study sought to explore the use of Connect 4 to elicit problem solving 
experiences that are relatively comparable to how people solve problems in real-life, 
where often a succession of mini solving experiences contribute to a superordinate 
goal. As identified in section 6.1.2, in Connect 4 a player takes turns with an 
opponent to drop counters into a grid and so engages in problem solving to 
determine where to make each move, with the overall goal of winning the game by 
getting four counters in a row (be that horizontally, vertically or diagonally). This may 
be compared to Weisberg's (2014; Fleck and Weisberg 2004, 2013) proposed 
continuum of problem solving methods. As highlighted in Figure 1.1 (section 1.1.5.5) 
the model demonstrates 'mini' solving experiences towards the superordinate goal in 
the same way as seen in Connect 4. As reported in section 6.3.1 playing Connect 4 
elicited self-reported insight and search experiences that were both positive and 
negative. Over half of the participants experienced all four types of solving enabling 
direct, within participant comparisons on a number of measures reported in 6.3 and 
discussed below. The vast majority reported at least three types (so did not 
experience one type), this can be seen to be comparable to other problem solving 
tasks where a proportion of participants did not report both search and insight 
solving (see section 4.4.4.1 for more detail regarding these participants who were 
generally excluded from the studies).  
In terms of performance for the superordinate goal of winning a game, as 
shown in Figure 6.1 a range of winning scores (note the maximum score was six - 
the number of games played by a participant) were seen. There was not a huge 
skew seen towards either winning of all the games or none, suggesting that while 
participants were identifying their own level of challenge to play at, they identified a 
level that was neither too easy (this would have shown a negative skew) nor too 
difficult (shown as a positive skew). Participants generally seemed engaged with the 
game and to be making effort in the game, so actually attempting to problem solve 
and win the game. Observations made by the researcher of participants as they 
played the game included swearing (to self or computer), shaking their fist at the 
screen, celebrating winning a game (dancing and fist pumps!) and referring to the 
competitor (the computer algorithm) as a person, for example calling it 'he' (it was 
almost always male gendered) and directly commenting on their competition against 
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'him'. Interestingly Danek et al. (2014b) likewise identified their participants voiced 
similar competitive feelings towards the magician filmed performing tricks. They 
interpreted this as demonstrating the intrinsic competitiveness of problem solving. As 
such this indicates that the Connect 4 game represented a naturalistic problem 
solving scenario that participants were immersed in. 
In addition to being satisfied that Connect 4 does elicit the expected 
experiences, it needs also to be evaluated in terms of its viability as a task to use in 
experiments. One factor is the range of participants who can take part. As identified 
in Chapter 5 and summarised in section 6.1.2, language based tasks may limit 
participant samples. Participants recruited in this study had a range of abilities and 
experience in playing Connect 4. This can firstly be seen in the range of levels that 
participants chose to play at, with all levels being selected across the participants 
from 'easy' through to the hardest level labelled as 'expert'. Furthermore, several 
participants identified that they had never played or heard of Connect 4 before: they 
were able to learn the simple rules in the single practice game and then play the six 
games. It is notable that everyday insight reported in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
identified experiences where the insight occurred in a learning context (see section 
2.4.4.3). It is likely that the novice Connect 4 players in this study (if not others who 
had already played) were experiencing these mini-c kinds of creativity (Kaufman and 
Beghetto, 2009). Future research could explore such experiential effects more 
extensively, as no formal recording of experience was made in this study.  
In terms of other non-language based tasks the magic paradigm introduced 
by Danek el al. (2014) provides an alternative, but only elicits positive solving 
experiences and not negative insight or search as in this study. Likewise, Salvi et 
al.'s (2016) visual completion tasks that give positive solving experiences to 
problems in the visuo-spatial domain. Furthermore, the picture completion tasks 
were actually found to be harder, so more limited in terms of participation than the 
CRA task (Salvi et al., 2016). Connect 4 can also been seen to operate in the visuo-
spatial realm, eliciting insight experiences comparable to the everyday reports 
identified in Chapters 2 and 3 (see section 2.4.4.1) that is appropriate for a range of 
abilities.  
As well as demonstrating validity as a problem solving task eliciting the range 
of solving types and accessibility for participants, Connect 4 should be assessed in 
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terms of the time participants took to play it. Pilot testing identified that participation 
in the full study took between 30 and 45 minutes. In terms of Connect 4 specifically, 
a relatively short move time was seen across the participants and solving types (just 
over ten seconds per move). With a maximum of 21 moves in a game (leading to 
stalemate) this provides an estimate of a (average) maximum game duration of 
about four minutes (244s). This means that a number of games can be played in the 
course of an experiment, so providing the potential to introduce conditions and 
measure problem solving in each of these to obtain more powerful within participant 
comparisons (Field, 2016). 
6.4.1.1 Limitations of Connect 4 task. 
However, there were some problems identified by this initial exploration in the 
use of Connect 4. Firstly the Connect 4 game used was a commercially produced, 
computer based version aimed at leisure-time players. As such there was restricted 
capacity to alter features of the game for use in an experiment. This was limiting, for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, the time between moves was short, meaning that 
problem solving episodes overlapped, decreasing the time over which HR could be 
compared (see further discussion below in section 6.4.4.1). Secondly, there were no 
breaks between each move to obtain the participants self-reports, meaning a 
researcher had to be present to record this information. This potentially introduced 
confounds, however steps were taken to avoid cuing participants (described in the 
method, see section 6.2.3). Additionally, the disinhibited behaviour of some 
participants (see above) would suggest that (at least for them) the presence of the 
researcher did not constrain their problem solving experience. An alternative would 
have been to follow Leone, Petroni, Fernandez Slezak and Sigman (2012) who 
collected reported solving experience after each chess game rather than during. 
However as demonstrated by de Groot (1946/ 65) expert chess players are able to 
memorise and recall chess board positions and moves, each of which is more 
distinctive than moves in a Connect 4 game. As such this approach would not have 
rendered accurate reports of experience during game play. Furthermore, reports 
made temporally close to the experience replicate methods seen in other positive 
solving elicitation paradigms such as CRA or magic tricks (Danek et al., 2014a; 
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004) 
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Having a purpose built Connect 4 game would have enabled breaks to be 
built in between each move to collect ratings for solving type and automating the 
process. It would further have provided more accurate time measurements (see 
below section 6.3.1.1 for further explanations) and the opportunity to synchronise 
reports with other measurement equipment, negating the need for participants to 
press the actual HRM buttons as in this study (see section 6.4.3). 
Overall however, this study identifies the potential of Connect 4 in future 
studies that aim to explore positive and negative, insight and search solving. It 
enables a wide and general sample to participate, with no prior knowledge or 
experience of the game. Furthermore, it is a sufficiently brief game in duration for it 
to be played more than once, so enabling within participant comparisons to be made 
or multiple incidences of events necessary for neuroimaging data collection. The 
limitations in the main relate to the version of the game used. The development of a 
computer-based Connect 4 game specifically for research purposes should eliminate 
these problems. 
6.4.2 Phenomenological Ratings for Solving Experience in Connect 4 
The phenomenological ratings recorded for participants' experiences whilst 
playing Connect 4 are useful for a number of reasons. Firstly they provide a 
replication of Danek et al. (2014b), who measured the phenomenology of their 
participants' insight experience, but did not provide comparisons to search (non-
insight) solving. Secondly, some of the aspects measured related to theoretical 
discussions explored in this research. For clarity, an overall discussion regarding 
these ratings will be undertaken with signposting offered where a particular rating 
relates to another aspect of this study. 
6.4.2.1 Pleasantness of different solving types. 
Whilst (as described above in section 6.4.1)  the participants reported 
experiencing the range of solving types, as highlighted by the qualitative work earlier 
in this thesis (see sections 3.4.6 and 4.4.2) caution should be employed in assuming 
that participants' reports directly correspond to the definitions given to them. As such 
Danek el al.'s (2014b) rating of pleasantness provides a useful check on participants' 
classification of positive and negative solving experiences. Hypothesis 7 predicted 
that positive insight and search moves would be rated as more pleasant (positive) 
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than negative ones. As reported in section 6.3.1.4, this effect was demonstrated, 
with ratings for positive solving being considerably higher in pleasantness than 
negative.  
Hypothesis 8, explored the relationship between pleasantness ratings for 
insight and search solving, finding no differences. The study was sufficiently 
powered (as determined through a priori sample size calculations) to detect an 
effect. A small interaction effect was observed between valence and solving type that 
saw more extreme ratings of valence for insight (so more positive for positive insight 
compared to positive search and more negative for negative insight compared to 
negative search). It may be that this relates to other properties of the solving not 
accounted for, one consideration might be arousal. As highlighted in section 1.2.4, 
this thesis focuses on the valence aspects of emotion, however recent research 
(published as this thesis is being written up) highlights that arousal may also be 
important (Shen et al., 2016). Shen et al. (2016) explored physiological changes in 
insight and search solving using the CRA (Chinese version) finding that insight trials 
saw higher electrodermal activity (EDA) than in search trials. EDA has been 
proposed to be an indicator of arousal (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993), 
as such this finding suggested that insight solving is more arousing than search. 
Although valence and arousal are proposed to be orthogonal aspects of emotion (for 
example in Russell's (1980) circumplex model of emotion), an increase in reports of 
valence (more positive or more negative valence) is shown to relate to increasing 
arousal ratings (Bradley & Lang, 1999; Lang et al., 1999). This explanation fits the 
interaction effect described for solving type and valence in Connect 4 moves; if 
insight is more arousing as Shen et al.'s (2016) study suggests, this would lead to 
the more extreme ratings of valence seen in insight (compared to search) as shown 
in Figure 6.5. 
6.4.2.2 Suddenness (perceived speed) of different solving types. 
The suddenness of different solving types is measured in two ways in this 
study, using behavioural measures (see discussion relating to this below, section 
6.4.3). The perceived speed, so how fast or slow solving was rated for each solving 
type was also measured. The prediction made in Hypothesis 6, that insight moves 
would be rated as faster than search was supported, while no differences were seen 
for ratings of move speed when comparing valence. Danek et al. (2014b) rated 
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suddenness as the second least important dimension of insight experience, however 
as highlighted previously (6.1.5) no comparisons were made with non-insight solving. 
Shen et al. (2015) did not measure a rating for suddenness, however participants did 
indicate how much they felt they hesitated. This might be expected to be conversely 
related to perceptions of suddenness, so where there was hesitation it would be 
expected there would be less suddenness experienced. Shen et al. (2015) found that 
ratings for hesitation were significantly greater for non-insight experiences compared 
to insight. Together these results might be seen as complementary, supporting the 
notion of differences in perceived suddenness in insight compared to search. These 
results will be discussed further below (6.4.3), relating behavioural and 
phenomenological measures of suddenness. 
6.4.2.3 Ratings of surprise in problem solving. 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that insight would be rated as more surprising than 
search, with results supporting this as shown in Figure 6.6. This again is congruent 
with previous research that identifies the surprise aspect of insight as summarised in 
section (insert red for Surprise and Insight section in chapter 1). The identification in 
this study that moves labelled as insight in Connect 4 were rated as more surprising 
than search supports the assertion by Danek et al. (2014b) that surprise is an 
important component of the phenomenological experience of insight. This is at odds 
with Shen et al. (2015) who did not recognise surprise in their description of emotion 
and insight. 
6.4.2.4 Ratings of certainty in problem solving. 
Figure 6.7 and results presented in 6.3.1.4 highlight that Hypothesis 10 was 
not supported, there were no differences in certainty ratings seen between insight 
compared to search (nor positive versus negative solving). Shen et al. (2015) 
identified certainty as one of the emotional components making up their 
psychological structure of the Aha experience. Like in the Connect 4 ratings 
collected for this study there were no differences in ratings for certainty between 
Shen et al.'s (2015) insight and non-insight trials. Danek et al. (2014b) also identified 
certainty as important to insight, but as discussed previously did not isolate these 
effects from alternative solving (by comparing to ratings for non-insight solving). A 
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further theoretical discussion relating to the role of certainty in insight and search 
solving can be seen below in relation to speed of moves (section 6.4.3.2). 
6.4.3 Speed of Problem Solving in Connect 4 
6.4.3.1 Speed of insight and search moves. 
As reported in section 6.3.1.1, hypothesis 1 and 2 were supported, with 
moves reported as insight being faster than for search. This is in line with previous 
research, both the finding from Study 4 (see discussion section 5.4.1) in this thesis 
and in the wider literature (see sections 5.1.1. and 6.1.2.1), for example 
Subramaniam et al. (2008). While the previous studies reported solving time 
differences in the CRA, this study extends the finding to a different problem solving 
task that arguably elicits more naturalistic solving (see discussion above in 6.4.1). 
Salvi et al. (2016) following arguments first presented by Cranford and Moss 
(2010) excluded solving in the first five seconds of the CRA trial arguing these might 
be labelled insight as a result of an impulsive response to quick solving for solutions 
arrived at through direct memory retrieval and recognition responses rather than 
insight. However, this rationale is really driven by the assumption that only solutions 
following impasse represent true insight. Weisberg's (2014; Fleck & Weisberg 2004, 
2013) model, outlined in section 1.1.5.5 highlights that insight, Aha experiences may 
not always be the result of impasse, this is also congruent with the ideas discussed 
regarding the everyday examples of insight (Chapter 2 and 3), particularly with 
regard to negative insight where individuals were unaware of a problem rendering an 
impasse experience impossible. Additionally, solutions from the final five seconds 
were excluded by Salvi et al. (2016) as it was suggested that guessing strategies 
were employed in this time to avoid the problem timing out. These were more likely 
to be labelled as search. These two descriptions of behaviour in the time-controlled, 
single solving trials of the CRA could account for insight reaction times being faster 
than search, suggesting methodological reasons rather than aspects relating to the 
differences in insight and search solving. However, in the Connect 4 paradigm these 
factors are not seen. Firstly, in terms of memory solutions, people would be less 
likely to have memorised and recall specific Connect 4 boards than word 
relationships, and in their recall/ recognition of these, did not mistakenly label these 
incidences as insight. Accordingly, participants often questioned such experiences in 
251 
 
their practice game. For example in taking early moves in the game they often relied 
on habitual moves, such as "I always start in the centre". These they identified as 
non-solving experiences rather than as either insight or search solving. Furthermore, 
participants were not given a time limit for each Connect 4 move, so the effects 
described to avoid timing out would again not be seen in this study. Taking this into 
account, it would seem to support the attribution of the difference in speeds seen, 
not to task effects but relating to some intrinsic property of insight solving compared 
to search that generalises across problem solving tasks. 
6.4.3.2 Speed of moves and certainty. 
Hypothesis 3 found no difference between the speed of positive and negative 
moves. This is in contrast to predictions made, based on findings from Study 2 and 
relating to certainty and loss aversion. Specifically that in loss or gain focused 
decision making (as highlighted in section 6.1.2.1) negative moves would involve 
longer deliberation than positive. Examination of Figure 6.2 shows almost no change 
between positive and negative move times in insight or search solving.  
A more detailed consideration of Lejarraga, Hertwig and Gonzalez (2012) 
results sees that whilst they report an overall effect of increased searching in loss, 
45% of participants either showed no difference in searching between loss and gain 
conditions or showed the opposite, searching more in gain. As such, it may be the 
case that the individual differences in loss aversion effects shown by Lejarraga et al. 
(2012, and replicated in Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2016) are likewise seen in this study's 
participants whilst playing Connect 4, with different responses to positive and 
negative conditions confounding predictions and leading to no net effect in terms of 
move time. 
The individual differences in search strategies seen in loss identified by 
Lejarraga et al. (2012) led them to consider other factors that might be confounding 
the effect, exploring how certainty impacts on search behaviour and finding that 
greater uncertainty extended searching. Thinking back to the finding above (section 
6.4.3.1) that insight moves were faster than search, the role of certainty might also 
be considered. As highlighted in section 2.4.3.1 (and briefly in 6.1.5), there is 
suggested to be greater certainty in insight solving compared to search. So where 
participants were more certain, this would suggest that they would stop their search 
252 
 
to make their move and label this as insight. Where there was less certainty, a 
protracted search would be seen and their final decision (move) be labelled 
accordingly as search. 
6.4.3.3 Limitations of phenomenological ratings. 
However, as discussed above in section 6.4.2.4, participants did not rate their 
solving experiences differently in terms of certainty. Furthermore, this finding is 
congruent with Shen et al.'s (2015) finding of no differences in certainty between 
insight solving and other problem solving. This casts doubt on the explanation, if the 
assumption is made that the post hoc reports of phenomenology are accurate. As 
demonstrated earlier in this thesis (Chapter 4) there appears to be a disconnect 
between the problem solving experience that is reported as insight from memory 
compared to that experienced in real-time. Speculation regarding this contrast offers 
a potential explanation in memory effects, and again here this could be considered. 
The phenomenological ratings were taken at the end, temporally separate from the 
actual solving experience. Furthermore, it may be that the differences in certainty 
were too subtle and/or the rating system too crude to capture any differences.  
This argument would seem to be supported by recent research by Webb, 
Little and Cropper (2016) who used Danek et al.'s (2014b) rating scales obtaining 
ratings for each problem (classic insight and non-insight and CRA puzzles) 
immediately on it being solved. They found a strong relationship between certainty 
and insight which was measured on a likert scale of 'experience of Aha' rather than 
as a dichotomous label (insight versus search). Section 6.4.1 identified the short-
comings of the version of Connect 4 used in this study, recommending that a 
purpose-built programme would offer the opportunity to take ratings more proximate 
to each move. This would provide a finer grained picture of players' experience 
including in terms of the felt certainty attached to each move. 
An additional consideration might be seen from the chess decision making 
approach, that doesn't really explore insight, but does extensively consider search. 
Recent findings from Leone, Fernandez Slezak, Golombek & Sigman (2017) suggest 
that in chess, echoing findings from experimental decision making, there is a speed 
accuracy trade-off for moves. With slower moves seeing higher quality moves than 
faster ones. Such assertions can be made due to methodological developments that 
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assign quality scores to moves within a chess game. This will be discussed further 
below in the context of Connect 4 in section 6.4.5.2. 
6.4.4 HR change in different types of problem solving 
There was no heart rate change over problem solving time as predicted by 
Hypothesis 11 and reported in 6.3.1.5. This is in contrast to the findings (section 
5.3.2) in Chapter 5 where a biphasic (initial deceleration followed by acceleration) 
heart rate change was demonstrated around the solution point of both search and 
insight solved CRA puzzles. There are a number of reasons why this may be the 
case. Firstly this could provide evidence that the processes seen in Connect 4 were 
distinct from the problem solving seen in the CRA, leading to different physiological 
signatures. However the range of ∆HR measures taken over problem solving time 
was more limited in this study using Connect 4 (3s pre and post move) than seen for 
the CRA in Study 4 and, typically measured in other studies that explored ∆HR over 
time (Bradley et al. 2001, Guerra et al., 2016; Lackner et al., 2013; respectively 
recorded 6s, 4s, 6s after stimulus). Furthermore, due to the methodological 
limitations of the Connect 4 game used, each problem solving episode leading up to 
a move decision was very close to the previous, as there was no break in the 
programme between moves. This led to the shortened HR comparisons, but also 
may have allowed for interference between solving episodes, with the physiological 
effects of one move impacting on the ∆HR seen for the next. This could mean that 
parts of the physiological response were missed by too short a recording period, or 
that interference between solving episodes prevented an effect from being observed. 
As such, any firm conclusion regarding the veracity of this result would require 
further investigation using a Connect 4 game with features discussed above (6.4.1). 
Hypothesis 12 was supported, with a larger decrease in HR for search than 
insight solving. This corresponds to the finding from Study 4 where again there was 
greater deceleration in HR for search compared to insight solving. Lackner et al. 
(2013) likewise demonstrated a reduced overall HR deceleration for amusing 'insight' 
exposure to humorous cartoons compared to non-humorous controls. Jausovec and 
Bakracevic's (1995) results still showed a net higher HR for insight compared to 
search, but the direction of change differed, with acceleration shown in response to 
both solving types (see Figure 5.1a, also Section 5.1.3.1). In sum these results 
demonstrate that the HR difference identified in this thesis may be generalizable 
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across problem solving tasks. It could be argued that differences in HR response 
between solving types is easier to detect than the time effects (it relies on net 
change rather than change over time). This may support the notion that similar 
processes were seen in both tasks, but the Connect 4 methodology employed was 
not sensitive enough to identify the effect over time. 
Heart rate change differences between positive and negative trials were not 
seen, meaning Hypothesis 13 (and 14) was not supported. As shown in Figure 6.9, 
there were different ∆HR patterns discernible for positive and negative moves that 
might be argued to be comparable to those reported in studies where positive and 
negative pictures were presented to participants. An extended deceleration for 
negative, and a triphasic pattern for positive. However the differences across time 
only ranged within one beat per minute, as such these patterns were effectively 
meaningless as shown by the statistical test results. 
The predictions made for HR difference in valence were based on research in 
a different paradigm. Participants, in studies such as Bradley et al.'s (2001) were 
passive observers of emotion eliciting stimuli. In the Connect 4 problem solving 
scenario participants' responded to their positive or negative situations by making a 
move. Bradley et al. (2001) explained the HR response to emotional images through 
the defence cascade model (Lang et al., 1997) where typically, an initial orientating 
reaction to assess a stimuli would cascade into a fight or flight response if the threat 
increased, or dissipate if it was not judged a threat or the threat retreated (Lang et 
al., 1997). The extended negative response, Bradley et al. (2001) argued was due to 
the static, unchanging nature of the negative images presented, as such there was 
no cascade to a response, simply prolonged orientating as the stimuli remained 
negative but unchanged (so leading to continued HR deceleration). However in this 
study the Connect 4 participants moved to action in both positive and negative 
situations by deciding on their next move, this potentially removed the extended 
orientating response responsible for the lowered HR in negative compared to 
positive picture presentations. 
6.4.4.1 Limitations of HR change data collection 
One aspect that limits the usefulness of HR data collected was the range of 
solving experience measured. As highlighted above in section 6.4.1.1, due to the 
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version of Connect 4 used in this research, a maximum of three seconds prior and 
subsequent to move decisions was captured. This is in contrast to previous studies 
(and in Chapter 5) where longer windows of time were considered. 
6.4.5 Individual differences in problem solving 
A number of individual difference aspects were considered in this study. Such 
an approach is relatively new, with most insight research focusing on general 
cognitive, process differences. This approach was taken to investigate the lay idea 
identified in Chapter 4 (see section 4.4.1.2) that those with greater emotionality 
would be more likely to label solving experiences as insight, because individuals high 
on emotional expression would be more likely to experience or identify the signature 
Aha moment attributed to insight. 
6.4.5.1 Proportion of insight  
Kounios et al. (2008) investigated individual differences in the tendency to 
solve anagrams with insight, dividing participants' proportion insight scores to high 
insight and low insight groups (further described in section 5.1.7). This measure 
provides an individual differences metric regarding people's solving behaviour with 
which to compare measures relating to emotionality. However as highlighted in 6.1.4 
this measure is yet to be widely validated. Hypothesis 4, therefore aimed to explore 
proportion insight scores across tasks in the same individuals, to offer such a 
validation.  
Firstly a difference was seen between the tasks, with participants reporting a 
higher proportion of insight to search solving in the CRA compared to when playing 
Connect 4. This may have reflected the differences in the two tasks, with continued 
efforts across moves in Connect 4 towards the ultimate goal of winning (by getting 
four in a row) leading to far greater strategic thinking than in the CRA, where each 
solving episode is distinct. 
Also of interest is whether participants showed the same tendency to report 
insight in each of the tasks relative to other players. There was no association seen 
between insight proportions on the two tasks. This would suggest that the proportion 
of insight measure reflected a task specific tendency that was not generalizable 
across the CRA and Connect 4 tasks. As such for this study the results using this 
measure will be discussed in relation to performance in Connect 4, with the 
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cautionary note that this may not be generalizable to other problem solving 
experiences/ types. 
Further research could explore whether there were similarities in reporting 
tendencies across a range of tasks. For example the four tasks that Salvi et al. 
(2016) used all present series of standalone convergent problems, but some are 
language based while others are more visuospatial. As such comparing these to 
Connect 4 for proportion insight reporting would help to pinpoint exactly where the 
differences originate. Further validation, as highlighted in 5.4.3, could compare real-
life reported or actual tendencies to experience insight. 
6.4.5.2 Relationship between tendency to report insight and 
performance on Connect 4. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that individuals who experienced more insight would 
perform better in Connect 4 and so win more games. This hypothesis aimed to 
provide a comparison to assertions in previous research that insight leads to more 
accurate solutions that search (but see section 5.4.1 for alternative interpretation of 
results). As identified in section 6.1.3 Connect 4 does not render moves that can be 
dichotomously labelled as correct/ incorrect. So the number of games won, taken as 
an indication of the quality of moves was compared to the proportion insight reported 
for each player, and as reported in section 6.3.1.3.  
It may be the case that for Connect 4, insight moves were not better or more 
effective than search meaning that an individual making more moves due to insight 
was at no advantage to another using more search-based moves. As identified in 
section 6.1.3 it may be that Connect 4 is a more strategic game and so search 
problem solving be more effective, or as effective as insight. For further discussions 
regarding the merits of insight or search solving in terms of adaptiveness in see 
section 7.1.1.2. 
Alternatively, it may be that the overall low proportions of insight reported 
created floor effects masking any advantage to insight within the composite measure 
of proportion of insight (compared to search). Another aspect to consider is that 
participants were playing at a self-selected level of difficulty. This would have 
introduced confounds effecting the number of games they won. A participant 
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choosing a level that was initially too hard could switch to an easier one half way 
through and likewise for the reverse (switching from an easier level to a harder one). 
Taking this all into consideration, no conclusions can be drawn from this 
aspect of the research, and no contributions can be made to the question of the 
relative accuracy or effectiveness of insight solving compared to search. Future 
research might aim to measure the effectiveness of each move drawing from similar 
efforts within chess (Sigman, Etchemendy, Fernandez Slezak, & Cecchi, 2010), 
perhaps in the purpose built version of Connect 4 discussed in section 6.4.1, 
probabilities for success for each possible move could be calculated and the 
probability or effectiveness (maybe in ranked order so chose best move, 2nd best 
etc.) of the actual move chosen for each time be recorded. This could then be 
compared to the labelling of each move as insight or search, and to other self-
reported aspects such as Danek et al.'s (2014b) phenomenological scales. 
6.4.5.3 Emotional expressivity and problem solving 
The first aspect to consider regarding emotional expressivity was the test-
retest reliability seen for participants who took part in Study 4 and Study 5 (tested 
through Hypothesis 15). Similar BEQ scores were seen at both times, suggesting 
that the BEQ is a reliable measure. In relation to BEQ scores reported in Gross and 
John's (1995) original study, the means seen in participants taking part in this 
research (Mstudy4 = 4.8,  SDstudy4 = .94; Mstudy5 = 4.9, SDstudy5 = .82) are comparable to 
those in the original research, where they report by sex (male score 4.2, female 
score 5).  
As discussed in section 5.5.3 no relationship was found between emotional 
expressivity and a tendency to experience insight whilst solving CRA problems. 
Hypothesis 16, examining this relationship in Connect 4 was likewise not supported, 
with no association seen (reported in section 6.3.2.2). The fact that both positive and 
negative solving is experienced in Connect 4 means that additional comparison 
could be made exploring the valence of solving in relation to expressivity. Two 
hypotheses compared participants tendencies to experience solving as positive (or 
negative) with their expressive behaviour for positive and negative emotions. There 
was no relationship between either of these. In sum, this would firstly support the 
finding in Study 4, that emotional expressivity is not related to tendency to 
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experience insight in problem solving. Furthermore, positive and negative 
expressivity do not relate to positive and negative solving experiences.  
6.4.5.4 Limitations in the individual differences measures used. 
As proposed in section 5.5.3, the measures collected for proportion of insight 
and positive solving can be seen as distinct from the expressivity of insight. This 
measured participants' experience of each move as they played Connect 4 rather 
that their expression of the experience. This is analogous to asking participants to 
identify the emotion of a picture (positive or negative) rather than measuring how 
much it made them smile or frown, in other words express the emotion they 
experienced. No studies have considered behavioural markers of insight or if in deed 
there is individual differences in expressivity. As highlighted in 5.4.3 Ovington et al.'s 
(2016) Dispositional Insight Scale might be argued to measure expressivity as it asks 
participants to rate their everyday problem solving on scales relating to aspects 
indicative of insight experience. As discussed however, this has not been validated 
against actual behavioural measures to date. 
6.4.5.5 Interoception: heart beat counting and problem solving 
The HBC scorers with more accurate compared to less accurate scores were 
no different in their baseline heart rate, suggesting that availability of heart signal did 
not account for performance on the HBC. Furthermore, as discussed in section 5.5.4 
and again seen in this study participants consistently underestimated their heart beat 
counts, as such suggesting that intuitive counting strategies were not being 
employed. 
Longitudinal comparisons were made to explore the reliability of HBC scores 
over time, and it was demonstrated (as per Hypothesis 20) that HBC scores 
improved between Study 4 and 5. This may suggest that there were learning or 
practice effects. No immediate practice effects were seen between the first and 
second sessions in either Study 4 or Study 5. It is unlikely that participants 
purposefully replicated the methodology to practice after their participation in Study 4 
or in preparation for Study 5 as this would require them to access an EEG or HRM 
(although they may have as this was not verified when they returned to take part in 
Study 5). It may be however that explicit counting of one's own heart beat or the 
question of how accurate they were is something that prior to their participation in 
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Study 4, they had never considered. It is possible that taking part in Study 4 led 
participants to become more aware of their heart beat and so see improvements 
over time because of this changed focus. Of all the tasks that they participated in, 
the HBC was the one that seemed to raise the most questions and interest 
(anecdotal observation of the researcher). The shift towards greater accuracy seen 
across the range of participants between Study 4 and 5 as shown in Figure 6.1.3 
would seem to support this idea.  Further research could consider the effects of 
practice or increased (or newly introduced) focus on heart beat counting to verify the 
improvements seen across studies in this thesis, and identify why this might be.  
This finding does have implications for studies that use performance on the 
HBC as a proxy for an individual's generalised interoceptive accuracy that is 
assumed a trait characteristic. This finding complements others that demonstrate 
interoceptive accuracy may differ with in individuals across contexts. Ainley, 
Tajadura‐Jiménez, Fotopoulou and Tsakiris (2012) demonstrated that improvements 
in HBC were seen when participants completed their counts whilst looking at 
themselves in a mirror compared to a blank screen. They suggested that the 
increased focus on self, improved interoceptive accuracy by focusing attention. 
Durlik (2016) reported a series of experiments in her thesis manipulating self-focus 
through social and physical threat. Interoceptive accuracy (HBD) improved for 
participants anticipating social anxiety (public speaking) and physical pain, but 
decreased in social exclusion and was unchanged under a social self-focus (being 
videoed). Durlik (2016) concluded that as interoceptive accuracy can be manipulated 
according to context it should be considered a state variable.  
Accordingly, it is equally possible that improvements in accuracy seen in this 
thesis between studies was due to contextual differences rather than any learning or 
practice effects. For example, perhaps the knowledge of impending assessment on 
the HBC was heightened in the second study when repeating participants knew what 
to expect, this may be considered an anticipation of social evaluation, with the 
research explicitly advising that their count would be compared to actual heart beats 
recorded. 
Furthermore, the demonstration by Ainley et al. (2012) and Durlik (2016) that 
assumed trait measures such as HBC and HBD potentially vary according to context, 
giving the ability to manipulate interoception levels might be utilised. This potentially 
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provides a means to conduct experimental manipulations to make within participant 
comparisons of the effects of different levels of interoception on behaviour such as 
problem solving. For example, comparing proportions of experiences labelled as 
insight for high compared to low interoception conditions. 
In this thesis however, despite a net increase in accuracy, comparisons of 
individual differences saw an association between HBC accuracy scores for an 
individual in Study 4 and 5, seeing more accurate scorers in the CRA study being 
similarly more accurate in the Connect 4 study. This was comparable to the test- 
retest correlation reported by Mussgay, Klinkenberg and Rüddel, (1999) (see also 
section 5.4.4). This may suggest that while there is inter-individual variation on HBC 
accuracy relating to context; a general accuracy level with variance around this in 
different contexts may be seen with which to make intra-individual discrimination and 
comparison possible. 
Hypothesis 21 predicted that higher HBC accuracy would see increased 
labelling of solutions as insight, replicating the null finding in Study 4 no association 
was again seen for the Connect 4 task. As highlighted previously, Feldman-Barrett et 
al. (2004) suggest that for those with accurate interoception, arousal cues influence 
their emotional experience, while other factors (cognitive and contextual) being more 
important in individuals with less accurate interoception. Ginzburg, Tsur, Barak-
Nahum, Defrin (2014) further propose a threshold effect in interoception, that 
individuals must be able to detect interoceptive signals for them to impact on other 
things such as confidence or body ownership or presumably have any effect on 
emotional experience or insight. Future research could explore this, with a large 
enough sample of accurate HBC scorers solving problems (CRA or Connect 4) to 
have the power to detect an effect. However, before such an undertaking the issues 
raised regarding the proportion insight measure would need to be addressed (see 
section 6.4.5.1). 
6.4.5.6 Limitations of interoception and HBC task. 
Of further consideration may be the interoceptive measure used. Garfinkel et 
al. (2015) identified three different aspects of interoception and compared 
performance on these. As highlighted in section 5.1.5.2 they found an association 
between the two principle measures of accuracy (HBC and HBD) but not between 
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awareness measures based on the different tasks. For this reason the decision was 
taken to use accuracy measures in research for this thesis. Despite their findings, 
Garfinkel et al. (2015) advocated the adoption of an awareness measure. This can 
be seen as complementary to Feldman-Barrett et al.'s (2004) finding that bodily 
signals may have different importance dependent on how accurately they are 
detected, and additionally on how accurate the individual thinks they are. Following 
this argument, an individual who does not think they are accurate will likely pay little 
heed to any signals detected. An individual who is both accurate at detecting signals 
and knows they are, will use this information effectively. Where there is a disconnect, 
so poor actual accuracy but high perceived accuracy, bodily signals may be 
misinterpreted. This more complicated picture may explain the lack of 
correspondence to other measures with the interoceptive accuracy measure taken in 
this study.  
However, these critiques depend on the integration of bodily signals being a 
conscious process, or at least being available to conscious monitoring for the 
awareness measure to be necessary. In fact, this maybe not be the case. Firstly, 
participant's (in both Study 4 and 5) apparent lack of intuitive knowledge about their 
own heart rate and were curious as to how well they did. Most made no indications 
of having even considered this previous to their participation, so might be presumed 
to have no conscious awareness of their interceptive accuracy (anecdotal 
observation of research, this was not explicitly measured). Garfinkel et al. (2013) 
illustrate an example where interoceptive accuracy effects are likely not conscious. 
They used a rapid serial visual presentation of words where participants detect two 
target words. Detection of the second word is masked if presented too close after the 
first, termed attentional blink. However, emotional words overcome the 'blink' and 
see improved detection. Garfinkel et al. (2013) presented the second word in 
synchrony with different stages of heart activity, comparing effects at systole and 
diastole. They demonstrated that while there was equal detection of words at both 
times, memory for words detected at systole was impaired (surprise free recall test). 
However, the impairment was reduced in those with accurate HBC scores. This 
shows an effect that was not conscious yet influenced processing reliant on an 
interaction of cognitive (detection and memory) and emotional (salient words 
breaking through the blink) processing. As such parallels can be seen to the 
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processes being explored in problem solving in Connect 4 in this study that again 
may not be conscious. As such the recommendations to use awareness rather than 
accuracy measures made by Garfinkel et al. (2013) may be less applicable in this 
circumstance. 
Interestingly, Hypothesis 23 was supported finding a relationship between 
HBC accuracy and BEQ 7. As identified in section 6.1.7, this item of the BEQ is 
essentially a measure of interoceptive sensibility, how aware individuals are of their 
bodily information. This finding contrasts to the null finding for this comparison in the 
CRA study, and also to other research comparing performance on interoceptive 
accuracy and sensibility measures which find no relationship (Cali, Ambronsini, 
Picconi, Mahling & Committeri, 2015; Garfinkel et al., 2015). The comparison of both 
Study 4 and 5 between HBC accuracy and BEQ7 was not related to the subsequent 
problem solving task being completed, therefore providing conflicting results. To 
remind, BEQ7 stated, "my body reacts very strongly to emotional situations". 
Participants who were more accurate at HBC rated this statement as more like them. 
This was interpreted as indicative of interoceptive sensibility, their tendency to notice 
bodily processes (see section 5.1.5.2). However, it may actually be an example of 
metacognition, as the statement relates bodily processes to emotional experience; 
participants rating this highly could be making judgements on how well the two 
correspond rather than purely their attention to bodily changes. This would be more 
in line with previous studies that show a correspondence between accuracy and 
awareness (e.g. Garfinkel et al, 2015). Further work might look to compare BEQ7 
directly to validated measures of interoceptive sensibility and awareness to better 
evaluate this relationship. 
6.4.6 Conclusion 
To summarise, Study 5 demonstrated the potential for Connect 4 to be used 
in problem solving research to elicit more true to life solving experiences where a 
series of problems are solved working towards an overall superordinate goal. This 
task was demonstrated to provide a wide sample of participants with repeated 
positive and negative solving, experienced as both insight and search. It is notable in 
demonstrating for the first time that negative insight can be elicited in an 
experimental setting using a laboratory based task. 
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Future work would need to refine the methodology, ideally designing and 
building a Connect 4 version specifically for research purposes where greater control 
would enable more refined data collection and manipulation of variables. 
Heart rate differences demonstrated in Study 4, between insight and search 
solving in word puzzles (the CRA) were replicated for solving in Connect 4, 
suggesting that this somatic marker be generalizable across solving contexts. 
However, time series differences previously seen were not detected. This may be 
attributed to the poor control seen in the version of Connect 4 utilised in this study, 
something to be explored with an improved paradigm in the future. 
The use of phenomenological self-reports for different solving types (insight 
versus search) and valence of solving (positive versus negative) provided direct 
comparisons in terms of experienced pleasantness, fastness, certainty and surprise. 
Pleasantness ratings offered confirmation that participants were labelling positive 
solving experiences differentially to negative, furthermore that insight was seen as 
more positive or negative than search solving. Perceptions of fastness and certainty 
were discussed in relation to behavioural findings, for example supporting previous 
work demonstrating that insight solutions are faster than search. The idea that they 
were also more accurate was explored, although no conclusive results were 
reported. 
Efforts to relate ability to detect somatic changes and individual differences in 
emotion experience in insight were not demonstrated that might be concluded to 
show no relationship between emotion and insight. However, this study represents a 
first effort to make testable predictions about such a relationship exploring likely 
candidates built on the qualitative information collected earlier in the thesis and 
drawing from emotion and insight research and theory. Notwithstanding the 
methodological issues also identified, a single null result should not mean that this 
relationship be discounted.  
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7 Overall Discussion  
This chapter will discuss the findings from this thesis (section 7.1) and will 
furthermore evaluate the innovative methods developed (7.2). It will firstly provide an 
overview of these, then each will be considered in relation to: the impact of the 
findings; limitations and; future directions. 
7.1 Theoretical and Practical Applications of Findings 
This programme of study aimed to explore the naturalistic experience of 
insight. Firstly it examined everyday experience of insight using qualitative data 
collection (online qualitative questionnaires and a diary study) and analysis to offer 
validation to experimental work in the field, protecting against the circularity problem 
in insight research identified in section 2.1.1. The findings reported in this thesis 
demonstrate that positive insight experienced in everyday life, in general, closely 
maps to the construct explored experimentally by psychologists over the last century. 
However the novel identification of negative insight experiences, those sudden 
sickening new realisations, further develops our understanding of the role of insight 
in problem solving. As such, an amended definition of insight is proposed: 
A sudden new understanding, realisation or idea that is accompanied 
by a positive feeling Aha moment, or negative feeling Uh-oh moment. 
The role of positive insight in relation to simplified stage models of creativity is 
long established, occurring during the illumination moment when a solution is found 
(Wallas, 1926). This thesis identifies negative insight moments as sudden problem 
finding experiences, seeing insight in this context initiating problem solving attempts 
rather than concluding them and so occurring much earlier in the solving process. 
The implications of this finding are discussed below in section 7.1.1. 
The everyday situations in which insight, both positive and negative can occur 
that were identified in this thesis can further inform future directions for both the 
study of insight and the application of findings from experimental insight studies. 
Further elaboration on these applications will be made in section 7.1.2  
Having established ecological validity in the definition of insight proposed, 
Chapters 3 and 4 further investigated and validated the role of insight in everyday 
life. These challenged some key assumptions previously made in insight research. 
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Firstly, highlighting a juxtaposition between research and lay expectations in relation 
to the prevalence of insight; Insight researchers are clear that it is a rare experience 
(Ohllson, 2011), whereas Chapter 4 finds that lay perception is surprised by this, 
expecting insight moments to occur frequently and regularly in daily life. Questions of 
the prevalence of insight and individual differences in its experience are explored 
and further work to be done that should facilitate our understanding of this is 
identified below (in section 7.1.3). 
The later research conducted in this thesis (Chapters 5 and 6), explored the 
biological underpinnings of insight drawing from research in insight but also the 
physiological changes relating to emotional experience. Findings demonstrate a 
somatic marker for insight, seeing a difference in heart rate change in problem 
solving experienced as insight compared to search. In addition to seeing insight as 
purely positive, other tacit assumptions regarding insight and emotion are challenged 
in the interpretation made in relation to such biological markers. The applicability of 
such findings is discussed below in 7.1.4. 
7.1.1 Insight and Process Models of Creativity 
7.1.1.1 Process models of creativity. 
With Chapter 2 verifying the possibility first highlighted by Gick and Lockhart 
(1995) that insight might be a negative as well as positive experience, Chapter 3 
reports research that explicitly collected negative insight moments. This identified a 
functional role of negative insight as problem finding. This extends consideration of 
insight within process models of creative problem solving (as discussed in section 
3.4.5) beyond its occurrence at the solution moment, illumination in Wallas' (1926) 
model or part of Runco and Chand's (1995) ideation. The cases of everyday 
negative insight in Chapter 3 demonstrated that it typically alerted an individual to the 
existence of a previously unknown (or acknowledged) problem, so occurred at the 
beginning of problem solving prior to the preparation stage identified by Wallas' 
(1926) model. As highlighted, negative insight can be seen as a problem finding 
process. Runco and Chand (1995) identify this as part of their model, but do not 
recognise the role of insight in this component of it. This has implications for 
research based on such theoretical standpoints. For example, Vernon, Hocking and 
Tyler (2016) frame their review of creative problem solving training tools 
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distinguishing between those that target problem finding, ideation and evaluation 
processes. Although not explicitly focused on insight, this demonstrates how models 
of creativity are used in applied research (in this case to identify interventions that 
promote creative problem solving). As such, findings from this thesis that contribute 
to such models can be seen as contributing to knowledge from which practical 
applications are developed. Furthermore, whilst the knowledge offered here is 
theoretical, it is garnered from real-life solving. This offers ecologically validity, to 
ensure that models do in fact represent problem-solving as seen in everyday life and 
are not simply lab-based conceptions. 
An alternate process model focuses on how expertise in creativity develops 
with Kaufman and Beghetto (2009) categorising individuals' creativity, describing the 
process through four stages, beginning with mini-c creativity where acts are creativity 
to the individual to the Bic C creativity of eminent creative individuals (see section 
1.1.3 for further description). The identification of personal insights in Study 1 and 2 
can be seen to be examples of mini-c creativity, seeing corroborating examples with 
Kaufman and Beghetto's (2009) proposed intrapersonal insights in teaching and 
learning contexts. Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.4.4.3 this thesis extends to 
offer exemplars of mini-c creativity in personal development, work contexts and 
possible applications in counselling (see further discussion below in section 7.1.2.2). 
7.1.1.2 Insight and search as adaptive behaviours. 
Much is made, in the research literature and beyond into mainstream 
publication and media (often targeting business and leadership audiences), of the 
role of positive insight in problem solving. Insight is seen as being a panacea for 
creativity (Cunningham & MacGregor, 2016), with tales of eminent creatives arriving 
at their break through discoveries in flashes of insight (see section 2.1.4.3). The 
implication being that insight solving is somehow superior and therefore more 
adaptive than search. For example Kounios goes as far as labelling those with this 
desirable trait as 'insightfuls' (this is not seen in his peer reviewed article, Kounios et 
al., (2008), but in media discussions of his work, for example in Shulte (2015)). He 
identifies step that might be taken to increase insight experience based on research 
into insight, the implicit assumption being that insight as a proxy for creativity is a 
desirable and adaptive trait. The recent development of scales to identify insightful or 
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creative individuals may also be argued to reflect a similar bias although presented 
more parsimoniously as a research tool (see section 7.1.3). 
7.1.1.3 Limitation of focusing on insight solving. 
A similar implicit bias is likewise reflected in the methods that insight 
researchers use. For instance there are often extensive descriptions of insight 
experience given to participants while the alternative experience is often simply 
labelled, 'not insight' or referred to as search with little explanation (e.g. Cranford & 
Moss, 2010; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). This might be considered as a limitation of 
this thesis, as it followed this methodology in delivery of the CRA and to a lesser 
extent in Connect 4. An interesting future direction would be to explore the effects 
and potential demand characteristics of explicitly favouring one type of solving over 
the other in the framing of the research. For example, to address whether it is 
possible that participants over report insight as a demand characteristic when they 
know this is the researchers' interest and would the reverse pattern be seen if the 
emphasis was on search. 
The same might be said for the qualitative studies conducted in this thesis, 
where again a focus was purely on insight rather than more general problem solving. 
However this approach was justified in respects of really aiming to understand how 
and if insight was experienced in everyday life, firstly as generalised insight (Chapter 
2), then subsequently narrowing the focus again to explicitly explore negative insight 
(Chapter 3). Protection against leading participants in their responses was offered 
through varying the definitions given to participants. It is suggested that the time may 
now be to again ask a more broad question, perhaps following Jarman's (2014) 
approach who asked participants to share their mental click experiences or going 
even wider and simply asking participants to share problem solving experiences from 
their everyday life without offering an explicit focus on any solving type . Evaluation 
could then compare experiences to see to what extent insight or search processes 
were reported. This might be done through online questionnaires to collect larger 
samples and event contingent ESM with face to face follow-ups to offer rich accounts 
of solving experience in everyday life and some measure of prevalence. 
Furthermore, interpretations of findings that insight researches make might 
also be argued to likewise reflect the bias of seeing insight solving as more adaptive 
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or desirable than search. An example being in relation to the interpretation of 
increased correct responses being labelled as insight compared to search, a finding 
replicated in this thesis for CRA solving. This is more extensively discussed in 
section 5.5.4 and 6.4.5.2, but can be summarised in contrasting inferences made 
about the correct solutions. Firstly, researchers have generally interpreted more 
correct responses labelled as insight as being because it is a more accurate solving 
method (Kounios et al. 2008, Salvi et al., 2016). An alternative interpretation posited 
in this thesis is that feelings of certainty lead participants to label solving as insight. 
The corresponding increase in accuracy not being an intrinsic property of insight, 
rather reflecting participants' confidence in solutions.  
Seeing insight as more accurate, or more adaptive than search may very 
much depend on the task at hand. Attempts to measure the effects of quality of 
solving experienced as insight and search in Connect 4, as reported in section 
6.4.5.2 fell short. As highlighted, in a game with ongoing moves contributing to a 
superordinate goal of winning, a simple correct/incorrect metric cannot be applied to 
moves made towards that goal. In this thesis, insufficient information was collected 
to calculate the individual quality of moves selected, as this would require exact 
information about the grid and position of all the player and opponents' counters. 
However, a measure of quality was taken in the number of Connect 4 games that 
participants won (for full discussion of this see section 6.4.5.2).  Any future versions 
of the game for research could incorporate algorithms to record the quality of each 
move giving a more fine-grained analysis of the relative quality or adaptiveness of 
moves labelled as insight compared to search (comparable to that done in chess 
moves by Sigman, Etchemendy, Fernandez Slezak, & Cecchi, 2010). In summary, 
this thesis highlights the potential bias of researcher's blanket assumptions that 
insight solving is more adaptive/ desirable than search. This is something that has 
not been tested, previously or in this thesis and without such testing care needs to 
be taken in making such claims.  
The dual process theory is suggested to possibly provide a framework from 
which to view insight (Gilhooly, Ball & Macchi, 2014). This posits that there are two 
types of cognitive processing: Type 1 thinking that is automatic, low on cognitive load 
and based on heuristics; Type 2 thinking being effortful, involving conscious focused 
attention and drawing on working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Taking the 
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simplistic binary distinction, search-based solving that is seen as involving conscious 
processing and effortful progress towards a solution might be mapped to Type 2 
thinking, whilst insight moments defined by their spontaneous appearance into 
consciousness (implying unconscious processing) be more aligned to Type 1 
thinking. However, different interpretations of aspects of insight and creative problem 
solving are made in relation to dual process theory, highlighting specific factors that 
impact on Type 1 and 2 thinking in insight solving and proposing the involvement of 
the different systems to different extents (c.f. Ball, Marsh, Litchfield, Cook, & Booth, 
2014; Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2014; Gilhooly, Georgiou, Sirota & 
Paphiti-Galeano, 2014). Barr, Pennycook, Stolz and Fugelsang (2014) suggest that 
both types of thinking are employed in creative solving and insight. Pertinent to 
considerations being made in this thesis with regards to trait tendencies towards one 
experience or another (insight or search) is the view proposed by Sowden, Pringle 
and Gabora (2014) who assert that such trait like dispositions towards Type 1 or 2 
thinking are less helpful than consideration regarding adaptive switching between the 
two systems. This approach does not assume one type of thinking is uniformly more 
adaptive than the other, alternatively proposing that each system be adaptive in 
specific contexts. Applying this to the insight/ search distinction, future research 
might consider the individual differences in switching or reported insight compared to 
search for different contexts, relating these to performance or quality metrics in 
solving. 
7.1.1.4 Role of impasse and incubation. 
As outlined in section 1.1.5, central to one of the prominent contemporary 
theories is the necessity of impasse, leading to unconscious incubation and therefore 
insight (Ohlsson, 1992; 2011). As such there are argued to be low feelings of warmth 
(see section 1.1.4.4), felt progress towards a solution during solving attempts until 
the point of insight (Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987). Research focusing on incubation, 
further posits that spreading activation best explains insight moments with the 
appearance of a solution available as sudden, conscious awareness (Gilhooly, 
2016).  
Findings from this thesis contribute to this debate in a number of ways. Firstly 
the identification of the theme Active Search in both Study 1 and 2 demonstrate that 
insights occur in everyday life whilst problem solving attempts continue. This 
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supports the idea that impasse is not necessary to the experience insight (see 
section 2.4.5.1), suggesting that insight can occur whilst attempts are still being 
made to solve a problem. This is congruent with other models of insight such as 
Weisberg's (2014; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013) that again identifies various 
pathways to a solution that incorporate impasse and insight, but does not content 
that reaching an impasse is necessary in order to experience an insight moment. 
This research therefore offers ecological verification to this model. Further 
interpretation of the pathways in Weisberg's (2014; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013) 
model are proposed with consideration of negative insight; seen in section 3.4.5. 
Weisberg's (2014; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013) model demonstrates how a 
realisation that highlights an error during solving attempts is adaptive. Such a 
negative realisation serving to inform the problem solver and perhaps helping them 
to change track and use this information in their future attempts to solve the problem. 
In terms of incubation, the identification of negative insights that occur "out of 
the blue" (see section 3.4.2) are problematic for spreading activation theories as they 
currently stand. Such theories asserting that unconscious processes require an 
activated goal, to which conceptual links continue to spread after conscious work has 
ceased, leading to novel connections that represent a solution appearing as-if from 
nowhere back into conscious awareness (Gilhooly, 2016). For many of the real-life 
negative insights seen in this thesis, there was no previous awareness of a problem, 
so presumably no activated goal state for activation to spread to. This thesis 
proposes an alternative explanation, considering spreading activation between 
salient experiences or thoughts that were not necessarily labelled seen as problems 
when they occurred. Figure 7.1 demonstrates in the top row (a-c) the ideas posited 
by existing theory (see Gilhooly, 2016) where an activated goal is seen resulting 
from previous attempts to solve the problem, the spreading activation that 
incorporates this goal with pertinent aspects of the problem leading to a sudden 
experience of finding the solution to the problem, as-if from nowhere. The bottom 
row demonstrates how spreading activation might lead to the identification of a 
problem (so new goal) in a sudden insight moment, where there was no previous 
conscious awareness on one, in this instance the problem appearing in 
consciousness out of the blue. Future research would look to explore this and 
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provide evidence on which to incorporate negative insight into incubation theories of 
problem solving. 
 
Figure 7.1 Conscious attempts (black lines) to solve a problem (a.) activate a 
goal and related concepts (X, Y). On reaching an impasse and getting stuck 
conscious attention moves elsewhere but activation spreads (dashed grey 
line) to related concepts (b), when this connects the solution to the problem it 
pops into awareness as a sudden insight solution (c). In negative insight 
salient concepts (d) continue to spread activation after moving out of 
conscious awareness (e). Spreading activation links previously unrelated 
concepts and identifies a problem that pops into awareness as a sudden 
negative insight (f). 
A further aspect highlighted by this thesis in the Time Away theme from Study 
2 is the reason why people move away from problems. The assumption is that 
people take time away from problems due to reaching an impasse. However, time 
away from a problem not only constituted prolonged periods where incubation might 
take place, Chapter 2 (section 2.4.5.2)  identified shorter breaks of day dreaming or 
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stimulus-independent thought (Schooler et al., 2011) as being implicated in insight. 
This corroborates a positive role of mind wandering which contrasts to it often being 
framed as maladaptive by distracting from the task in-hand (for example see Dixon, 
Fox & Christoff, 2014).  
As identified in section 2.4.5.2, none of the everyday insight descriptions 
shared elaborated on the reason for taking time away from problem attempts. 
Furthermore, no other research has explicitly investigated reasons for taking time out 
in real-life solving. As such future studies might aim to validate these assumptions, 
possibly adopting methods similar to those seen in this thesis to capture everyday 
problem solving experience. 
7.1.1.5 Integrating emotion and insight theory. 
This programme of research saw, on identification of emotional aspects of 
insight attempts to integrate theory from the separate literatures relating to emotion 
and insight. Taking a dimensional approach to emotion (Russell, 1981) it was 
identified that in addition to insight having a positive valence, that sudden 
realisations may also have negative, 'bad for me' valuations attached (Gross, 2016). 
This thesis identified physiological changes in heart rate for the two different solving 
types, with less deceleration for insight compared to search solving. This was 
comparable to findings in both insight research, for example Lackner et al. (2013), 
and in response to emotional stimuli (Bradley et al. 2001, Guerra et al., 2016). This 
thesis is suggesting that similar processes may be seen in insight and emotion and 
so offers a possible verification of Shen's (2015) assertion that insight be framed as 
a source of endogenous emotion. 
However, the discriminations in heart rate between positive and negative 
solving predicted for the Connect 4 study were not observed. As identified in section 
6.4.2.1 this may be attributable to differences between the context in Connect 4, 
where participants are actively problem solving, compared to passive participants in 
emotion research who view presentation of emotional images with no goal. 
Furthermore, this thesis did not explore the second dimension of emotion in insight 
experience, this being the role of arousal. As identified in section 6.4.2.1, Shen et al. 
(2016) found that insight solving showed higher electro dermal activity (EDA) than 
search. Future research could look to explore the roles of EDA and heart rate 
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change together, using a naturalistic problem solving task such as Connect 4 to 
provide comparisons of positive and negative insight and search solving. This would 
enable further integration of dimensional theory of emotion in insight. Further 
discussions regarding physiological aspects are discussed below in section 7.1.4. 
As highlighted in Chapter 1, other discrete emotions have also been 
discussed in relation to insight, particularly happiness and surprise which are two of 
Ekman's (1972) basic emotions. In line with other phenomenological reports of 
insight collected in laboratory studies that implicated happiness (Danek et al., 2014b; 
Shen et al, 2015), Chapter 2 saw every day insight likewise described in these terms 
for example positive emotions such as happiness and certainty (see section 2.4.3.1). 
Comparisons of phenomenological ratings in Chapter 6 of this thesis add weight to 
this finding, with positive insight being rated as more pleasant (Danek et al. (2014b) 
used pleasantness and happiness interchangeably) than positive search and 
negative insight being more unpleasant that negative search. This demonstrates that 
phenomenological self-reports of problem solving used in lab-based tasks to 
discriminate solving are comparable to experiences of insight solving reported in 
everyday life. 
There were conflicting reports in relation to the role of surprise, with Shen et 
al. (2015) discounting its role, while Danek et al. (2014b) suggested it was important. 
Findings from Chapter 6, do see a difference with insight solving rated as more 
surprising than search, supporting Danek et al.'s (2014b) view, however the effect is 
small suggesting that surprise may not be as central to the insight experience as has 
been suggested (see Section 1.2.3.2). Furthermore, not only is surprise in insight 
disputed, as identified in Section 1.2.3.2 there are debates regarding the construct of 
surprise as an emotion. 
The final aspect that was related to positive emotions in everyday insight 
reported in Chapter 2 and 3 was certainty. A measure of certainty was also taken in 
Chapter 6 which conversely saw no difference in reported experience for insight 
compared to search solving. Certainty might be seen as analogous to confidence. A 
recent study found that, as suggested in everyday insight in this thesis (Chapters 2 
and 3), participants were more confident of solutions (to magic tricks) they labelled 
as insight rather than search (Hedne, Norman & Metcalfe, 2016). But, conversely, 
the feeling of warmth (FOW) ratings made on the run up to solving in the study 
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showed no difference for insight compared to search, across the course of solving 
(although the FOW ratings immediately before a solution was found were similar to 
post solving confidence reports, so high FOW just before solving saw higher 
confidence reports post solution). This demonstrates that certainty or confidence 
differences between insight and search are seen at the solution moment (just before 
or after), but not during solving attempts. It may be that the participants giving 
certainty ratings in Chapter 6 of this thesis were recalling their feelings during solving 
rather than at the solution point and so it could explain why there is a discrepancy 
between findings from different studies. 
The use of phenomenological ratings more proximate to the actual solving, 
rather than post solving ratings (as seen in this thesis and Danek et al. (2015b) is 
one avenue to be progressed. A recent study, published after all research design 
and data collection for this thesis had been completed did take ratings for 
confidence, impasse, pleasure and surprise attached to each trial where a problem 
was solved (Webb, Little & Cropper, 2016). Rather than make assumptions about 
solving due to the type of problem solved (participants completed classic insight, 
non-insight and CRA problems that the authors designated as a hybrid of the two) or 
force binary categorisation of problems as insight or search participants gave a 
rating for their feeling of Aha. The ratings between Aha and confidence (certainty) 
showed high collinearity meaning that confidence ratings were removed from the 
multilevel analysis that was carried out to explore how well solving accuracy was 
predicted by the different ratings. This suggests that confidence ratings showed the 
greatest correspondence to feelings of insight (measured through the rated Aha 
experience) in terms of predicting accuracy, yet showed only a moderate level of 
prediction. The authors additionally highlight that there was more of an association 
between the Aha experience, than there was to accuracy. As such, the picture with 
regards to what contributes to the experience of insight is still unclear.  
This thesis replicated the scales used by Danek et al. (2014b) that focused on 
perceived pleasantness, surprise, certainty and fastness of solving to provide a 
direct comparison of results for solving experiences labelled as insight and search. 
An alternative would be to utilise established and well validated measures of 
emotional experience. One of the most widely used being Self-Assessment 
Mannequins (Bradley & Lang, 1994). These take dimensional measures of emotion, 
275 
 
providing ratings of arousal (calm to excited), valence (negative to positive) and 
dominance (control felt over stimulus: dominated to dominant). A dimensional 
approach in ratings would have better matched the approach taken in this thesis that 
focuses on dimensional aspects of emotion. However using such an approach would 
have made comparison to the work of Danek et al. (2014b) and other insight 
research using discrete descriptions of emotion as more problematic. This highlights 
that future work might consider reconciling Danek et al.'s (2014b) ratings taking a 
predominately discrete approach to emotion with the dimensional measure designed 
by Bradley and Land (1994) in consideration of emotion in relation to insight. 
Perhaps reviewing literature and providing a common framework in relation to 
emotional perspectives of insight from which researchers can draw needs to be a 
next step. Furthermore, comparing measures drawing from both perspectives with 
each other during problem solving would provide a better understanding of how the 
two perspectives and corresponding measures relate which would have implications 
for emotion research and theory more broadly. 
7.1.2 Everyday Insight: Application of Findings 
This thesis sees the collection of a large number of examples of everyday 
insight and problem solving. These could form the basis for a corpus of real-world 
problems that could be developed and presented in naturalistic cognitive tests, 
similarly to those that Gilhooly et al. (2007) presented to older adults (see section 
3.4.1). The focus of Gilhooly et al.'s (2007) problems was interpersonal relationships, 
but equally pertinent would be intrapersonal problems seen in section 3.6.2. In 
addition, practical applications are highlighted below in relation to the situations 
identified in the everyday examples. 
7.1.2.1 Learning and teaching 
One aspect that is highlighted by this thesis is the role of insight in learning 
and teaching environments, with examples seen in these contexts in Chapter 2 and 
3. This socially facilitated insight, discussed in section 2.4.4.3 and 2.4.5.3 can be 
seen as adaptive with the insight experiences described as leading to improved 
understanding. However, little is known of how insight moments operate within a 
learning context. Some research suggests that there are memory advantages to 
information identified through insight (Danek, Fraps, Müller, Grothe & Öllinger, 2013) 
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and that this may be related to both the emotional component (Aha experience) and 
cognitive solving processes involved (Kizilirmak, Galvao Gomes da Silva, Imamoglu 
& Richardson-Klavehn, 2016). However, these are experimental studies with 
problems of lab. induced confounds. Further research might explore how and if 
advantages to insight occur in real-life learning and in what contexts this is adaptive. 
Everyday data collection methods such as those developed in this thesis (see below 
sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2) but targeted to learning environments may be useful to 
further inform experimental studies by identifying how insight moments are 
experienced and judged as useful in a learning context. Such information may then 
be utilised to inform interventions to aid the recognition or experience of adaptive 
insight moments in a learning environment. 
Alongside the development of interventions that aim to facilitate learning/ 
understanding, there would need to be reliable and validated measures of insight 
occurrence in every day settings such as the class room to test the effectiveness of 
the intervention. Self-reports could be sought, but these are reliant on participants 
making reports and further may be distracting in a class situation, taking focus away 
from the learning environment. As such the development of measures that capture 
behavioural or physiological markers could offer a distraction free alternative. This 
thesis presented preliminary findings of a somatic marker for insight. As discussed 
below (section 7.1.4) future work to identify a robust and reliable marker could then 
be applied to these situations and even could enable the exploration of insight within 
non-human animals. 
7.1.2.2 Personal development and therapy. 
A second avenue for application of findings in this thesis is that of therapeutic 
settings. The examples of Personal Insight identified in Chapter 2 (see section 
2.4.4.2) can be related to counselling literature that centres on self-insight as a 
vehicle for therapeutic change. With help-seeking a consequence of problem-finding, 
it can be seen as an adaptive everyday behaviour outside of therapy. As discussed 
in section 3.6.2, future research could explore the relationship between negative 
insight and help-seeking in different populations (clinical versus non-clinical) and 
work to identify a model of Personal Insight as a healthy behaviour. 
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7.1.2.3 Workplace creativity. 
The social aspects of creativity and insight in the workplace is perhaps the 
most explored everyday aspect (for example, Amabile, Barsade, Mueller & Staw, 
2005, Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; Hargadon & Bechky, 2006). With creativity 
being highlighted as ever more important in the competitive, rapidly changing 
business environment (Baer, 2012; Puccio & Cabra, 2010, Cunningham and 
MacGregor, 2016). The work based and research related contexts highlighted in this 
thesis (Study 3 and 4) where participants describe insights relating to their working 
environment or the context of research (often relating to graduate research) again 
suggest that this be an area to develop in the future. Rigolizzo and Amabile (2015) 
discuss the importance of problem identification in entrepreneurial creativity in both 
newly established and longer running business settings. The role of negative insight 
as problem identification identified in this thesis would therefore need to be taken 
into consideration in models that propose such a stage. 
7.1.2.4 Positive psychology. 
Conner, DeYoung and Silvia (2016) recently identified an "upward spiral of 
wellbeing" (p. 6) in relation to everyday creativity, seeing lagged effects of positive 
mood and self-rated flourishing the day after reports of creative activity, the definition 
of which included "coming up with novel or original ideas" (p.3). This suggests that 
experience or recognition of everyday creativity, including mini-c creativity 
(intrapersonal insights) identified in this thesis, as insight could likewise have 
implications for wellbeing. As such this affords an avenue for impact, using the 
findings from this thesis to widen perception of what constitutes everyday creativity 
beyond little-c creativity such as painting or music, explicitly highlighting these links 
to positive wellbeing outcomes. Future research could look to compare the 
contributions of little-c and mini-c creativity to positive psychology measures such as 
positive affect and flourishing. 
7.1.3 Individual Differences in Insight Prevalence and Phenomenology 
Later studies in this programme of research built on findings regarding 
everyday experience of insight. One aspect identified was individual differences in in 
the experience of insight. This will firstly be discussed in terms of prevalence. 
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As identified in Chapter 4, some participants did not report any insight 
experiences over a week. De-brief interviews checked that this was not due to lack 
of reporting nor method of data collection, with one participant identifying that they 
had never experienced insight. At the same time, independent researchers using a 
questionnaire survey with a large sample likewise found that nearly twenty percent of 
their participants reported never experiencing insight (Ovington et al. 2015). 
Together these findings challenge the idea that insight is a universal experience. 
This thesis additionally offers face to face validation to the interpretation of Ovington 
et al.'s (2015) data. This has implications for both theory and applied fields.  
Firstly in terms of theory, those who advocate a special process view of 
insight (e.g. Ball, Marsh, Litchfield, Cook & Booth, 2014; Subramaniam, Kounios, 
Parrish & Jung-Beeman, 2009), would need to explain this lack of experience in 
certain individuals. This could mean considering a deficit model, perhaps similar to 
the idea of alexithymia, which describes a lack of experience of emotion (Hogeveen, 
Bird, Chau, Krueger & Grafman, 2016). Such an assertion would then need to 
identify the neurological differences that underpin this deficit. For a business as 
usual view, the assertion that insight is a based on general underlying processes 
(e.g. Ollinger & Knoblich, 2009; Chein & Weisberg, 2013) would again lead to the 
question of what differences in these processes are seen between individuals who 
do and do not experience insight. For example, do these differences lie in cognitive 
aspects such as memory or attention or in emotional factors such as emotionality. 
In applied fields, such individuals may need special consideration. For 
example in counselling contexts where insight is seen as central to the therapeutic 
process (see more detail in section 2.4.4.2 and 7.1.2.2) different theory or 
approaches may need to be taken with individuals who do not experience insight. 
Similarly in education and business, where creativity is seen as a desirable trait, 
there are implications for those whose creative experience contrasts to this ideal. 
Recent attention has turned to individual differences in insight (e.g. 
Cunningham & MacGregor, 2014; 2016; Kounios et al., 2008; Ovington et al., 2016), 
which was seen in the identification of a congruent theme of Individual Differences in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. This saw exploration of individual differences in terms of 
prevalence and experiential aspects (see section 4.4.1) and can be seen as offering 
validation to approaches that seek to measure these individual differences, either 
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experimentally or in everyday experience. An alternative way to express this is 
assuming a trait or dispositional tendency to experience insight can be measured 
(this is the assumption Kounios et al., 2008 make). Whether this disposition is 
domain general (so sees consistent individual differences across tasks) or domain 
specific (with different experience and expression of insight according to context) is 
yet to be determined. In this thesis the proportion of insight levels for the two 
problem solving tasks were different. Furthermore no consistent pattern of tendency 
was seen within individuals across the tasks, so an individual reporting high levels of 
insight in Connect 4 did not similarly report high levels in the CRA. This may be 
suggestive of domain specific insight tendency patterns. However, as identified in 
section 7.2.3, the Connect 4 paradigm could be further developed. There were also 
problems with the approach taken by Kounios et al. (2008) in assuming performance 
on any lab-based problem solving task represents a general disposition towards 
insight seen in everyday life (see further discussion in 4.5.1).  This led to 
inconclusive findings in relation to the further lab-based exploration of individual 
differences in dispositional insight.  
Future research may look to compare the different measures for insight 
disposition including Ovington et al.'s (2016) Disposition of Insight Scale and 
Cunningham and MacGregor's (2014, 2016) Productive-Reproductive Thinking 
Inventory (P-R) and explore tendency to report insight across various lab-based 
insight tasks (following Kounios et al., 2008) in relation to actual measures of insight 
occurrence. As highlighted in this thesis (Study 3), lay perceptions of insight (the 
amount of insight an individual judges they themselves experience) overestimate 
what happens in actuality (as measured using event contingent ESM). As such any 
self-report measure must be validated with behavioural data. 
Two further individual difference aspects were considered in relation to 
insight. These aimed to explore the relationship between emotion and insight so 
focused on individual differences in emotional experience, the rationale being that if 
these impacted on insight, associations would be seen relating them to insight 
experience. As summarised in Chapter 6, no associations were seen between 
interoception measured with the Heart Beat Counting task, emotional expressivity 
and tendency to experience insight. However as highlighted above there are 
questions regarding the tendency to experience insight measure used. Future 
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research should not discount the relationship proposed in this thesis between 
individual differences in emotional experience and insight on the basis of a single set 
of null findings using poorly validated measures. Furthermore, other findings in this 
thesis are suggestive of a relationship: the identification and distinction of everyday 
insight solving by valence (positive and negative) and; somatic markers in insight 
consistent to those seen in emotional experience (both shown in this thesis for HR 
and discussed in section 1.2.5 in interpretation of neuroimaging results from other 
studies). 
7.1.4 Biological Markers for Insight 
Models that integrate emotion and cognition posit the involvement of 
physiological changes, for example the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994). 
Accordingly examination of the biology of insight, with consideration to emotion 
literature was made. This identified complementary findings with regards to heart 
rate change during insight (Jausovec & Bakracevic,1995; Lackner et al., 2013), 
emotion elicitation (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert & Lang, 2001) and detection of 
salient (or surprising) stimuli (Guerra et al., 2016) (for full outline of findings see 
section 5.1.3). This thesis identified a HR change over time that corresponded to 
previous findings but using within participant and within task comparisons to enable 
difference to be more confidently attributed to the solving type. A biphasic response 
was shown in Study 4 for both types of problem solving, with an initial deceleration 
towards the point of insight then seeing acceleration post solution. This was 
consistent with HR responses seen in both previous insight and emotion research 
(e.g. see Bradley et al., 2001; Lackner et al., 2013). In both the CRA task (Study 4) 
and Connect 4 (Study 5) less deceleration was seen for insight in comparison to 
search solving. This was again consistent with results for insight versus non-solving 
(Lackner et al., 2013) and emotional versus neutral images (Bradley et al., 2001). 
Together the results from this programme of study identify heart rate change as a 
potential somatic marker for insight and enable links to an emotion theory view of 
insight. Shen et al. (2016) recently demonstrated a difference in EDA between 
insight and search trials using the CRA. As speculated in section 6.1.6.2, the 
relationship between arousal and valence, with extremes of valence increasing in 
arousal might explain these corresponding HR results for insight, seen as more 
arousing than search solving. Future research might look to replicate findings with 
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measures of both EDA and HR change in the CRA and across different solving 
contexts, for example using a refined version of Connect 4 (discussed below in 
section 7.2.3). 
In terms of the applicability of these findings, this research (exploring somatic 
markers as in this thesis, also: Lackner et al., 2013 and Shen et al., 2016) is in its 
infancy. If a robust marker is quantified, it would first need to reliably discriminate 
between insight and search solving. Whilst this thesis did identify differences in HR, 
the effect size was small meaning the utility of such a difference may be limited. 
Such a signature could then be used in situations where self-reports of experience 
are either unreliable or impracticable. For example as discussed above in section 
7.1.2.1. Further work could look to validate a signature in non-verbal populations, for 
example babies and infants or non-human animals. However, such a position is a 
long way off because the current research body, consisting of a few studies focusing 
on different measures and showing small effects does not demonstrate a robust 
difference on which to make such discrimination between solving types. More 
immediate complementary research might aim to explore other physiological and 
behavioural markers, for example facial expressions or other observable behaviours 
that map to insight. These could be combined to provide redundancy in any 
detection method developed. 
7.2 Evaluation of Novel Methodology Developed for the Naturalistic Study of 
Insight Experience 
In addition to the findings outlined above this programme of research also 
identified specific research problems to which novel methodological solutions were 
proposed. This section will provide a brief evaluation of these. 
Firstly, the use of online questionnaires to collect open textual, qualitative 
accounts of participant's experience sees a departure from typical qualitative 
approaches. This methodology was applied to the collection of one-off snap shot 
accounts of everyday experience, but also in event contingent Experience Sampling 
Methodology. This will be explored in section 7.2.1 
Secondly, in response to the circularity problems in insight research identified 
in section 2.11 it was decided that a qualitative approach should be taken in 
exploring everyday experience of insight. However, the subjectivity introduced by 
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such methodology was seen as problematic in light of the influence of definitions on 
previous insight research. Therefore a methodology was developed to protect 
against these effects. Section 7.2.2 below explores this new methodology: 
Integrative Thematic Analysis. 
Finally, the identification of negative insight presented a problem for existing 
paradigms of research where established insight elicitation tasks focus purely on 
positive insight. As such this programme of research aimed to identify and validate a 
new laboratory based task that would provide experiences of positive and negative 
insight and search solving echoing those seen in everyday life. It proposes that 
Connect 4 elicits this full range of solving types with a more naturalistic solving 
experience than previous methods. The efficacy of this method and further 
development opportunities are outlined below in 7.2.3. 
7.2.1 Online Questionnaire Collection of Qualitative Textual Responses 
Typical qualitative methods collect data using face to face semi-structured 
interviews, focus groups, observations, and review of documents and media of life 
(e.g. personal journals) (Braun, Clarke & Weate, 2016; Creswell, 2013). Study 1, 2 
and 3 saw online collection of data using the Survey Monkey which is predominately 
set up for the collection of quantitative survey data. Online collection of qualitative 
data using a questionnaire is a new burgeoning qualitative data collection approach 
that is often overlooked in qualitative research (Toerien & Wilkinson, 2004). As such, 
this thesis presents an additional example of this methodology being successfully 
employed in the field of cognitive psychology. 
 In Study 1 and 2 textual responses were collected in response to open-ended 
questions aiming to capture participant's descriptions of a snapshot experience with 
as little leading bias as possible (e.g. offering of minimal or no definitions, questions 
to encourage description of experience and when it happened). As outlined in 
section 2.4.7 there were limitations to this method, with the responses given being 
more limited than in other qualitative methods (Braun & Clarke, 2013). For example 
in face to face interviews, participant' responses can be probed where it is not clear, 
or to encourage a more detailed explanation. Short or unclear responses given 
through an anonymous questionnaire therefore may remain ambiguous and wrongly 
interpreted without this opportunity to follow up responses.  
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However there are strengths to be highlighted as well. Firstly in the number 
and distribution of participants that an online survey can reach in comparison to face 
to face research. Additionally, the anonymity it affords can also be seen as 
advantageous. This thesis did not focus on a topic that was particularly sensitive 
(although anonymity may have contributed to the reporting of Personal Insights), but 
for other projects this may be an important consideration.  
Study 4 additionally demonstrated an adopted version of the qualitative 
collection of insight experience, using the questionnaire format as a portal for 
participants to record their insight experiences as they occurred, following event 
elicited Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; 
Moskowitz & Sadikaj, 2011). As such the benefits of the questionnaire were seen 
including: being a convenient medium for participants to make their reports (via their 
own smartphones or devices with online access); secure handling and storage of 
data and; time stamps to enable verification of reports. The addition of the face to 
face de-brief interview enabled probing of responses to check where information 
given was unclear, and to encourage elaboration of the experience. This highlights 
how the combination of collection methods, following methods outlined by Sun, 
Sharples and Makri (2011) who used it to validate a mobile phone application, could 
be useful in studies exploring everyday experience of psychological phenomena. 
Finally, the use of qualitative methods within the questionnaire identified that 
participants' responses did not always relate to the definition given. As seen in the 
theme, Uh-oh no insight (section 3.3.1) in Study 2 and also in Study 3 (section 
4.4.2), participants focused on one aspect of the insight definition, providing 
examples of an Uh-oh or Aha experience that did not represent a new understanding 
or idea. The de-brief interviews in Study 3 afforded confirmation that this was the 
case. This has important implications for all online research, highlighting the need to 
check that participants are describing what the researcher thinks they are and not to 
assume that in giving a definition it will be heeded. If, for example in this thesis it had 
been decided to collect quantitative data rather than qualitative, the proportion of 
participants who responded thinking about only the Aha or Uh-oh aspect of the 
definition would be unknown, and responses taken to represent insight when this 
may not be the case. Therefore a recommendation based on findings from this thesis 
would be to include qualitative open text responses in all questionnaires, regardless 
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of approach (qualitative or quantitative) to check responses do relate to the 
phenomenon under investigation. 
7.2.2 Integrative Thematic Analysis: Qualitative methodology  
The thematic analysis methodology outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006) was 
adapted in this programme of research to protect against researcher subjectivity 
introduced by their necessary expert knowledge in the field being explored. For 
many situations where qualitative research is being used as a first-base exploratory 
tool or to reach a rich understanding of contextual, local-based knowledge this may 
not be a problem because reflexivity statements are included to acknowledge the 
position the researchers take. However this thesis was taking what Braun and Clarke 
(2013) categorise as small q qualitative research, aiming to inform quantitative 
research. However, because it was effectively informing the quantitative research 
after-the-effect, the existing body of knowledge would influence the analysis taken by 
the researcher. Specifically in the case of exploring everyday insight to validate 
experimental work, protection was needed to ensure continued circularity effect did 
not occur (see 2.1.1). As such a second researcher, naïve to the research area 
analysed the data in tandem to the first researcher and themes were integrated, a 
method this thesis termed Integrative Thematic Analysis (ITA). 
Through the three studies that used ITA in this thesis a number of strengths of 
it as a methodology were demonstrated. In Study 2, the first researcher overlooked 
the theme, Time Away likely because it was identified in Study 1. The inclusion of a 
second researcher, not the same second researcher as in Study 1 meant that this 
omission was identified. In a reverse situation, the identification of a theme related to 
the research aims and literature review conducted by the first researcher (Gut 
Feelings) could be argued to be driven by this knowledge. The identification of a 
comparable theme by the second researcher offered reassurance that this was a 
genuine theme, rather than result of the first researcher's expert knowledge (see 
section 3.4.7). Both of these situations highlight how the data-driven contribution of a 
naïve researcher has advantages over the typical role of a second researcher 
offering a confirmatory review of analysis carried out. Following this approach, it is 
unlikely that the missed theme in Study 1 would have been identified through the 
review of themes and supporting data presented by the first researcher. 
Furthermore, a researcher with knowledge of the research field would be more likely 
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to exhibit confirmatory bias, while the use of a naïve researcher, working 
independently to identify themes offers protection against this. 
There are however some disadvantages to ITA to highlight. Particularly in 
terms of the additional resources required to follow this method. Over the three 
studies in this thesis using ITA this meant engaging a different second researcher for 
each analysis. Using the same second researcher over the series of studies would 
have meant that the discussion involved in the integration of themes from the 
previous study would have biased the subjectivity of the second researcher meaning 
they were not naïve in the follow up analysis. If the first researcher has been 
effective in disseminating findings from earlier research and so demonstrating 
impact, this too could have detrimental effects in finding a second researcher who 
was truly naïve. Fortunately in this programme of research, the first researcher was 
was able to locate appropriate naïve second researchers. This would likely be an 
even greater problem in large and specialist research teams who all work in the 
same field. As such the creative use of collaboration between researchers in 
different fields, but sharing qualitative methodologies could provide reciprocal 
second researchers to follow ITA. 
In sum, while it may not be necessary in all research contexts, this thesis has 
demonstrated that ITA may be the method of choice where protection against 
subjectivity is particularly important, but qualitative methodology be seen as the best 
approach. In designing research using ITA analysis the role of a second researcher 
should be an appropriately naïve individual with the time to dedicate to the process. 
7.2.3 Connect 4: Task to Elicit Naturalistic Laboratory Based Positive and 
Negative Problem Solving Experience 
Section 6.4.1 sees an in-depth evaluation of Connect 4 as naturalistic 
laboratory based task to elicit experience of positive and negative solving 
experience. It is argued to be naturalistic in the same way as chess, a more 
established research tool used to explore decision making and problem solving 
(Charness, 1992; Connors, Burns & Campirelli, 2011; Gobet & Simon, 1996). Yet 
this thesis argues that the necessity of a level of knowledge in order to play chess 
places a constraint on its utility as a research tool for non-expert populations. 
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Connect 4 on the other hand has very simple rules, as demonstrated in this thesis, 
explainable in a short briefing session at the beginning of participation in research.  
To summarise, the reliability and validity of Connect 4 as a problem solving 
elicitation tool was demonstrated in terms of it producing the expected range of 
solving experiences (positive and negative, insight and search) in the sample of 
participants recruited in Study 6. These were students and non-students, with no 
constraints in terms of language or experience of playing the game. As such this 
study demonstrates Connect 4 as being a task that is suitable for a general sample 
of adult participants. Furthermore, Connect 4 is recommended by its manufacturers 
as suitable for children over six years old. Future research could therefore explore 
the suitability of this task to elicit problem solving experience in children alongside 
adults to enable an exploration of developmental aspects in problem solving, insight 
and creativity. This is something that was highlighted by Guildford (1950) as an 
important area for investigation, and remains a matter of contemporary debate in 
terms of the extent that creativity is or is not seen in children (Russ & Fiorelli, 2010). 
Connect 4 could provide an experimental paradigm to elicit naturalistic solving 
experience across and through development into adult hood. 
A current, major limitation was the version of the game used in this thesis. A 
computer based application, was downloaded as-is, in a format designed for casual 
game play rather than research. This meant that vital data collection opportunities 
were limited in terms of the amount of information that could be collected from the 
participant about each move. Furthermore, the short duration between each move 
created potential overlap that was problematic for the HR data collected, reducing 
the scope of analysis conducted. Finally, measurement of move quality through the 
game was not possible, as the moves made by the player and opponent were not 
recorded (see also above 7.1.1.2). As such a recommendation of this thesis would 
be for a purpose built research-focused version of Connect 4 be commissioned in 
order to improve control and data collection. This would provide more robust findings 
in relation to solving experience, adaptiveness of moves selected and factors such 
as physiological measures. Furthermore, the use of Connect 4 and the benefits of 
visuo-spatial methodologies to elicit insight perhaps demonstrate the need for 
openness to employing other novel methods to elicit insight that do not rely on 
specific abilities such as language skills.  
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7.3 Conclusion 
In summary, this thesis has explored insight beyond the cognitive domain. 
Firstly, using qualitative data collection and analysis to characterise everyday insight 
experience. Through a series of studies novel aspects of insight including negative 
insight, as a problem finding process were identified. As a result this thesis proposed 
to re-define the insight moment as: 
A sudden new understanding, realisation or idea that is accompanied 
by a positive feeling Aha moment, or negative feeling Uh-oh moment. 
A quantitative approach was then taken to explore the aspects identified in the 
qualitative studies in this thesis and implicated through a review of previous insight 
and emotion research literature. Psychological and physiological aspects were 
measured as participants solved problems, firstly word puzzles (Compound Remote 
Associates [CRA]) and secondly whilst playing Connect 4. No association was seen 
between emotional expressivity or interoceptive accuracy (Heart Beat Counting) and 
solving performance (proportion solved through insight). A difference in heart rate 
(HR) was identified between solving labelled as insight and search in both CRA and 
Connect 4, with a greater decrease in HR in search solving than insight. A biphasic 
HR change was seen in the CRA solving, this was congruent to patterns of HR 
change shown in previous research in response to emotional stimuli and humorous, 
insight cartoons. Together this suggests that solving experienced as insight may be 
distinguishable from search through somatic measures such as heart rate. The 
successful elicitation of both positive and negative insight and search solving in a 
laboratory-based setting for the first time further validates the study of 
phenomenological and emotional aspects of insight. In addition it provides a novel 
methodology to use in the future investigation of insight phenomenology. 
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Appendix 1 Participant details of experimental insight studies. 
 
Study 
 
Sample description 
 
Age 
Mean SD Range 
Bowden & Jung-Beeman 
2003 students na a  
Bowers, Reghr, 
Balthazard & Parker, 1990 students na na na 
Cranford & Moss, 2010 students na na na 
Cranford & Moss, 2011 students na na na 
Cranford & Moss, 2012 students na na na 
Cunningham at al 2009 students na na 20-30 
Cushen & Wiley 2011 students 18.76 1.08  
Daneck et al 2014 mainly Students 24.4 na 3.3 
Duncker, 1945 mainly Students na na  
Fleck & Weisberg 2004 students 20.5 na na 
Fleck & Weisberg 2013 students 21.24 5.03  
Gilhooly and Fioratou 
2009 students 22.64 6.38 18-35 
Gilhooly et al. 2014 students 22.15 5.20 18-49 
Isen, Daubman & 
Nowicki, 1987 students na na na 
Jarosz, Colflesh & Wiley, 
2012 from university community na na 21-30 
Jones, 2003 students   18-46 
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004 na na na na 
MacGregor, Ormerod & 
Chronicle, 2001 
study 1, 2, 3 & 5 students 
4 visitors at uni. openday na na na 
Maier , 1931 students na na na 
Mednick 1962 students na na  
Metcalfe & Wiebe 1987 study 1 volunteers (n=26) study 2 -  students (n=73) na na na 
Subramaniam et al 2009 na na na  
Weisberg & Alba, 1981 students na na na 
na = not available 
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Appendix 2. Pilot Study: CRA task 
The aim of the pilot was firstly to assess language effects on performance, 
comparing performance for those with English as a first language to English 
additional language or bilingual (English plus another language spoken before age 
7).  Previous research has suggested that there might be effects of language 
experience on insight tasks (Cushen & Wiley, 2011). Additionally, the convenience 
student sample being utilised has a high proportion of international students making 
language experience effects a pertinent consideration. Secondly, the pilot was used 
to identify the word triads to be used in the main study. It aimed to identify triads of 
sufficient difficulty to promote problem solving experiences and render trials that 
elicited solutions reported as being insight and non-insight. A final aim of the pilot 
was to refine the protocols developed to run the experiment, particularly in relation to 
the computer programme delivering the task and output data produced 
Method 
Participants 
Ten student participants (see Table A1 for breakdown of participants) were 
recruited from a convenience sample of University students with a range of language 
status (see section below). One participant withdrew from the study and so data was 
removed.  
Table A1 Breakdown of pilot participants 
 Number Age: Mean (Standard 
Deviation) Female Male 
English  1 3 26.75 (7.09) 
Bilingual1 2 1 36.00 (3.00) 
English 
additional 
language2 
2 0 33.50 (0.71) 
1 English spoken before age 7   2 Originally three EAL participants, one withdrew data. 
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Materials 
Compound Remote Associates task. Word triads were taken from 
Sandkühler and Bhattacharya (2008) who adapted the Compound Remote 
Associates task (CRA, Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b) for a European, English 
speaking sample.  The 45 triads which over 50% of Sandkühler and Bhattacharya's 
(2008) sample answered correctly were piloted, as such these triads represented the 
ones which were most successful at eliciting solution experiences. However, no 
feeling of insight ratings were recorded in this study, so the pilot aimed to check that 
triads produced solutions reported as both insight and non-insight. Three triads were 
selected for practice trials, these were the next three most successfully solved from 
Sandkühler and Bhattacharya's (2008) results.  
Previous research using word triads (Remote Associates Test or CRA) have 
utilised different numbers of triads, as shown in Table A2. Studies that use 
neuroimaging techniques see the use of larger numbers of triads. For Study 3 which 
is not using neuroimaging, there will be an aim to identify a number of triads 
comparable with other non-neuroimaging studies, which range between 15 and 44 
triads.  
The problems were presented on a 330mm laptop monitor and typed 
responses and feelings of insight (insight or non-insight) collected. The task 
procedure was implemented using PsychoPy software version 1.80.03 (Peirce, 
2007; 2008). 
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Table A2 Number of word Triads in studies using RAT/CRA 
 
Study 
Number 
of Triads 
Neuroimaging Bowden & Jung-Beeman (2003a)  144 
 Sandkühler & Bhattacharya (2008) 138 
 Haarmann, George, Smaliy & Dien 
(2012)  124 
 Cranford & Moss (2010, 2012): 60 
triads  60 
Non 
neuroimaging Mednick (1962) original RAT  30 
 MacGregor and Cunningham (2008)   20 
 Jarosz, Coldflesh & Wiley (2012) 15 
 Creswell, Dutcher, Klein, Harris & 
Levine (2013) 30 
 Morris, Dontcheva, Finkelstein & 
Gerber (2013)     20 
 McCarthy, Malony & Morrison (2013) 44 
 Oppezzo & Schwartz (2014) 16 
 
Participant Feedback Questionnaire. A questionnaire was designed to gain 
qualitative feedback from participants about the pilot. They were asked a series of 
questions to assess: their understanding of the task; the usability of CRA task 
delivered via PsychoPy and a laptop; aspects of the task design (see Table A4 for 
list of questions). 
Procedure 
Participation in the study was on an individual basis conducted in a quiet, 
private location. On giving informed consent participants provided brief demographic 
information including their age, sex and language status. Language criteria were 
English as a first language [English]; early bilingual in English and another language 
(spoken before age of 7 years) [Bilingual]; late bilingual (English after age of 7 years) 
319 
 
[English additional language]. The age of seven was used by Cushen & Wiley (2011) 
in their study of the effects of bilingualism in insight, this was adopted in this pilot for 
consistency. The CRA task was verbally explained to the participant with the aid of 
written instructions. An example was also explored accompanied by its answer; the 
reason for it reviewed by the researcher to check that the participant understood the 
task. The participant was then asked to complete three practice trials on the laptop. 
The first of these was the example just given, to ensure that at least one practice trial 
resulted in the participant answering and trying out the full trial protocol. After 
attempting the further two practices the researcher again checked the participant's 
understanding and answered any questions they had. The participant then attempted 
to solve the 45 CRA trials, where they indicated that they had a solution, they were 
then prompted to type the answer and give a feeling of insight (either indicating that 
they solved it by insight or non-insight). On completion of the CRA task they were 
asked to complete the Participant Feedback Questionnaire and then de-briefed. 
Results and Discussion 
One participant from the bilingual sample appeared to have misunderstood 
the task: this was not noticed until examination of their data (some days after their 
participation). The participant answered all of the questions in a consistent yet 
incorrect way. This was despite reporting that they understood the instruction and 
not indicating otherwise in the feedback questionnaire. The data for this participant is 
not included in the results reported below. 
 
Language effects on performance in the CRA task 
By examining the performance of participants with different language status it 
can be seen that participants who spoke English from an early age, (English only 
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speakers or early Bilingual) performed better than those with English as an 
Additional Language (see Figure A1). However, as highlighted above, one 
participant who was an early bilingual gave answers that suggested that they 
misunderstood the task instructions. In addition, a suggested improvement for the 
study was given by one participant suggesting the use of "images with the word for 
people who have English as an additional language". As well as the task being more 
difficult, the proportion of trials reported as insight appears much smaller for the 
participants' with English as an additional language. In sum it highlights that there 
may be differences in solving the CRA which is a language based task for those 
working in their non-native language.  
 
  
Figure A1 Graph to show mean correct insight and non-insight trails for 
different Language speakers: English, Bilingual (English before 7 years old) 
and English as an additional language (English after 7 years old). 
 
Cushion and Wiley (2011) deliberately avoided language based tasks to 
control for basic language effects in their exploration of insight, selecting to use a 
Non-insight              Insight 
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series of spatial tasks, some demonstrated to elicit insight and other non-insightful 
analytic solving. But, as the within task elicitation of insight and non-insight solving 
seen in the CRA is central to the research rationale in Study 3 this is not an option. 
As the CRA is word based, and often uses colloquial phrases or compound words, it 
is unsurprising that participants with English as an additional language found the 
task harder. In addition, the original CRA and much of subsequent research has 
been conducted on U.S. colleague populations with a likely low proportion of non-
native English speakers. As such, this pilot suggests that to enable comparison with 
other studies; and to maximise the likelihood of accurate responding and elicitation 
of problem solving episodes, that participants should have English as their first 
language. 
Identification of the word triads to be used in Study 3 
One participant indicated that they solved all of the word trials by insight. Their 
data was therefore excluded from the following analysis. Eight participants' 
responses were analysed and the frequency recorded for correct responses, insight 
and non-insight ratings, incorrect and timed-out (and so did not attempt to answer) 
trials. Table A3 shows this triad-by-triad breakdown of performance.  
Study 3 required for trials that were challenging, but still meant that 
participants would be able to solve enough through both insight and search to 
measure related aspects such as heart rate. To reduce ceiling effects, the triads 
most often solved (by 75% or more of the pilot participants) were discounted (above 
solid line in Table A3). Likewise, triads which were too hard (solved by less than 
25%) of participants were also removed (below solid line in Table A3).  The 
remaining 26 triads were used for the CRA task in the main study. These can be 
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seen to provide insight solutions (n=76) and search solutions (n=25) across the 
triads.  
Table A3 Frequency counts of responses for each word triad. 
Word1 Word2 Word3      Answer Correct Insight 
  Non 
insight 
In-  
correct 
Time 
out 
cane daddy free sugar 7 5 2 0 1 
rocking wheel man chair 6 5 1 1 1 
house grass card green 6 3 3 1 1 
cry walker face baby 6 5 1 0 2 
flag north position pole 5 5 0 1 2 
night wrist stop watch 5 3 2 1 2 
fur hanger tail coat 5 4 1 2 1 
dust cereal toilet bowl 5 3 2 1 2 
sleeping pipe trash bag 5 2 3 0 3 
pad trap click mouse 5 3 2 0 3 
flake mobile fall snow 5 2 3 0 3 
high mate teacher school 4 4 0 0 4 
light birthday stick candle 4 3 1 1 3 
hard drift chopper wood 4 4 0 2 2 
river note account bank 4 4 0 0 4 
pain serial whale killer 4 4 0 0 4 
measure worm video tape 4 3 1 1 3 
polish finger head nail 4 3 1 2 2 
party towel ball beach 4 2 2 2 2 
bed throat point sore 4 4 0 1 3 
palm line house tree 3 2 1 2 3 
health taker child care 3 3 0 1 4 
tooth stroke hair brush 3 3 0 0 5 
safety cushion point pin 3 3 0 2 3 
equal stop anguage sign 3 2 1 1 4 
wise work alarm clock 3 2 1 1 4 
cottage knife cake cheese 3 2 1 3 2 
back clip wall paper 3 2 1 2 3 
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water mine shaker salt 3 2 1 1 4 
fog car shoe horn 3 2 1 1 4 
sandwich house golf club 2 2 0 3 3 
pine pie juice apple 2 2 0 1 5 
chamber mask natural gas 2 2 0 1 5 
boat limit high speed 2 1 1 1 5 
dream break light day 2 2 0 1 5 
dew moon bee honey 2 2 0 0 6 
gun puff room powder 2 1 1 3 3 
end line brain dead 2 2 0 1 5 
fish mine rush gold 2 2 0 0 6 
wheel hand shopping cart 1 1 0 3 4 
fire range tropical forest 1 0 1 3 4 
carpet alert cross red 1 1 0 2 5 
date alley fold blind 1 1 0 1 6 
right cat carbon copy 0 0 0 0 8 
wet law case suit 0 0 0 2 6 
Development of protocols for Study 3 
The final purpose of the pilot study was to determine whether the protocols 
developed for Study 3 worked and enabled the collection of data in controlled 
conditions. This first aspect was successful, with the collection of typed word 
responses, reaction time data (indicating solution point and key presses in typing the 
answers) and feeling of insight ratings. Qualitative feedback from participants was 
also collected to help identify improvements to methodology and to ensure that all of 
the instructions were clear and understandable (see Table A4). 
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Table A4 includes a summary of the participant qualitative comments in 
response to each of the questions. 
1. Please give any general feedback regarding your participation which you 
feel may be important for the researchers to be aware of? 
 
2. Please indicate any aspects of your participation where you were unclear 
on what was expected of you? How could this have been improved? 
3. Please comment on the puzzles that you were asked to solve. 
4. How easy was it to use the computer to indicate if you had solved a puzzle 
and then give your answer - what could be improved about this? 
5. On solving a puzzle, did you find that it was useful to have the insight/ non 
insight solving descriptions displayed each time you indicated how you 
solved it? Please detail if/ how you used this information. 
 
 From the feedback it can be seen that what was expected of participants 
was generally understood and instructions were clear. Participants suggested that 
being given definitions when making feeling of insight was generally helpful, although 
one highlighted that they were quite wordy. No major problems were highlighted other 
than in terms of the language status of participants discussed above. 
 In conclusion this pilot identified 26 CRA word triads to use in Study 3. It 
highlighted possible differences in performance of participants who speak English as 
an additional language, suggesting that for the word based, CRA task samples should 
be limited to native English speakers. Finally, it enabled research protocols to be 
tested, ensuring that the development of the CRA task on PsychoPy was fit for purpose 
and rendered appropriate data. 
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Appendix 3. 
Sample size calculations for Study 4 (CRA) and Study 5 (Connect 4). 
Effect sizes in previous comparable key studies 
Jausovec & Bakracevic (1995). Not enough information given in this paper 
to calculate effect size. 
Lackner et al. (2013). Lackner et al. (2013) reported effect sizes for their DV 
of HR change in relation to effects of time (ηp2 = .52) and picture type [insight/non-
insight] (ηp2 = .16). Cohen's (1988) benchmarks for partial eta square are: small 
.0099, medium .0588, large .1379 (Richardson, 2011). Therefore these effects can 
be interpreted as large effects. 
Pollatos, Herbert, Matthias and Schandry (2007). Pollatos et al. measured 
heart rate response to IAPS (International Affective Picture System) and 
interoceptivity (Heart Beat Counting task (HBC)). The authors report 2x2 ANOVA 
Picture content (positive/negative) versus HBC accuracy (high/low) with an effect 
size of (eta squared) 𝜂𝜂2  = 0.09 . This can be interpreted as a medium to large effect 
size (Cohen, 1988). 
Sample size calculation 
A priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power software to calculate 
the required sample size. Other assumptions were made according to 
recommendations by Cohen (1992), taking a significance criterion of 0.05 and power 
of 0.8.  
For repeated measures ANOVA on HR change: Based on the above, it was 
assumed that there would be a large effect size for Heart Rate. 
A conservative calculation was conducted using the G*Power function (see 
Table 1 and 2) for independent samples ANOVA this is following the advice of Miles 
(2013) who highlights that it is difficult to estimate the correlations between 
measures (as this is not reported in previous studies). As independent ANOVA has 
less power than repeated measures, he argues that using this as a conservative 
calculation would provide a solution to this problem. 
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Table 1. Summary of G*Power sample calculations for planned ANOVA 
analyses in Study 4 
Study 4 : CRA Numerator 
df 
groups Sample 
required 
Main effect: solving 
type 
1 22 53 
Main effect: time 10 22 113 
Interaction: solving x 
time 
10 22 113 
 
Table 1. Summary of G*Power sample calculations for planned ANOVA 
analyses in Study 5 
Study 5: Connect 4 Numerator 
df 
groups Sample 
required 
Main effect: solving type 1 44 58 
Main effect: valance 1 44 58 
Main effect: time 10 44 115 
Interaction: 2 way - HR 
x valance 
4 44 84 
Interaction: 2 way  - HR 
or valance x time 
10 44 115 
Interaction: 3 way - HR 
x Val x time 
20 44 151 
 
Correlations: HBC/ BEQ. Based on the above review of previous research 
calculations were conducted assuming a medium effect. G*power identifies that a 
sample of 64 would be necessary to detect a medium effect, with α = .05, power = 
.80 
Conclusion 
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Taking all of these into consideration, the sample required to detect the key 
aspects of interest would be up to 64, therefore it will be aimed to recruit 80 
participants to ensure that with missing data, artefacts etc. on the HR signal that 
there is a large enough sample. 
Some of the interactions do require larger samples, however, in light of these 
being less key, and in consideration of the conservative nature of the calculations 
(not taking into account the increased power of the repeated measures design) it 
was decided to aim for the lower sample size relating to the key comparisons. 
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